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1.0…Abstract: 
 
This dissertation seeks to make a unique contribution to the study of geopolitics and 
empire in Central Asia by focusing on both the indigenous developments of grand 
strategies and their legacies by examining several key points in history of the region’s 
geopolitics in order to determine the peculiar and specific nature of regional geopolitical 
evolution, and how its basic concepts can be understood using such a locally based 
framework. By putting the focus on several key concepts which hold steady through 
major societal and technological upheavals, as well as foreign incursion and both the 
inward and outward migrations, which together create the conditions which I have 
dubbed ‘The Formless Empire’, it is possible to see the elements of a regional and 
homegrown tradition of grand strategy and geopolitical thinking which is endemic to the 
area of Inner Eurasia, even as this concept adapts from a totality of political policy to 
merely frontier and military policy over the course of time.  
This indigenous concept of grand strategy encompasses political, military, and 
diplomatic aspects utilizing the key concepts of strategic mobility, and flexible or indirect 
governance. These political power systems originated in their largest incarnations 
amongst the nomadic people of the steppe and other people commonly considered 
peripheral in history, but who in a Central Asian context were the original centerpieces 
of regional politics until technological changes led to their eclipse by the big sedentary 
powers such as Russia and China. However, even these well-established states took 
elements of ‘The Formless Empire’ into their policies (if largely relegated to frontiers, the 
military, and a few informal relationships alone) and therefore the influence of the 
region’s past still lingers on in different forms in the present. 
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Introductory Chapter 
 
“If I determine the enemy's disposition of forces while I have no perceptible form, I can 
concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented. The pinnacle of military 
deployment approaches the formless: if it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot 
discern it nor the wise make plans against it.” 
 
~Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
1.1…Defining the Terminology 
 
The two relevant terms which need to be clarified in order for this project to put forth a 
logical and coherent argument as well as remain focused on a defined scope is both 
what is meant by the geographic phrase ‘Central Asia’ and its derivative versions as 
well as the specifics of the new ‘Formless Empire’ concept put forward here to 
understand that region’s historical and political context. Using historical case studies 
beginning in the third century B.C.E. and moving up through the present day offers an 
immense danger of overreach, meaning there are two limiting factors on the specific 
examples-one is geographic and the other is the conceptual relevance. On occasion a 
case study slightly or even noticeably outside the region of focus is utilized for 
illustrating such a purpose and likewise case studies which fall outside of the focus of 
the primary examples will be brought up as secondary cases to further illustrate 
preexisting points. 
  
 
1.2…Geographic Overview 
 
First, it is relevant to define exactly what we call the region ‘Central Asia’. The definition 
of what this constitutes has fluctuated with time. Originally a place set apart from littoral 
and coastal Eurasia due to the relative dominance in its economy and politics of both 
overland caravan trade and nomadic herding people-this is as good a place to start from 
rather than using the somewhat limiting yet commonly held contemporary definition of 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan alone. Indeed, while 
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the story of Central Asia has moved to increasingly marginalize the importance of the 
nomadic population in the past few centuries, a certain fluidity of movement and 
ambiguity of borders is endemic to the region-and so it is only logical that the 
geographic scope chosen for the examples fluctuates with the warp and weft of eras, 
political entities, and the apparent strategic thinking used in them. Therefore our 
concept of what constitutes Central Asia itself is held on the type of state which dwells 
there, rather than an absolute sense of clearly defined borders. 
It is, however, possible to show the rough region of delineation for the purpose of 
this study. The terms Central Asia, Inner Eurasia, and Central Eurasia can all apply to 
various examples and often multiple terms will be used to show both minor distinctions 
and to break up linguistic repetitiveness. ‘Central Asia’ is often employed to describe 
what historically is known as ‘Transoxiana’ and its surrounding steppes. ‘Inner Eurasia’ 
and the nearly identical ‘Central Eurasia’ are used in order to describe a somewhat 
more vast area including Transoxiana but extending further past the steppe to 
encompass much of the terrain of non-littoral Eurasia, this can include the Black Sea 
steppe in the west and the mixed steppe/forest land of Manchuria in the east.1 
This massive region-though often lowly populated in terms of density-known for 
its overland rather than oceanic trade-is the geographic setting to which we now must 
turn our attention. Geography and ecology is the first building block in a region from 
which the societies endemic to it grow, and so it is important to appraise this factor first. 
The most important elements of this geography is both its vast space as well as its 
diversity-both contained within a certain level of continuity connected by the flat, dry 
grasslands known as the steppe. For most of history the steppe was a poor place for 
agriculture to expand into, aside from the occasional fertile river valley, but still the grass 
could support numerous domesticated animals. This flat and edible (for pack animals) 
highway enabled herding-based nomadism to take hold-turning the apparently hostile 
and sparse landscape into a highway which connected the various mountainous, 
forested, and cultivated plains areas together through the common denominator of 
mobile groups of herding people who migrated and traded across the steppe. As the 
steppe flows west-east from the Ukraine to Western Manchuria and much more 
                                                          
1
 Stuart Legg. The Heartland (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970), pages 31-9 
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narrowly from the forest edge of southern Siberia to the mountains of the Caucasus and 
Afghanistan, as well as the deserts of Xinjiang and Turkmenistan, we have a common 
ecological denominator which can be taken to make a large and diverse area part of a 
unified geopolitical network. This and the regions adjacent to it are often integrated into 
this network through the policies and accidents of history, and share certain common 
attributes which make them a cohesive if somewhat nebulous whole in military and 
political history. Being on the interior of the world’s largest continent and having a 
seasonal-if often more cold than warm-dry climate coupled with intermediary location 
between what is traditional considered to be the major world civilizations create a 
unique context worth examining.2 3 
These circumstances naturally facilitate the decentralized ‘multicultural’ empire 
as the lynchpin of governance. The modern term ‘multicultural’ will stand in this 
dissertation as an approximate term which describes a society of relative openness to 
foreign influence with an ethnically and often religiously diverse population. Though far 
more typical and older than the nation-state and endemic to almost every part of the 
world-the study of empire often evokes negative emotional reactions in contemporary 
study. We can further delve into the importance of empire in the following chapter, but 
for now it is worth noting that, value judgments aside, empire is tied only with tribes and 
city-states for the top place position of historically common political entities. As Jane 
Burbank and Frederick Cooper state succinctly in their overview of the subject: 
“By comparison [with empire] the nation state appears as a blip on the historical 
horizon, a state form that emerged recently under imperial skies and whose hold 
on the world’s political imagination may well prove partial or transitory.”4 
 
Inside Inner Eurasia this predilection for empire was perhaps even greater than 
elsewhere overall. Wide varieties of peoples, economic structures, and geographic 
diversity came together to imply that only a highly mobile, decentralized, and often 
informal type of power structure could suffice for optimal geopolitical governance. Often 
it was the tribal element of the nomadic peoples which held the decisive strategic niche 
                                                          
2
 David Christian. A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Volume I: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the 
Mongol Empire (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), pages 5-6. 
3
Legg, 37-9. 
4
 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), page 3. 
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of mobility and space control to be the ruling elite and the predators that preyed upon 
the settled and littoral peoples around them. Other more settled people who emulated 
the military methods of the nomads often responded in kind as they too adapted into 
this system-though in time technological and economic changes would swing the force 
of dynamism in this realm to the more settled and littoral powers. Even so, such a 
change would have to adapt itself to the realities of governing in such a region and 
make even the new and often alien powers adapt accordingly just as much to the local 
circumstances. 
2,000 B.C.E. is the rough starting point of this geopolitical complex when the 
chariot was introduced to the region. Utilizing the endemic regional horses to great 
effect on the flat steppe plains was the first opening salvo in the evolution of the steppe-
empire.5 This was the first change that enabled the nomadic element of the population 
to become the decisive lynchpin in the system, however they did not hit their full integral 
stride until about a thousand years later with the adoption of horseback riding and the 
high endurance little steppe ponies which would become their staple. The first wave of 
nomads, such as the Huns and  Xiongnu, were the vanguard of this increased potency 
amongst the nomadic tribes and showed the societies peripheral to them the deadly 
combination of horse-borne mobility and lifestyle in conjunction with accurate arrow fire 
from the horn-and-sinew recurve bows which could be fired from full gallop.   
Another addition to their power came in another thousand years, with the 
invention of the stirrup. Now the hammer of the light ranged cavalry could have the 
complimentary anvil of heavy cavalry armed with a furious charge of lowered lances. 
The stirrup-enabling the rider to couch his lance in the charge-greatly increased the 
combat effectiveness of such units and further added to the power of the nomadic 
armies. With armies which rode entirely on horseback and lived in transportable tents 
called gers (Mongolian) and yurts (Turkic) such forces had many advantageous for 
achieving total strategic dominance out of proportion to their numbers over any place 
with sufficient grazing land for the livestock, and so the steppe was both highway and 
corridor for them. It would remain so until the 19th Century, when only railroads would 
                                                          
5
 Rhoads Murphy. “An Ecological History of Central Asian Nomadism”, Chapter 3 in Gary Seaman (Editor) Ecology 
and Empire: Nomads in the Cultural Evolution of the Old World (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 
1989), page 45. 
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enable the settled peripheral societies to surpass this mobility through technological 
innovation.6 
This nomadic system, whether it was employed by indigenous inhabitants of 
Inner Eurasia or by peripheral powers that had the time and perseverance to adapt, 
would have certain political aspects in its structure as well which would impact the 
subsequent phases of geopolitical change to varying extents. In his overview of Central 
Asian history where he resets the position of Central Asia from its usual relegation to 
the periphery back to the core of Eurasian history, Christopher Beckwith uses the term 
‘comitatus’ (originally coined by Tacitus to describe Germanic kinship bonds as well as 
the practice of rewarding soldiers with land by high ranking officers in the Roman 
Republic) to describe this method of governance. The nomadic ruling elite would sustain 
its power through personal charisma and gift-giving, ensuring a loyal retinue to the 
single ruler which could be relied upon to have large amount of delegation. To do this 
the leadership of various tribes and empires had to foster trade and tribute systems. 
Given the military flexibility and power of nomadic armies, this was imposable over large 
scales of space. However, the constant migration of other tribes often meant such 
arrangements were temporary and subject to usurpation by others. It was through such 
processes that a cyclic system of informal empire and economic integration was spread 
throughout the region. This is a comprehensive system, and in no way simply related to 
military affairs, but rather all of geopolitics.7 
The ultimate example of this system would be the first true Eurasia-spanning 
hegemonic power; the Mongol Empire. We will go into much more detail about that state 
and its critical importance to this study in Chapter 3, but for now it is relevant simply to 
use it as an example of the many aspects of the Formless Empire coming together on a 
truly massive scale. As Burbank and Cooper so adequately summarize it: 
 
“Although the Mongol Empires fragmented quickly, the unification of Eurasia left 
its imprint on later politics. The Mongols protection of religious institutions, their 
governing practices based on recognized difference, with no fixed center or core 
population; the cultivation of personalized loyalty as the sovereigns means of 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 46-8. 
7
 Christopher Beckwith. Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pages 11-23, 76. 
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control; the fluid politics of contingent alliance, pragmatic subordination, and 
treaty making- this repertoire remained in play long after Chinggis’ empire 
disintegrated.”8 
 
The general trend of governance in the region was a type of ‘tanistry’, or consensus 
building and getting results through a relatively egalitarian distribution of powers-even if 
from a single head of state. This was a flexible rule with no state church or settled 
doctrine-and it became the norm throughout the steppes-and was particularly strong 
when the nomadic influence was at its highest.9 
As will be examined further in the body of the text, the nature of the land and the 
preexisting political order begun with nomadism as its central point would have a long 
and lingering influence after the collapse of nomadic centrality. It was precisely these 
geopolitical indigenous conditions-and their long term (rather than era specific) nature, 
which brings us to examine the next critical concept of this study-that of the idea of ‘The 
Formless Empire’. 
 
1.3…The Concept of the Formless Empire 
 
It may seem strange that in a study which purports to examine the indigenous evolution 
of a Central Asian geopolitical strategy to begin by referencing as its primary theorist a 
Chinese thinker-but that is where the first example of relevant written strategic doctrine 
begins. There is no dedicated indigenous geopolitical thinker from Inner Eurasia during 
its formative years which has survived intact as a primary and recorded source-only 
historical examples which will make the bulk of this study’s argument. The closest two 
we have are Ibn Khaldun  and Sun Tzu-neither of whom were exactly imbedded inside 
this dissertation’s definition of Inner Eurasia. Nonetheless, the former wrote extensively 
about the region in his historical studies and even personally met one of the case 
studies mentioned later, and the latter was part of the governing establishment of a 
state in China-itself the nation most often at long-term odds with the various steppe 
peoples of Central Asia. The next chapter will go further into detail about Ibn Khladun 
and other famous thinkers on the region from across the eras, but it is critical to delve 
                                                          
8
 Burbank and Cooper, 115. 
9
 Richard N. Frye. “Central Asian Concepts of Rule on the Steppe and Sown” (in Seamann), pages 135-7. 
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into Sun Tzu, as understanding his works and the strategic doctrine he espoused is of 
critical importance to the comprehending the concept this dissertation uses when 
deploying the phrase ‘formless’. 
Sun Tzu is not an absolutely verifiable figure of history. His identity is as formless 
as the geostrategic philosophy he advocated. It is possible that he is in fact an 
apocryphal figure meant to represent the amalgamation of strategic thinking coming 
from multiple individuals during The Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.E.) in Chinese 
history and put together in order to summarize the lessons of that two century period of 
warfare built on harsh and painful experience.10 
For convenience sake, if nothing else, we will treat Sun Tzu as an individual, 
however. After all, there is at least some biographical information for this nebulous 
figure. Reputed to be a strategist in the service of the state of Wu, Sun Tzu’s military 
abilities were renowned enough that the King of Wu challenged him to instill martial 
discipline into the courtly ladies of his palace-a task which Sun Tzu was able to 
accomplish to the satisfaction of the king. This enabled him to become the chief general 
of the kingdom and over the course of several campaigns raise the status and power of 
Wu over its immediate rivals. Somewhere amongst this busy life, Sun Tzu wrote his 
famous work of strategic thinking.11 
Despite the declared martial concentration implicit in the name, The Art of War’s 
primary concern is the same as statecraft itself: the ultimate survival of the state. 
Indeed, it sees warfare, diplomacy, and overall state welfare as holistically integrated, 
an attitude which it can be noted was used by the Mongols as well who (knowingly or 
not) used many of the tactics in Sun Tzu’s work.12 The strategic principles encapsulated 
in the Art of War are based around the ideas of deceptions, speed, mobility, flexibility, 
and indirectness. Mark McNeilly classifies them into six points based on the major sub-
headings of the text: 
1. Win without fighting. 
2. Avoid strength, attack weakness. 
3. Deception and foreknowledge. 
                                                          
10
 Victor H. Mair. The Art of War: Sun Zi’s Military Methods (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 27. 
11
 Ibid., 12-3. 
12
 Mark McNeilly. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), page 5-6. 
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4. Speed and Movement 
5. Shaping the Enemy 
6. Character based leadership.13 
Winning without fighting is the declaration that having to resort to warfare is always a 
loss; even for the eventually victorious party-so the first strategy should be to force a foe 
to acquiesce without having to engage them in battle. “The general rule for use of the 
military is that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it.”14 On obvious parallel 
to the common tactic of Eurasian empires to leave defeated foes alive as vassals rather 
than outright annex them can be made here. Following that, if force must be resorted to, 
aim for the weak points of the enemy, of which one can be made aware of through 
espionage and good intelligence services. To achieve this crippling of the enemy 
through striking their weak points, speed of action is the ultimate virtue, which in turn will 
mold the enemy into a vulnerable position. Sun Tzu makes explicit the point that while 
military operations can be clumsy and swift-they are never skillful and slow or long-
lasting as “victory, not persistence, is most important in battle.”15 Finally, tying all of 
these principles together and greatly facilitating their execution is the leadership 
qualities of the field commander and his officers. In a striking parallel to Beckwith’s 
observation of the bonds of personal loyalty fostered in Inner Eurasian politics Sun Tzu 
remarks that the way for a commander to win the loyalty of his men is to instill fair 
discipline and share their dangers.16 
In direct contrast to this view is the Clausewitzian theory which goes through 
periods of varying popularity in Western Europe and North America. Its emphasis on 
decisive battles, direct engagement, and annihilation of the foe as primary objective 
shows an alternative geopolitical view of military operations.17 Rather than reveling in 
simply a decisive blow which is still within the context of an attrition-based warfare 
paradigm, Sun Tzu’s treatise is really if anything a treatise against the very principle of 
attrition based warfare having any validity whatsoever. Deception, speed, adaptability, 
and maneuver are all attempts to avoid direct confrontation and still achieve results, and 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 68. 
14
 Sun Tzu. The Art of War (Translated by Thomas Cleary, Boston: Shambhala, 1988), page  66. 
15
 Ibid., 58. 
16
 Ibid., 43. 
17
 McNeilly, 38. 
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when and if confrontation, due to error or circumstance, becomes inevitable it becomes 
about overcoming the opposition in such a way as to keep one’s own forces as intact as 
possible.18 As Sun Tzu says: 
 
“A skilled attack is one against which opponents do not know how to defend; a 
skilled defense is one where opponents do not know how to attack. Therefore, 
those skilled in defense are not so because of fortress walls. This is why high 
walls and deep moats do not guarantee security, while strong armor and effective 
weapons do not guarantee strength. If opponents want to hold firm, attack where 
they are unprepared; if opponents want to establish a battlefront, appear where 
they do not expect you.”19 
 
Now that we have established the general tenor of Sun Tzu’s concept of formlessness, 
it becomes important to look at the Inner Eurasian context for something similar enough 
to borrow the term for. Indeed, the term formlessness in this dissertation is to be the 
term of choice for the case studies examined precisely because there is obvious 
strategic overlap with the doctrines of Sun Tzu. Rather than blatantly run with Sun Tzu 
was our theorist however, this work will instead apply the term ‘formless’ to mean the 
mobile, flexible, and indirect nature of Inner Eurasian geopolitical evolution itself in its 
own context. 
 
1.4…Inner Eurasia: The Confluence of Formlessness and Geopolitics 
 
Being now armed with knowledge of the geographic circumstances and the related 
methods of foreign policy governance which they helped engender, a brief overview of 
the nature of the case studies which form the bulk of this text are in order. 
The next chapter will be the Literature Review and Methodology, which will look 
at how other thinkers and historians have viewed the region in question and pertinent 
geopolitics in general and show why the particular ground we are covering is unique to 
the study of historical international relations. Following upon that is Chapter Three, 
where we examine the rise and dominance of the first truly formless nomadic 
geopolitical system in Inner Eurasia and follow it forwards from its regional beginnings 
                                                          
18
 Mair, 53-4. 
19
 Sun Tzu, 9. 
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to near total Eurasian dominance and westward expansion. Chapter Four will examine 
the mixed nomadic/settled system which grew out of technological changes and the 
merger of nomadic and settled peoples in certain regions, including ones somewhat out 
of the typical geographical scope of the study such as The Mughal Empire, who offer up 
an example of The Formless Empire leaving itself an adapt to the littoral-and show a 
precursor of what was to come to Inner Eurasia soon after. The fifth chapter will show 
the apparent unraveling of this system due to expansionistic pressures from outside-
namely Russia and China-who at that point become the dominant actors in our narrative 
as we move into the 18th and 19th Centuries-but we will not simply examine their 
undoing of the nomadic consensus-but rather focus on the things they adopted from the 
people they fought and conquered-becoming a bit more like the nomads in the process. 
This will also show the evolution of The Formless Empire from a total political, social, 
economic, and geopolitical concept into increasingly merely a military and tactical one. 
Chapter Six will be the point of lowest ebb of nomadic power, where even littoral states 
like Britain and Japan enter the fray and large modern-style entities appear to extinguish 
the indigenous system which once reigned supreme-but even here the echoes of that 
old system find new rebirth in military strategies and frontier politics amidst one of the 
forgotten fronts of the Russian Revolution and World War II. Chapter Seven then shows 
the apparent dominance of such conventional states, changed as they might be, but 
how ultimately brief that domination was before the Sino-Soviet Split and the end of the 
Cold War restored flexibility and indirect power relationships to large parts of the region, 
at least in informal power relations. Finally, we end out case studies in our 
contemporary times, looking at something more akin to a return to a more effective 
tradition through an updated model of the Formless Empire-one which takes into 
account that the present day reality of much of the world, not just the region we are 
studying, offers potential for Inner Eurasian geopolitical heritage to thrive again, even if 
acknowledging this time that it shares much more similarities to the rest of the world 
than it once did. 
This is not to argue that a total return to the past is now upon us, but rather that a 
certain set of trends which ring through all eras of the history of geopolitical Inner 
Eurasia are always present in some form, to varying degrees of potency. In effect, this 
14 
 
dissertation will be using historical examples to chart the evolution, rather than the 
destruction or obliteration, of The Formless Empire. How it, just like the geopolitical 
strategy it advocates, is constantly adapting to new technological and societal changes 
in order to stay relevant to the land of which it is endemic-and yet throughout it all it 
retains many of its key characteristics.  Like evolution it is neither progressive nor 
regressive, but simply responses to changing circumstance-a blind system of adaptation 
for survival which suits a particular ecological niche. One might argue that any region of 
the world does exactly the same thing-and probably be correct, but the Eurasian steppe 
and its neighborhood is a region of particularly high levels of migration, mobility, and flux 
and thus makes the best starting point for examining the principles of geopolitical 
formlessness in theory as it relates to geopolitics and strategy. Overall, we will see the 
relevance, both historically and theoretically, of the unique geopolitical model which 
arose via indigenous roots in the very heart of the world’s largest continent. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review & Theoretical Methodology 
"Realism is the only way of thinking about issues about tyranny and freedom, or war 
and peace that can truly claim not to be based on faith-and despite its reputation for 
immorality-the only one which is ethically serious. It requires a discipline of thought that 
may be too austere for a culture which prizes psychological comfort above everything 
else-and it is reasonable to question whether liberal societies are capable of the moral 
effort that is involved in setting aside hopes for world transformation. Cultures that have 
not been shaped by Christianity and its secular surrogates have always harbored a 
tradition of realist thought, which is likely to be as strong in the future as it was in the 
past." 
 
~John Gray 
 
2.0…Summation 
 
Empire in Central Asia seems an almost trite and overdone subject, but a quick review 
of both theory and historical coverage exposes a lack of overlap between the study of 
International Relations and history vis-à-vis the grand narrative of Central Asian history 
past through present, specifically in regards to the assumption of “The Great Game” as 
wholly representative of the normal geopolitics in Inner Eurasian history, when instead 
the role of indigenous actors can be taken to be the real starting point for any search 
survey. There is also a failure to take into account other eras and the continuous 
process of state and interstate evolution that has been occurring consistently. One 
could say that while many disciplines, theories, and historical overviews have been 
completed there has yet to be a comprehensive tying together of source material 
showing the grand picture of the evolution of a uniquely indigenous type of policy 
making in Inner Eurasia which connects the policies of early nomadic peoples through 
more modern state formation and continuing on, in one way or the other, through the 
present day. Presented below is the state of relevant literature and its inadequacy for 
addressing the greater and continuous trends in Inner Eurasian grand strategy. 
 
2.1…The Theoretical Texts 
This dissertation’s main project is essentially to use historical examples to make a case 
for a new theoretical way to help explain the unique geopolitical evolution and 
circumstances of Inner Eurasia. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, this can be 
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done by appropriating Sun Tzu’s concept of ‘formlessness’ as a geopolitical one. Sun 
Tzu’s very concept of formlessness, though relayed in a specifically military manner, it is 
just as useful a geopolitical concept as one of tactical leadership in the field. In The Art 
of War Sun Tzu constantly reminds the reader that it is by being decentralized, mobile, 
and obscure that one can act where they want and retreat at will. This concept, albeit 
slightly outside of the Inner Eurasian culture complex, is abundantly useful when 
exploring the evolution of the grand strategies of the powers involved there, foreign and 
domestic and will be adapted as terminology to explain a separate, but related, rise of 
uniquely Eurasian system. What now becomes necessary is to look at other geopolitical 
thinkers who are relevant to the region, and anything we might be able to harvest from 
them in our exploration of formlessness as a geopolitical concept. 
 Halford Mackinder’s Eurasian Heartland Thesis as expressed in several articles, 
of which the seminal The Geographic Pivot of History is of course the most famous 
grand geopolitical study of the region this dissertation covers, in Europe and America at 
least. Despite being concerned primarily with the issues at stake in the time Mackinder 
saw as contemporary, it offers great insight into how the low population density and vast 
inland spaces combine to make mobility the key element of study in the region. He in 
turn provides the motivation and reasoning for such a form of domination and the 
purpose of achieving it in the specific context of Inner Eurasia.20 Though it is the 
purpose of this dissertation to study the indigenous evolution of geopolitics in what 
Mackinder christened ‘The Heartland’, and therefore set up a type of counter-narrative 
to the typical Eurocentric need to understand all part of the world with exported 
European theories, it is also worth noting that the indigenous developments studied do 
not run particularly contrary to Mackinder’s observations. Mackinder obviously had an 
understanding of many of the dynamics of the regional history in his observations, 
particularly in regards to Russia and its geographic heritage.21 Most importantly, after 
charting the fall of this great inland steppe-highway in prominence compared to the 
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maritime system of Western Europe, he postulates that industrialization (particularly 
railroads) have the potential to return this importance to the region in the future.22 
 In the chapter “In Defense of the Heartland-Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics 
and Hundred Years On”, Colin S. Gray makes the very topical point of Mackinder’s 
continuing relevance for comparison to how contemporary scholars treat issues such as 
geopolitics: 
“Just as history inherently is strategic, so also must it be geopolitical. The former 
quality speaks to the persistence of the threat or use of force , while the latter, 
the focus here, affirms that ‘real international relations occur in geographic 
space,’ and spatial relationships matter greatly…Modern scholarship on 
International Relations has been well populated with theories which betray an all 
but complete indifference to geography in its political and strategic dimensions.”23 
 
Seeing as the largest scale conflicts in both warfare and diplomacy during the Twentieth 
Century (the time, arguably, of lowest geopolitical relevance for Central Asia) have been 
attempts to either impose of thwart Eurasian hegemony through either military of 
diplomatic means24, this is clearly a subject of significant relevance. Looking at the 
historical and indigenous evolution of this concept as well as its potential paths for the 
future is of vital importance, and human- geography interaction remains a key element 
in this study. 
Though geostrategic policy making was not the focus of his intellectual 
endeavors, another scholar from even further afield in time-if somewhat closer in 
location-worth looking at is Ibn Khaldun. A fourteenth century historian, traveler, and 
political theorist from Morocco who spent much time in the Middle East, Khaldun was 
partly inspired by the history of both the Arab conquests as well as the successions of 
Turkic migrations which washed over the various regions he called home. He even lived 
through one, being in Syria during the Timurid invasion and getting to meet the 
conquering Emir Timur in person during the siege of Damascus and to engage in 
discussion with him. Interestingly, despite Timur’s fearsome reputation in official history, 
Khaldun saw him as a masterful prince and heaped praise upon him. We will cover 
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more of Timur’s somewhat misunderstood career later in Chapter Four.  Khaldun is 
therefore a direct witness to some of the very events used as case studies in this 
dissertation, and this shows in his largely secular and state based analysis of the world 
he observed. Like Central Asian states he adopted a cyclical view of rise and fall and 
government for social control rather than religious reasons-as was the common 
explanation in the Arab world at the time.25 
 In The Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun postulates a theory of history encompassing 
where civilizations arise, and the impact of science on policy, and geography on such 
things as agriculture. But his main focus is the interaction of nomadic and sedentary 
people-and his general preference for the virtues of the nomadic people-at least as 
leaders for the state. 
“Sedentary people are much concerned with all kinds of pleasures. They are 
accustomed to luxury and success in worldly occupations and to indulgence in 
worldly desires. Therefore, their souls are colored with all kinds of blame-worthy 
and evil qualities.”26 
 
Nomadic peoples, according to Khaldun, have greater solidarity, or ‘assibiya’, which 
enables them to more effectively utilize leadership, armies, and build larger and better 
nations. Naturally, however, as they conquer more and more civilized and sedentary 
people they lose this inherent nomadic virtue and adopt more of the customs of the 
conquered.27 Without commenting on the subjective values of this process, we will still 
see something quite similar to this being repeated in cycles through the pageant of 
Inner Eurasian history. 
 Khaldun was concerned with creating a safe yet dynamic space for science and 
trade to progress while embedded within the non-progressive and often cyclic system of 
international politics. The reason he felt that nomadic people would be both more 
effective at setting up these temporary periods which would allow domestic society to 
advance is stated in explicit terms: 
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“These savage peoples, furthermore, have no homelands that they might use as 
a fertile pasture, and no fixed place to which they might repair. All regions and 
places are the same to them. Therefore, they do not restrict themselves to 
possession of their own neighboring regions. They do not stop at the borders of 
their horizon. They swarm across distant zones and achieve superiority over 
faraway nations.”28 
 
This type of pan-regional connectivity makes larger and more powerful states, and for a 
few generations at least (Khaldun estimated an average of four such generations) and 
in the initial periods when the nomadic ruling elite can harness the wealth of the settled 
nations but before it is corrupted by said wealth the greatest combination of civic and 
scientific virtue can be made.29 
 Ibn Khaldun cannot take such a central place in this study as Sun Tzu, because 
he focuses less on the strategic element and rather more the setting and the civics of 
what he studies, but his observations mesh perfectly with looking at the nomadic system 
from a geopolitical perspective-as well as supporting the idea that good politics can 
create periods of scientific progress while not necessarily meaning that any progress 
exists in the political systems which come and go. Of course, Khaldun had no way of 
knowing that one day the technological progress of the settled world would reset the 
balance of power against the once militarily dominant nomadic peoples-a phenomenon 
later chapters of this dissertation will explore further. But even with this inversion of 
geopolitical power in the realms of the following case studies, Khaldun’s overall idea of 
the ruling clique having a broader and more flexible understanding would often hold 
true. 
 Another large text worth mentioning, more for its possible unexpected lack of use 
rather than frequent consultation, are the strategic theories of Sir Basil Henry Liddel 
Hart. Having written an entire treatise on indirect strategy and having for decades 
before been championing the value of modern strategists studying the campaigns of the 
Mongol Empire, one might be tempted to assume Liddel Hart’s Strategy would be a 
must for inclusion in this study. The problem is, Liddel Hart seems to have read and 
become enamored with Sun Tzu but not actually learned many of the fundamental 
lessons that are taught in the Art of War. He correctly deduces that mobility and 
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unpredictability are the prize virtues of strategy in this method of thought, but applies 
them to be rigidly predictable and advocates always operating in the indirect. 30 What 
Sun Tzu actually advocated was to always outsmart and outmaneuver your enemy by 
being formless, this often means indirect action, but sometimes means very direct 
action. Certainly, the case studies we will examine will have examples of steppe-space 
interaction of many geostrategic varieties. Examples in Strategy of a direct battle 
method working are ignored or unconvincingly explained away, most egregiously with 
the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War.31  
 Though neither primarily about history or international relations, though 
frequently citing of both, the contemporary philosopher John Gray is worth at least 
mentioning for making a solid case for the disparaging of progressive ideologies in 
politics. Just as the Soviet Union failed to install anything but the most temporary and 
superficial unifying order working for a modernistic sense of progress on the region, so 
too is it worth at least implicitly implying that other progressive political projects-usually 
from western Europe or North America- are unlikely to be any more successful if applied 
to the region. 
 A large percentage of case studies in this dissertation are from polytheistic, 
shamanistic, or just generally non-Abrahamic cultures. At no point is this study 
interested in dealing with comparative religion, but it is worth noting that most world 
views lack messianic aspects and a progressive ideal to import onto politics. Christianity 
and Islam are uniquely idealistic and most modernistic political projects are directly 
descended from them either by reaction or adaptation.32 Even though much of the 
region studied here would eventually convert to Islam, the values of a more 
heterogeneous order would never really leave the region, and this further feeds into 
understanding Inner Eurasia (and I would argue, humanity as a whole)  in a politically 
cyclic fashion.  An Abrahamic culture might be far less likely to either produce either a 
Sun Tzu or be the originator of the very first Formless Empire. 
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2.2…Secondary Sources 
Despite wishing to overturn its primacy as the most relevant historical era, it is important 
to examine the nature of the present day understanding of the Great Game, and how it-
and its subsequent modern/Soviet period-is an aberration in the historical experience of 
the region of Inner Eurasia which even so are not removed from the indigenous topic of 
study presented here. 
Seemingly most pertinent to this study is Nomads, Empires, States: Modes of 
Foreign Relation and Political Economy by Kees van der Pijl. Pijl correctly re-asserts the 
vital role of understanding tribalism in all human relations as well as environmental 
context. He even mentions such overlaps with this dissertation such as Tang Dynasty 
foreign policy towards its inland frontier, the ‘Pax Mongolica’ and Russia and China as 
societies influenced by their dealings with nomadic people. He goes on, in fact, to say 
that modern capitalism and its opponents behave as nomadic and non-settled actors of 
the past once did on the global scale, thus arguing for continuity.33 
It is fantastic that such a works exists within the IR canon. However, dealing with 
an entirely Marxist viewpoint-while not at all a handicap for the economic issues of the 
region-still leaves the implicit realist underpinnings of regime survival and above all the 
geostrategy in military affairs lingering on the sidelines. Since the purpose of this 
dissertation is more political than economic, it is important to add to the study of the 
region a non-Marxist perspective of many of the same themes. Also, as previously 
mentioned, this dissertation seeks to avoid progressive views of political history and 
Marxism is nothing if not implicitly progressive in its assumption about politics and 
international affairs. What we will be looking it as far more akin to natural selection, 
where change is not progressive but merely adaptive and reactive, and the purposes of 
the adaptations remains constant through the various alterations.34 
  In The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia Lutz Kleveman makes 
the comparison of Central Asian power struggles today and how they mirror the 
Victorian Great Game, though as he gets into the present day policies and how 
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financial, corporate, and indirect they are35 it becomes harder and harder to square this 
comparison with an era of massive armies and direct territorial expansion. Karl Meyer 
makes a similar omission in The Dust of Empire: The Race for Supremacy in the Asian 
Heartland by noting that the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union seems to show a 
break from the past.36 Of course it was a break from the past of the Great Game, but he 
fails to note the relevance of older eras where such a rapid and total collapse into 
smaller units might not be so out of place.  
The most thorough survey of contemporary Central Asia, Inside Central Asia by 
Dilip Hiro, is very detailed in noting all the methods that Russia uses to remain a great 
power in the region, and the methods used by China, India, and the United States use 
to expand their influence as well. This matches quite well with the general historical 
experience of the region.37 However there is no discussion of the overlaps these kinds 
of policies have with the traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic power structures of pre 
modern states and empires in the region, or the evolution of strategies in the regions 
and countries involved. Work about the Great Game itself, such as Peter Hopkirk’s The 
Great Game38, or Shareen Blair Brysac and Karl Meyer’s Tournament of Shadows39 
focuses purely on the Victorian era and a little around it. One of the things about the era 
that seems to most intrigue scholars who focus on it is the bipolarity and the lack of 
large powerful states between India and the core of Russia. This is nothing if not further 
proof of the Great Game’s unsustainability as a typical era in Central Asia, or a worthy 
comparison to contemporary foreign policy in the region. It certainly has its place, but so 
does many other eras which need to be examined to understand the full picture. 
 How Inner Eurasia has been covered so far in both the literature of International 
Relations and History has been either as a realm that produces bands of predatory 
conquerors and extorters (the colorfully named “vagina of peoples” by Renee 
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Groussard)40, or as the passive and un-empowered victim trapped between the 
rapacious empires of Britain, China, and Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries.41 A broad 
study of the history of Central Asia as its own world unit, and the various forms of 
indirect imperialism that often spring up in the region, therefore needs to take into 
account both sedentary and nomadic predatory nations. Although these may appear as 
two different specimens, their policies influenced each other immensely, and much of 
the later imperial expansion which came from countries like Russia and China was 
heavily rooted in their own unique experiences with nomadic conquerors.  It is on this 
topic of the continuity of policy from nomad to settled state that the existing literature is 
sadly lacking. This is a critically important element in order to study continuity of policy 
through the ages, and therefore it will be one of the important tasks of this project to 
seek out the commonalities of policy between the various certain empires that inhabit 
the Eurasian heartland. 
 Historical sources are the bedrock of tracing continuity of Eurasian empires, and 
thus they make up a large bulk of the necessary reference material. The seminal and 
previous mentioned Empire of the Steppes by Rene Grousset, covers the basic history 
of the nomadic peoples but for further detail of types of political structures, military 
strategy, and rule there is a rich plethora of historical overviews.  For instance, S.A.M. 
Adshead’s Central Asia in World History views the pre-modern empires of the region 
with a particular eye towards their grand strategy. The Timurid Empire in particular is 
singled out for its geopolitical goals of dominating Central Asia at just the right key 
geographic points to bring stability to the settled subjects, redirect the trade routes 
through their territories, and to provide a nebulous frontier that enabled its warriors and 
nomadic aristocracy to keep occupied through pillaging nearby states.42  Also looking at 
this era is the compilation study Rulers From the Steppe: State Formation on the 
Eurasian Periphery, edited by Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks.43 The numerous essays 
contained in this work detail such things as the political and strategic objectives of the 
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Mongols, Mongol policies towards integrating the economy of the whole of Eurasia to 
serve their needs and submit towards their regulation, the frequency of bipolar, 
multipolar, and unipolar systems in Central Asia and the cyclic patterns which then tend 
to emerge in response to each other.  They even mention in context the hybrid 
dynasties in China (such as the Tang) where the first Emperor was half-Turkish and 
was often called “The Chinese Khaghan.44”   
Further building on the interconnectivity of China to both the history and the 
contemporary reality of Central Asian issues is Eastern Turkistan to the Twelfth Century 
by William Samolin. Ostensibly a history of the region of Turkestan (modern day 
Xinjiang), it naturally deals with numerous interactions between whoever the inhabitants 
of the area are at a given time and the various Chinese empires that straddled its 
border. This book contains numerous primary sources (translated) in addition to its 
mostly secondary source material, including a direct summation of foreign policy 
objectives from the Han Dynasty.45 
The strategic overlaps of this example should be obviously compared with 
contemporary Chinese policies in Xinjiang, and yet so far there has been little effort to 
show just how traditional modern Chinese geopolitics is.  Other interesting anecdotes 
from this book include a translation of an Orkhon inscription from the Goktürk Empire 
which admonishes Turkic people of Chinese perfidy and how they seek to use soft 
power, to put in modern terms, to convert Turkic people into malleable neighbors.46 In 
the collision of settled and nomad, and indirect empires, sources like these are 
absolutely essential to charting continuity with the present. Continuing on in further eras, 
The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6, which focuses on foreign and border 
polities shows the evolution of Inner Eurasian peoples in contact with China and vice 
versa. Most striking of these examples are the Khitan and Manchus who both did their 
part to blur the lines between traditional Chinese policy making and the normal political 
procedures of the more nomadic peoples.47 This is a most welcome survey to show the 
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interconnectivity of China with Inner Eurasia in traditional geopolitical planning, as well 
as the fears of a compromised and porous frontier in the foreign policy establishment. 
The counter to that concern is of course the more aggressive policies of some 
youthful and more militaristically vigorous dynasties. In particular interest in bridging the 
gap between distant past and present is the final Imperial dynasty, the Qing. The Qing 
was the dynasty founded by the Manchus, descended from the Jurchen people who had 
displaced the Khitans in the 12th Century and whose brief northern regime was ended 
by the Mongol expansion. The Manchurians placed a highly centralized and 
bureaucratic regime upon the Chinese, as was the custom of native Chinese rules-but 
towards the Mongols and the western realms they tried their hand at confederated co-
options, and if that failed, overt military despotism. A particularly detailed overview of 
this historical process of Manchurian state formation and its connections to the present 
day borders and policies of the contemporary People’s Republic is found in Peter C. 
Perdue’s China Marches West. This archival-researched tome of Sino-Manchu 
conquest shows how the old pre-modern border policies of the Han and Tang dynasties 
evolved under foreign dominion and forged a link with the contemporary foreign policy 
establishment.48 
Popular a topic as modern Chinese policy seems to be, and expansive as the 
historic study of its massive and epic history is, there is not yet a sustained effort to link 
the two from the perspective of International Relations.  This is a loophole this study will 
seek to rectify. It is always important to remember that long-lived nations such as China 
have experienced the past few centuries as an aberration-and as the playing field levels 
for them older methods of policy making from when they were hegemonic powers can 
become more relevant, rather than less. 
 China is only half the equation of still-surviving settled states with significant 
experience as both the victims of Eurasian empires and as their perpetrators.  Russia is 
very important to in the historical context, especially as their experience under the 
policies of what was called by Europeans of the time and contemporary historians “The 
Golden Horde” (actually the Kipchak Khanate, or at the time of its founding Ulus of 
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Jochi) which personifies the nature of indirect empire for the purpose of this study. This 
parallels contemporary Russian foreign policy today to a certain extent. In Russia and 
the Mongol Yoke: The History of Russian Principalities and the Golden Horde by Leo de 
Hartog the system of wealth extraction and indirect management the Mongols used on 
the various divided Russian states are thoroughly detailed. The formless and indirect 
rule of the Mongols was preferable to many Russians, most notably the Novgorod 
Republic, than extremely invasive western help would have been. An obvious parallel to 
modern states in Central Asia relying on Russia or China rather than the US or the EU, 
and their various liberalist demands, could be made here.  In addition, Hartog illustrates 
clearly both the economic systems set up under this imperial system as well as the 
great power politics that necessitated mutual dependency, specifically the rise of states 
like The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the intrusion of The Knights Templar and 
eventually the coming of Timurid forces.49 
Charles J. Halperin further elaborates on the structure of nomadic rule upon 
Russian development, specifically the development of Muscovy, which would of course 
eventually become the modern Russian state. From carrying over a trans-frontier postal 
service to toleration of minorities or maintaining influence over vast stretches of alien 
territory using a combination of indirect methods, the impact of the Mongols on Russian 
strategic thinking it well documented in Russia and the Golden Horde.50 Another gap by 
many regional specialists of Inner Eurasia that remains relatively unexplored is Russia’s 
inherent connection with the greater Inner Eurasia. From pre-Mongol times through to 
the modern Siberian oil boom the idea of Russian connection with the more Central 
Asian system is underexplored in the west. The modern Eurasianist thinkers in Russia 
itself are of course a growing exception. Thinkers like Alexander Dugin may represent 
an ideologically extreme wing, but they have a valid overall thesis of Russia’s 
integration with its southern and eastern frontiers as vital and overlooked.  Eurasianism 
as a form of soft power, or grand strategy, is discussed by Marlene Laruelle in her book 
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Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire51 as well as Graham Smith’s The Masks of 
Proteus.52 Some western scholarship has also began to explore the interconnectedness 
with Russia and Central Asia by looking at the deep historic ties between Russian 
history and the Turko-Mongolian world, although it is divorced from an International 
Relations perspective, David Christian’s A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia 
does a great job putting these events that should have never been divorced in 
scholarship back together again.53 A Combination with the basic ideas of Eurasianist 
geopolitics could bridge the gap in both of these views and exploit a previously 
untapped niche to show the continuous evolution of Russian foreign policy side by side 
with its more eastern contemporaries. Unfortunately the extreme and often neofascist 
and totalitarian implications in modern Eurasianist thought belie such hopes as they run 
quite contrary to the actual examples of governance in the various cases of the 
Formless Empire in history. 
 In addition to Russia and China and their various interactions with the steppe and 
the heartland of Eurasia there are other useful examples that are a bit more removed or 
at least less easy to categorize. Most notable and interesting of these is that of the 
Khitan people, who by their very history seem to be a perfect test case for just how 
flexible an ‘onshore balancing’ indirect Eurasian empire can be.  In The Empire of the 
Qara Khitai in Eurasian History Michal Biran charts the convoluted and intriguing tale of 
a people who had two different empires, and three different cultural worlds that they 
moved between.  Starting as a nomad force on the very periphery of anyone’s system, 
the Khitans conquered Manchuria, Mongolia and parts of northern China to set up the 
Liao Dynasty. This was part of a tri-polar system however, and eventually the native 
Chinese Song Dynasty allied with the Jurchen people to drive them out. The Liao may 
have fallen, but the Khitans survived. Falling back on their nomadic roots they took to 
the west, founding a new empire, the Qara-Khitan Khanate, in what is today 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Xinjiang and extending at its height into modern 
day Uzbekistan.  This second chance empire would last a century before being 
overtaken by the Mongols and rely on very indirect methods and balance of power 
politics to survive in the cutthroat multi-polar world that was pre-Mongol Central Asia.  
Added difficulties for them occurred in a subject population that was predominantly 
Muslim and Turkic under a ruling class of Sinified Shamanistic Khitans.54  
This quite fascinating but almost unheard of tale of the rise and fall of a truly 
formless empire shows both the full potential and execution of the types of grand 
strategy and policy making that this dissertation seeks to examine. Many of the Khitan 
people would go on to serve as administrators in the aristocracy of the Mongol Empire, 
which connects them and their policies directly to the evolution of grand strategy to all of 
Inner Eurasia, as it was the Mongol Empire which was the one time in history where that 
whole territory was unified under the hegemony of one specific power. 
 Between these medieval examples and more modern settings lies a crucial 
bridge where the formless empire went from being an expedient set of policies enacted 
by nomadic-influenced governments to a centralized and modern state contract. This 
was what was often referred to in the Middle East and Central Asia as the “Gunpowder 
Era”55 and saw a great increase in the amount of settled or semi-nomadic conquerors 
which blurred the lines between the previous lifestyle distinction of farmer and 
herdsman. Nomadism may have been decreasing as the critical element of 
formlessness, but the policies themselves continued on and evolved to suit 
technological and demographic changes. In quick succession came numerous state 
builders who blurred the lines between the old pure nomads and the settled state 
bureaucracies of what was then the future. Emir Timur redirected wealth through raiding 
and trade routes through conquest to return to Transoxiana, giving new life to a 
declining route. This was while attempting to bring prosperity to his settled subjects and 
a militaristic outlet for his tribal army.56  
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His descendent Prince Babur would be forced to flee the collapse of the Timurid 
Empire and start anew elsewhere. In a kind of gunpowder era re-enactment of the 
Khitan relocation he was able to take the army and upper echelons of a mobile state 
with him into India, and there found the Mughal Empire, which would combine elements 
of Inner Eurasian with Indian statecraft, creating a new locally adaptable hybrid. In the 
18th Century came the last gasp of this kind of Turkic empire building process with both 
Nader Shah of Iran and later Afghan kingmakers moving to build states and shore up 
their local power. There was not much mileage left of indigenous Inner Eurasia by this 
point however, and with the exception of Russia and the Manchu reign in China it 
seemed like an end to an entire geopolitical way of life. This story was covered most 
completely in recent years by John Darwin in his historical survey After Tamerlane, 
showing the collapse of what once was the world’s largest world-system and its 
replacement with more maritime powers. The story is correct, but the conclusion of 
Darwin’s work presumes an end or even fundamental change to this system and does 
not seriously consider its re-emergence in our times or that of the near future.57 While it 
is great that such a survey of this period exists, one which will be cited frequently, this 
seminal work needs to be seen in a greater context including both the pre-modern past 
and continuing on through the present. 
Getting to the modern period, we touch once more on the previous mentioned 
era of European great power expansion into the region. The various khanates in the 
north falling to Russia, the remnants of the Mughal Empire and its neighbors to the 
British, and the solidification of the Chinese western border under the guidance of the 
Manchurian Qing Dynasty. This era is certainly not being disregarded by this study, but 
instead will be treated rightfully as one of many links on a chain. As event the semi-
nomadic states lose out to the settled farmer and the modern state the policies of the 
various competing empires took on a formless dimension, particularly towards each 
other. Both the eternal Ottoman-Russian frontier in the west58 and the questions of 
Outer Manchuria/Maritime Siberia between Russia and China in the east became 
nebulous battlefields of influence and intrigue, temporarily increasing, rather than 
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decreasing, in the breakdown of the Russian Empire and before its reunification under 
the Soviet Union. In the period during this chaos outside powers found the best way to 
be involved was indirectly and with local mobile proxies. Most notable here was the 
Japanese intervention in maritime Siberia, as well as the Siberian government in exile 
led by Alexander Kolchak.59 There is much literature exploring this era historically and 
its impact, but little of it has much to do with the overall geopolitical evolution of Inner 
Eurasia, and perhaps it is time to examine it as part of that greater whole. 
 It is also worth keeping in mind that just because empire had passed them by, 
there is no need to exclude the Mongols from this study as it enters more contemporary 
territory. Mongolia broke free of China (at least in part) in the early twentieth century and 
has remained tied to Russian policy ever since. Elements of the Russian Civil War 
raged within its borders and it became the second country to adopt a Marxist revolution. 
As a type of almost constant borderland between Russia and China for a century it 
represents a great case study to see a hangover from previous eras surviving deep into 
the modernist attempts at centralized collectivization and emerging intact on the other 
side of the 20th Century ready to pursue the contemporary era.  
 The failure of Soviet modernization has also been covered by various scholars, 
though it has yet to be seen as much aside from a policy failure. In Seeing Like a State 
James C. Scott makes the case that local integration is better for development, which is 
highly relevant. There is, however, no mentioning of how that was indeed the economic 
policy of most pre-modern Inner Eurasian empires and states, not that one would be 
expected in such a far ranging book.60 One could also argue that it is the contemporary 
policy of great powers that influence the region today and no longer seek to directly 
control the independent nations that exist where once there were but large empires. 
Another author who makes a great contribution is Mark von Hagen who argues that in 
the Post-Soviet era we should return the concept of “Eurasia” as a world system in 
order to free ourselves from the tropes of studies just focused on Central Asia or 
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Eastern Europe, and also to reconnect these places with their pre-Soviet past.61 It is a 
point that needs to be further explored. 
 After studying the various forms of indirect and flexible empire within the 
Eurasian heartland from a historical perspective, more contemporary sources will be 
needed to show the persistence of continuity.  Books like China: Fragile Superpower62, 
and Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics63 show the broad 
strategic framework that the major powers of Eurasia are operating in today and both 
their domestic and foreign concerns that motivate their contemporary policies. Also 
relevant to the concerns of indirect empire and great power politics are contemporary 
works about the present instability and geopolitical fault lines that lurk in former Soviet 
Space and the policies the Russian government has enacted in such regions.64 What 
these lack is a deep historical perspective that shows the cycles of power and policy 
over broad stretches of time. They also focus on case studies which lie outside of the 
self-imposed geographic scope of this work, but it is worth mentioning them for they 
tackle similar themes that the case studies examined will touch upon, mostly vassalage 
and indirect geopolitical control. 
Though there have been works that do address some of these issues of 
nebulous conflict outside of conventional nation-state interactions from a contemporary 
perspective, such as examining the broad view of conflict in books like The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War65 by Strathis N. Kalyvas and Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing66 by 
Christopher Cramer. However these works tend to focus on the more typical 
international relations hotspots such as wars in Sub-Saharan Africa and nation building 
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through conflict in the Balkans, though they are good at looking at the nature of indirect 
international action and proxy warfare, but do not focus on Inner Eurasia.  
Theories of state-building and empire in Central Asia do find a voice in the 
historical overview Empires of the Silk Road67, by Christopher I. Beckwith, one that 
traces continuity from history through to the post-Cold War world. Given its scope, this 
is one of the key sources for this dissertation, but even so there are gaps that still need 
to be filled pertaining the role of geopolitics from the perspective of International 
Relations which in any case the book is not written to address. Beckwith has a 
compelling argument about the nature of the nomadic state being an equal part with the 
settled subjects and pursuing primarily economic objectives.  This historical theory 
deserves to be placed in a contemporary International Relations context. Especially 
relevant in the nature of interpersonal networks in establishing power politics based on 
the acquisition and taxation of goods and commerce, rather than direct territorial 
exploitation. Beckwith is particularly strong in noting that the tradition of the indigenous 
empires of Inner Eurasia function in this unique way that sets them apart as a case 
study from the more conventional understanding of empire.68 
Similarly, the contemporary overview of hot-button political issues in Central Asia 
contained within Central Asia: A Gathering Storm? charts the variety of ways great 
power conflict and influence can drive attempts at hegemony.69 Perhaps most relevantly 
for those who might doubt the relevance of basing a comparison off of the structure of 
governance used by ‘tribal nomads’ The Headless State by David Sneath makes a 
welcome addition to the dialogue.70 In that work, Sneath argues that the steppe nomad 
had a fairly typical aristocratic government structure, like most states, and that tribalism 
played a much less direct role than more typical foreign policy and financial concern 
normal to governments everywhere. Its execution may have been different, one can 
                                                          
67
 Christopher I. Beckwith. Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
68
 Ibid., 23. 
69
 Boris Rumer, editor. Central Asia: A Gathering Storm? (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 
70
 David Sneath. The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner 
Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
 
33 
 
take from this comparison that steppe-based cultures and states can be studied in 
international relations as proper states, albeit unique ones. 
 
2.3…Geopolitical Sources 
Geopolitical literature will be another important part of this project, and will be the 
foundation upholding many of the theoretical and historical examples.  A good overview 
of geopolitics changing with technology and the times, but staying relevant in the study 
of International Relations, can be found in Walton’s Geopolitics and the Great Powers in 
the Twenty-First Century. This work makes the case that all grand strategies have 
fundamentally geographic objectives, and that this has been the case since the time of 
Thucydides.71 Although primarily focused on East Asia and the Pacific Rim, the ideas 
contained could be applied to Central Eurasia. Nation-State and the Crisis of World 
Politics72 by John H. Herz examines how technology can impact the strategic concepts 
of political space, a useful hypothesis in any era, including the Cold War when it was 
published, but it is especially relevant in the present information age considering the 
speed that information, finances, and military forces can now move at. This fits in well 
with Mackinder’s ahead of the times thesis about land power resurgence back to its 
former power in medieval times due to technological advancement, as explained by 
William H. Parker in his survey of Mackinder’s continuing geopolitical relevance: 
Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft.73  This topic, as well as its usefulness to 
the study of contemporary Central Asian politics is also addressed by an even more 
recent survey of Mackinder’s work and its usefulness in understanding Eurasian 
geopolitics: Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West. This work also 
contains a survey of large directly imposed empires in the 20th Century “Heartland” and 
how they failed by creating such drastic counter-reactions (Japan, Germany, the Soviet 
Union, etc).74  This is an integral piece of the puzzle to understand why, not just how, 
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indirect empire comes into existence, and the advantageous it carries over the more 
overt and brutal forms of hegemony. 
How geopolitics is perceived by in various cultural contexts and by the 
governments of smaller powers is also relevant, as the small powers often determine 
the options of the larger. This topic is covered quite adequately in the book Small States 
in International Relations though it is not done in an Inner Eurasian context.75  
The interpretation of geopolitics can also vary over the different priorities of 
societies as they craft their primary foreign policy priorities. Although this author 
believes that it is geography which has more of a determining effect on culture than 
vice-versa, different peoples within the Inner Eurasian system did come to different 
conclusions on how to manage their indirect empires, which were formless in different 
ways more often than not. With this in mind Cultural Realism76 and works like it are 
relevant studies as well, showing how historical priorities carry certain levels of strategic 
prestige on contemporary planners.  
 
2.4…Theoretical Sources 
As this dissertation seeks to build its own localized theory from historical case studies, it 
does not deal explicitly with theory as a framework in the same way that it does history. 
That being said, it is good to appraise the theoretical frameworks which do exist that 
happen to have the most overlap with the topics in order to draw parallels with more 
conventional I.R. scholarship. 
 Neoclassical Realism is particularly useful to the execution of this project 
because the elements it takes from both classical realism and neorealism, while 
discarding many others that are only particular to the typical and limiting 
western/Westphalian system view.  Since this research project has its primary focus on 
the way that states behave toward each other and how they balance, both internally and 
within alliance networks, as well as how they are motivated by domestic political factors 
(namely resource acquisition to fuel economic growth and the stability of ethnic 
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minorities on their borderlands) realism is of course going to be the most useful 
theoretical framework.  Neoclassical realism is, in particular, of necessity for it takes into 
account numerous domestic considerations in the study of foreign policy has a more 
loose and historically grounded, and global definition of exactly what the state is, and 
thus does not discount the role of economics in power politics as both the cause and the 
symptom of power imbalances.77   
 Another element of Neoclassical Realism is that it takes away the predictable 
causality and assumptions of rationality that are so common in the Neorealism more 
typical of today. As this project seeks to focus on a kind of naturally evolving process 
that stems mostly from a combination of circumstance and geography, which in turn is 
tied to policy making responses, whether successes or failures, it would be better to on 
the Neoclassical side of the Realism spectrum.78 
 Realism is also heavily focused on the examination of hegemony, and how 
hegemonic powers both come to be, and eventually how they forfeit their position. 
Hegemony and balance-of-power theory both have a lot to do with the concept of 
indirect and informal empire.  As can be seen in the case of the Golden Horde in 
Russia, or contemporary Russia in the Central Asian Republics, both of these theories 
can be combined with a hegemonic state using a system of internal alliance balance-of-
power to keep its allies subordinate and maintain its position of dominance and access 
over and into the “vassal” states.  The dichotomy between hegemony and balance-of-
power theory itself often has a very modern and western-centric view. For instance, 
hegemony, rather than balance-of-power is the normal state of international affairs in 
many regions of the world and eras of history.  Europe, the Middle East, and North 
Africa under the Roman Empire at its height was a decidedly hegemonic system, as 
have any of the great unified dynasty periods of Chinese history or even the entire world 
from the fall of the Soviet Union until recently vis-à-vis the United States, as explained 
quite persuasively in The Balance of Power in World History.79 
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When examining an atypical form of hegemony, as this dissertation seeks to do, 
both balance-of-power and hegemony no longer seem exclusive, but begin to merge 
into a similar and fluctuating system. Therefore it is imperative that the insights gleaned 
from the multilayered interplay between domestic and international factors, as summed 
up in Neoclassical Realism, be used to study the issue of formless policy making.   
Particularly striking and relevant examples of this merger of hegemony with 
balance-of-power in Inner Eurasian history need to be examined. Obviously “Inner 
Eurasian History” can be quite a broad swathe of time but since the indirect empire is 
not a constant, but rather just a particularly reoccurring policy (despite seemingly to be 
more prevalent there than anywhere outside of the present day) the task is not as 
daunting as it seems. The primary determining factor for inclusion as a case study will 
be signs of parallel and continuity with the present situation in Inner Eurasia, or grand 
strategic theories about its past, present, and potential futures.  For instance, it is 
notable that how The Golden Horde regulated the relations between its underling 
Russian principalities bear resemblance when compared with the situation of how 
contemporary Russia manages the affairs of its Central Asian near-abroad.  The water 
disputes between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have eerie parallels with the competition in 
the fur trade and the hierarchy of tribute payments among the Russian principalities of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.80 81 Additionally, the Chinese experience, with 
all its warps and wefts, in its own sphere of influence in Central Asia reflects the unique 
circumstances of that civilization’s own history within the region.  Both Han and Tang 
Dynasties could achieve hegemony over the East Asian region, but in the open-ended 
spaces of Inner Eurasia they instead used a strict military rule over the nearby settled 
areas and then utilized diplomacy for the indirect manipulation of outside tribes and 
powers.  
 The Manchu Qing Dynasty of 1644-1911 was the first (aside from the Mongols 
of course) to take control of the regions, west and north, that threatened China, and 
although the modern borders of the People’s Republic have shrunk slightly since then, 
they remain largely intact, albeit without Mongolia and Outer Manchuria, to what the 
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Qing established with their gunpowder weapons and semi-steppe origins. But it was at 
this point that the mixed administrative system started to break down, for the mobility of 
the tribes was finally taking a backstage to the guns of the expanding Russians, who 
quickly absorbed over the next centuries much of the neighboring territory, leaving 
behind a bipolar system in Central Asia which would last, albeit with a much larger 
share of Russian more than Chinese hegemony, until the fall of the Soviet Union.  Now, 
thanks to the imperial scale-back of Russia, the rise of China, and the development of 
new alliances and war technology, the solid borders of the land give way to the vast 
fluidity of the steppe once more. This means China’s old security concerns from 
previous eras have returned to haunt her. When this system of direct annexation 
coupled with peripheral intervention broke down it could leave to grave security 
concerns and a threatened western border. Thus for obvious reasons it still greatly 
impacts Chinese policy to this day, especially in relation to the directly annexed area of 
Xinjiang (new frontier, formerly known as Turkestan) and the indirectly influenced (or at 
the least attempted indirect influence) of countries like Kazakhstan.82  
These types of interactions, which are clearly power politics, also have a variety 
of overlapping factors such as economic and domestic concerns and fit well with what 
the research so far has to offer about the experiences of empires in Central Eurasia. It’s 
also is a perfect match for Neoclassical Realism whose focus is on regime survival, fear 
of loss, and reaction to perceived threats that have their roots in historical and 
geopolitical grievances and objectives. 
Though it will not be referenced explicitly in the coming chapters, it is also worth 
looking at World Systems Theory for another explanation of overlapping interests and 
strategies which it is good to know about when considering Central Asian geopolitics. 
World Systems Theory was originally formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein to explain the 
nature of capitalist economic systems within hegemonic international structures.  
According to World Systems Theory (WST) both industrial age imperialism and the 
present globalized economic system are a type of financial imperialism which extracts 
wealth and resources from the periphery (poorer countries, weaker countries, etc) in 
order to fuel the growth of the core. Therefore WST deals with indirect imperial 
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structures and the ways they can be set up without even direct annexation or 
administration. It is this element of WST that makes it most useful to understanding the 
concept of the formless empire.83 It is worth noting, however, that this is a background 
issue which must take second place to power politics as a primary focus. Still, its 
explains some methods which are quite directly tied to those very issues as economics 
usually played second fiddle to regime survival in Central Asia. 
 At the very nature of WST is the idea that the post-Cold War world is a large an 
adaptive process that by its multipolar and faced paced nature disregards both Leninist 
and Wilsonian ideals in equal measure. According to Wallerstein while the ‘world 
system’ may be new, many regional systems existed and overlapped each other in 
history. What is more, those systems were capable of coexistence because they did not 
adhere to the universalism so prevalent in western and Middle Eastern culture. 
Examples specifically cited are China during the Tang Dynasty, the Roman Empire, and 
the Mughal Empire. All of whom were hegemonic powers in their own system but still 
engaged with other systems elsewhere. The ability for a plurality of economic and 
political models to exist while still being hegemonic powers is absolutely essential to the 
understanding of how the Inner Eurasian system worked, even if Wallerstein doesn’t 
focus on that particular example.84 
 “Exploitative Hegemony” is a phrase often coupled with examining the effect of 
WST on the geopolitical system. Particularly powers which have peaked and fear 
decline are apt to drain whatever they can from a given international political 
arrangement.85 This shows one of the primary advantages of mobile formlessness, as a 
state can linger on past its shelf life, so to speak, by maintaining a type of economic 
hegemony which can have the effect of prolonging its political one. Indeed, in the 
context of Inner Eurasia, the two types of hegemony may very well be indivisible, and 
this above all is why both Neoclassical Realism and WST make great partners in 
understanding the nature and evolution of this region’s grand strategy.  
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It is the particular nature of states, empires, and confederacies in Inner Eurasian 
history to be very loose and open to trade, commerce, and international exchange. In 
fact some WST theorists think the world system predates Wallerstein’s 15th Century 
origin, specifically in regards to Inner Eurasia.  Many place the Mongol Empire as the 
first World System, whereas others go even further back tracing the long history of 
international economic activity taking place along the multicultural and multiple 
empire/national territory through which the trade routes of the Silk Road passed.86 
 In many pre-modern Eurasian empires it was the extraction of tribute that offers 
intriguing examples when compared with our modern globalized economy. And it is the 
interplay between power politics, and the movement of trade, capital, and resource 
extraction that is one of the most vital aspects of this study. 
 
2.5…Methodology 
The structure of this dissertation will be unconventional. Its intention is to track the 
strategies of the indigenous geopolitical concept of The Formless Empire and to chart 
the course of its continual evolution even as it gradually weakens its hold on the 
regional Inner Eurasian state system over time before eventually having what could be 
classified as a potential partial resurgence in the contemporary era. Therefore, the 
concept itself has the tendency to change from case study to case study. What, in the 
early chapters, is a comprehensive geopolitical phenomenon encapsulating both the 
domestic and foreign apparatus of the state and its relationships, gradually is modified 
to a more finite definition of policy as the countries themselves become more 
centralized and conventional by modern standards. Nonetheless, the context remains. 
While the early examples of the Xiongnu, Khitans, and Mongols represent some 
of the most blatant archetypes of formless empires by having mobile capitals, different 
forms of government for different subjects, and ill-defined borders upheld through 
personal relationships-later examples gradually move in more conventional directions. 
The Timurids, for example, had a clearly defined capital city in Samarkand and a 
permanent regional base, yet outside of this immediate area the old ways of nomadism, 
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raiding, and indirect rule were still remarkably strong. Therefore, the concept of The 
Formless Empire evolves from one of pure speed and mobility to one of a centralized 
state core with a massive decentralized and formless periphery. 
This process gradually, and then upon reaching the industrial era, quite 
suddenly, speeds up. Starting with the Russian and Manchu/Chinese conquests and 
settlements of their own frontier areas, the power of the state sees the withering away of 
the political element of The Formless Empire, but retains its tactical concepts in order to 
operate against nomadic rivalry. By this point, the case studies examined will be done 
so from the perspective that, while even as they bring about the material circumstances 
which erode the once dominant power of formless geopolitics, the new powers adopt 
many of its elements into at least their foreign and military policy. This grafting is by no 
means absolute, and is meant to illustrate a regional phenomenon. For instance, 
Russian ruling strategy in Central Asia and Siberia is different than it was in Poland or 
the Ukraine, just as Chinese governance in its core regions, or hegemony in its 
southern periphery were conducted in other ways due to the different geographic 
context of those regions. Thus, while the formative experience of nations like China and 
Russia as they interact with the heartland of Eurasia are critical to charting the evolution 
of The Formless Empire, they are not assumed to have affected the entirety of foreign 
policy of these countries on their other border regions (though occasionally this does 
happen and may be briefly remarked upon). 
By the Twentieth Century, the Formless Empire becomes nothing more than a 
faint echo of policy, seen only in a few shady engagements and the propping up of 
insurgent surrogates. While the mechanization of warfare after the First World War 
would likely would have led to greater mobility on the battlefield anyway, the various 
proxy-conflicts in the period of chaos after the Chinese and Russian Revolutions still 
offered a glimmer of the geopolitical realities in large spaces of low density population 
such as Siberia and Manchuria, which taxed the logistical infrastructure of conventional 
states and enabled the rise of less conventional strategic actors, such as Mao Zedong.  
It is important to stress once again that the purpose of this study is precisely to 
see exactly what survived of the original more holistic concept of The Formless Empire, 
not to make the case that it did not change or weaken with time.However, it is implied 
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that it provided the historical context for state evolution in the region, and that 
understanding this context is crucial to a comprehensive world view of the region from a 
local perspective today, as well as possible avenues of opportunity in its future. 
This dissertation seeks to focus exactly on that which charts the evolution of its 
indigenous geopolitics. Thus, some sources were preferred over others for a variety of 
criteria. One of which was that it charted evolution and adaptation. This is also true for 
case studies, which explains the very obvious preference for examples east of the Black 
Sea. Case studies which prioritized interactions of nomads with future settled agrarian 
powers were also stressed in order to show how transmission of tactical continuity came 
about. Some case studies leave the region in question in order to show other interesting 
adaptations, for instance the rapid littoral evolution of the Mughals, which showed in 
effect the reverse of what was about to happen in China and Russia. Iran under Nader 
Shah was also a seemingly atypical example taken because it showed the potential of a 
semi-nomadic army to wage the massive kinds of campaigns not seen since the 
medieval era even when deep in the period of technological change brought about by 
gunpowder. These are critical comparative examples that are included to show how 
dynamic the Inner Eurasian system could be outside of its homeland, and how this type 
of cross cultural interaction affected both parties. 
Another important concept in selecting both literature and case studies was that it 
approached a value neutral or even positive view of the nomadic and now peripheral 
people who make up many of the case studies. Considering thousands of years of 
having more literate neighbors state that these groups of people were nothing but wild 
barbarians, it becomes important to follow Beckwith’s example but adapt it to an 
International Relations perspective. Once, Inner Eurasia was the core of regime 
creation, not the periphery, and always it maintained just as valid geopolitical objectives 
in its statecraft as did the more conventionally regarded littoral nations with whom it was 
often at odds. Therefore, to redress the balance here, this dissertation seeks to treat 
nomadic peoples and their semi-nomadic successors as legitimate state actors whose 
policies were just as much a product of rational thought and strategic thinking as those 
of many of their enemies, and indeed, while it may go unacknowledged, they were also 
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influential on the settled states which would succeed them, first in frontier governance, 
and then in tactical deployment in the region. 
In summation, this dissertation is not an overview of every single possible case 
study, nor is it to be taken as a survey of anything but the very geopolitical concept 
which it advocates to be a historical reality and an alternative to more traditional 
narratives of the region as either a rapacious bastion of land pirates or a weak victim of 
outside actors alone. 
 
2.6…The Literature Gap 
Having explored much of the relevant material pertaining to this subject it becomes 
apparent there is a significant gap in what is covered, from a geopolitical perspective 
outside of the modern era. Considering how well Inner Eurasia is covered in general as 
a topic this may seem surprising, but the gap in the literature is not due to a lack of 
writing or research, but rather a lack of overlap between grand perspective, different 
eras, international relations, and history. I.R. scholars have been dismissive or ignorant 
about the pre-modern heritage of the Eurasian strategic culture complex, or have placed 
it within a non-indigenous theory of understanding alien to the people of the time. 
Historians make interesting observations about the geopolitical evolution of native 
power politics in the region, but tend to cut off their observations once the modern era is 
reached, or the Cold War came to an end. This leads to the danger of striking the 
contemporary political situation in the region from the greater record, and divorcing it 
from being one of many links on an adapting but continuous chain of events. In addition, 
any attempts to theorize the trends of the Inner Eurasian geopolitical system that is 
bereft of geographic background or economic and political overlap which can be 
provided by political theory is likewise missing the big picture. 
 Therefore, the gap that exists is not in any particular instance, but rather in failing 
to link all the separate kinds of studies regarding grand strategy in Inner Eurasia 
together into one cohesive narrative of an evolving system. Using the ideas of an 
indigenous Formless Empire as the linking mechanism for historical case studies across 
the eras, it is the purpose of this dissertation to tell the overarching story of the evolution 
and significance of The Formless Empire in both the past, and today. 
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Chapter Three: Historic Examples of the Pre-Modern Formless Land Empire 
 
“Such was the harvest of results produced by a cloud of ruthless and idealess 
horsemen sweeping over the un-impeded plain-a blow, as it were, from the great Asiatic 
hammer striking freely through vacant space.” 
 
~Halford Mackinder, The Geographic Pivot of History 
 
3.0…Summation: 
 
In order to fully understand the workings of the formless empire within the space of 
Inner Eurasia it is necessary to acknowledge how common this practice of strategic and 
political mobility combined has been in the history of the region. There are many 
examples of the formless empire in Eurasian states who originated from nomadic and 
semi-nomadic peoples, more than enough to fill several volumes. Therefore, there will 
be a specific and focused study of a few examples that illustrate the principle of indirect 
rule and geopolitical formlessness particularly well, especially in interacting with more 
conventional neighbors.  
Also taken into account are interesting historical parallels to foreign policy 
decisions that can be observed in the world of today such as balance of power politics, 
punishment expedition, and the political purpose of economic networks in the 
maintenance of indirect hegemony. With these factors in mind, the particular case to be 
used are the Xiongnu people, the Khitan people-who had two successive empires-one 
in northern China (the Liao Dynasty) and one in Central Asia (the Kara-Khitai Khanate), 
The early pan-Eurasian Mongol Empire, and specifically the Golden Horde or Kipchak 
Khanate, the part of the Mongol Empire in Russia and western Central Asia. What these 
examples uniquely show is not necessarily just the normal pattern of nomadic people 
becoming sedentary in line with their subject populations of neighbors, as was often the 
norm observed by Ibn Khaldun up through more modern historians,87 88 but fairly stable 
regime-systems that retained certain essential ‘formless’ characteristics throughout all 
or most of their existence. Those examples listed above seem to fit this basic 
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geopolitical criterion and thus provide a level of consistency in their policies that make 
them particularly noteworthy. The case will be made that these empires in particular 
show parallels to contemporary Eurasian geopolitical thinking and thus offer a unique 
window to look with hindsight on grand strategies that by circumstance seem to be 
recurring again today. 
 
3.1…The Steppe Military Model 
 
There have been many nomadic powers throughout the history of Inner Eurasia. 
Bounded to the north by taiga forests, the south by desert and mountains, and cut with 
rivers, lakes, and various other topographies, this region is still defined by the centrality 
of one all-encompassing feature, the steppe.89 It is this grassland, dry and yet plentiful 
for horses and pack animals, that fuels what was arguably the longest lived and most 
successful set of military cultures of the pre-modern era. Armies existing entirely of 
cavalry and made up of nomads who had grown up in the saddle possessed the 
ultimate mobility. The core unit of this success was the mounted archer, who could fire 
accurately from full gallop. Coupled with the shock forces of a heavy cavalry reserve-to 
stage a breakthrough at the decisive moment, such a potent and flexible combination 
often could not be resisted by the armies of settled agrarian neighbors and would 
dominate the Eurasian military field until the rise of gunpowder and eventually railroads 
overtook them.90 Such forces could also melt back into the endless steppe using both 
their mobility and lack of permanent settlements (which would need to be defended) and 
avoid or trap a less flexible enemy.  It was quite normal for steppe armies to defeat 
enemies of significantly greater number by utilizing speed, adaptability, and superior 
organization.91 
 
3.2…The Xiongnu and Han: Adaptation Through Imitation 
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Various nomadic steppe people from both north and west of the Chinese civilization had 
long interacted with the settled kingdoms in China proper. Often when the Chinese were 
divided the nomadic people could make inroads into the settled areas, and at other 
times, such as the partially Turkic Tang Dynasty, where China was strong and united it 
could strike deep into the nomadic steppe and keep the various peoples there divided. 
A rare historical example of a bipolar system developing amongst this perpetual conflict 
occurred in the earlier Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) which faced off against the 
Xiongnu, a nomadic people who occupied both the Mongolian steppe and the area 
known today as Turkistan. Here a unified nomadic state and a unified Chinese dynasty 
existed at the same time and the differences between the two could not have started off 
as any more distinct.92 
 The Xiongnu Empire was founded by Modu Chanyu. It was a construct based 
around the mobility of the horse and of livestock through pastureland and was regarded 
as having particularly uncouth and uncivilized subjects by Chinese scholars of the time. 
This bothered the Xiongnu little; however they had no agricultural capacity or economic 
power. Han China, on the other hand, had plenty of both as well as desirable trade 
goods. In order to be able to reward his vassals and warriors, as well as present 
diplomatic gifts to other non-Chinese people, it became a vital foreign policy objective to 
acquire these goods for Modu Chanyu. Although the Xiongnu had captured cities and 
goods manufactories by taking over the Tarim basin cities, without some form of 
integration into the Chinese economy they were doomed to stagnation if they could not 
trade.93 
Given that the only significant advantage the nation possessed over the Han 
Dynasty was its military capabilities, and that the Chinese were notoriously suspicious 
of trading with nomadic barbarians for various reasons94, the natural course of action for 
the new Xiongnu state was to begin acquiring what they needed through raiding. These 
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raids eventually convinced the Chinese that it would be easier and cheaper to allow 
trade with their northern neighbors, resulting in a treaty in 198 BCE stipulating that the 
Xiongnu were to be treated as diplomatic equals, and rendered tribute in the form of 
grain and luxury goods in exchange for non-aggression.95 
This arrangement would soon come to be seen by both sides as mutually 
beneficial-at least for a little while. The raid could be destructive to the economic 
patterns active on both sides of the border, therefore representing a potential burden for 
the nomads as well. After all, the treaty was in force for 60 years and during the ensuing 
stability the Xiongnu, a nation supposedly built on war, kept wealth flowing into their 
territories continually and without a renewal of major war. The construction of one of the 
first almost entirely pastoralist states effectively became based on the control of trade 
networks and the exacting of tributes.96 Although this model of imperial governance may 
have arisen out of the unique nature of a state ruled by nomadic pastoralists, the plan of 
the army patrolling key areas and allowing large amounts of the people in its network a 
certain degree of autonomy was the beginning of a highly successful and often repeated 
type of grand strategy in the lands of Inner Eurasia. After all, rather than bear the costs 
and effort of direct rule, why not engage in a mutually beneficial-if unequal-relationship? 
To quote David Christian on the nature of the Xiongnu system: “Macro-parasites, like 
micro-parasites, have to protect their hosts.”97 
This dangerous game was of course being played by both sides. The Chinese 
had been building up a cavalry based armed force of their own, often supplemented 
with various steppe peoples. The treaty system may have had benefits for them, but it 
was humiliating and clearly benefited the Xiongnu more. Eventually, the officials of the 
Han Dynasty came to the conclusion that it was time to overthrow this order for one 
more favorable to their interests and security. They would do so by adopting many of 
the tactics and strategies of the Xiongnu.98 It was time to make their own formless 
empire, only this time with the players reversed. 
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The Han spent their time fostering internal division in the empire who had opened 
up their trade routes. Freedom of travel can work both ways, and Chinese money and 
goods were effective at undermining the unity of the Xiongnu, as well as opening up 
new contacts with peoples further afield who also bordered the Xiongnu state. A 
lightening campaign launched by the general Ban Chao (the supposed originator, in 
China at least, of the maxim “Use barbarians to fight barbarians”) accomplished this feat 
by heavy reliance on nomadic auxiliaries and a reported interest in the strategies of Sun 
Tzu. His actions surely implies this is true, as wreaking havoc indirectly through 
deception before even launching the main assault is a mainstay of the Master’s 
thinking.99 Soon the Xiongnu state was split in two, with one half a tributary of the Han 
Dynasty and another weakened, but still a foe. Now the battles would take place far 
from Chinese territory on one or another of the Xiongnu states.100 Both sides had played 
for total hegemony of the formless variety over the borderlands, and it seemed the 
Chinese had won, but this was only the first round. 
 The nomadic peoples were kept largely on the defensive for a while after this turn 
of events. As late as 120 CE Pan Yung, a court official, was advocating a continued 
vigilance towards the western regions in a way that smacks of what would evolve into 
the tropes of Eurasian formless empires: 
 
 “1. The occupation of the Western Regions denies it to the Hsiung-nu. 
2. The cost of occupation is partially defrayed by the payment of tribute and 
advantageous trade. 
3. Neglect of the region will put the Oasis States and the trade routes in the 
hands of the Hsiung-nu who will profit thereby. 
4. A strong Hsiung-nu state inevitably turns to ravage the borders of the 
empire.101” 
 
Now that the shoe was on the other foot it was time for the Xiongnu and other Turkic 
peoples of the region to lament their fortunes as the Chinese redirected their trade 
networks and political order to suit their own ends. Gradually the cost of constant 
deployment of Chinese armies (who often could not live on their own without a massive 
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infusion of supplies on the steppe) to border forts began to wear down the government, 
and as the Han Dynasty began to scale down the scale of the operations was constantly 
being pulled back closer and closer to the homeland. The Han would eventually fall and 
so a long period of disorder would reign in China-and it was the same on the steppe 
until the coming of the Turkic Empire. The partially Turkic Tang Dynasty, which had its 
own nomadic heritage would however largely pick up the policies of the Han and 
continue them towards the Turks. Chinese armies of the 7th and 8th centuries would play 
the game of vassalage and indirect rule tit for tat with the Turkic peoples. China had 
gone from being an imitator of the Formless Empire, to being an active player under 
Tang Taizong, combining the elements of both worlds built on the historical experience 
of both Xiongnu and Han Dynasties.102 
 As an early Turk inscription said: 
“The Chinese people were wily and deceitful…the Turkish people let their 
state…go to ruin…Their sons worthy to become slaves, and their daughters 
worthy of becoming ladies became servants of the Chinese people. The Turkish 
lords abandoned their Turkish titles. The lords who were in China held the 
Chinese titles and obeyed the Chinese emperor and gave their services to him 
for fifty years.”103 
 
The nomadic state may have pioneered the formless empire but the Han and Tang 
Dynasties showed that it could be applied by settled states as well. A Eurasian-wide 
phenomenon of power politics had begun-but it had yet to reach its apogee. That would 
come later, also evolving in the borderlands between China and the Eurasian nomad, 
though in a different location-and with different results. 
 
3.3…A Khitan House Divided Can Still Stand 
 
The Tang Dynasty was crumbling in the 10th Century. It had previously been rocked by 
decreasing power of the central government and massive rebellions. Now the declining 
government, which was on its last legs, invited a people outside the empire to come in 
and shore up their northern frontier in 936. These people were the Khitans.104 
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 The Khitans had originated in the north in what today is known in much of the 
world as Manchuria or the North-East Provence of China. For much of their history 
before they rose to prominence they had been weaker than many of their neighbors and 
thus had learned to be canny and adapt to whatever balance of power currently held 
sway.105 With their conquest of the Po-Hai kingdom in Manchuria and the invitation by 
the Tang to enter the game of Chinese power politics their fortunes were about to 
change quite drastically, however.  
 Previously in Chinese history, the steppe nomads had largely waged war for 
access to trade and tribute. The governance of settled people was at best a sideshow to 
the actual purposes of regime support and acquisition that the nomadic rulers. This 
would begin to change with the Khitans, who set a precedent of those based in the Liao 
River valley adopting a different kind of political model for nomadic/settled interaction.106 
The Liao river valley was a unique geographic area in eastern Eurasia which combined 
pastoralists, small agricultural villages, and cities into one relatively small area where 
they overlapped. This was not the last time this region in particular would create a 
unique hybrid dynasty (the Jurchens and Manchus would follow) but it was here, at the 
start of Khitan rule, that a unique kind of formless empire would start to develop. One 
nomadic, yet with a large settled element that was an important part of the state.107 
 In 907 a leader known as Abaoji united the Khitans and their immediate 
neighbors into a proper regional force. As the Tang collapsed utterly the Khitans used 
their clout to justify annexing large tracks of northern China into their rule. Despite the 
immense opportunities this presented in terms of having direct influence over an 
agriculturally active and craft-producing populace there were also dangers for the 
Khitans. The fragmented Chinese states south of them could all economically 
outperform the new Khitan state through their population alone-and there were still other 
nomadic groups not in the Khitan alliance network that could simultaneously threaten 
the northern borders. Adding the acquisition of large amounts of Chinese farmers, 
merchants, and officials, could become an internal danger in such an uncertain time. 
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Therefore, Abaoji improvised. He would rule both his nomads and his settled subjects in 
the ways pleasing to them both, and be a Khan and an Emperor at the same time. 
Therefore the Khitan Khanate became the Liao Dynasty, named for the unique river 
valley that had spawned this innovative compromise between ways of life.108 This 
unique place would continue being the birthplace of new hybrid dynasties all the way 
through the 1930s, and we will return to it in future case studies. 
 The Liao Dynasty sought accommodation by maintaining a nomadic government 
that still conducted business in major cities which were designated as “regional capitals” 
that the ruling entourage would travel continuously between. Each city had its region 
and locally recruited permanent staff of bureaucrats. The northern and western sections 
of the empire were ruled in the manner of steppe people with personal relationships with 
the ruler and interwoven relationships between families, lords, and vassals.109 Pasture 
land was the primary resource for these people who remained the ruling elite even as 
they kept to their traditions. This way they could avoid the fate of many other conquest 
dynasties that had acculturated too much to the settled Chinese way, lost their military 
talents and flexibility, and succumbed to other invaders. To be a proper ruling class they 
had to maintain their nomadic way of life, as they saw it.110 
 The story in the south was quite different. The areas populated by Chinese were 
given a certain amount of regional autonomy, including the rights to keep the traditional 
Chinese Confucian examination system to select their administrators. The overall 
number of governors started out as almost always Khitan but over time there was 
syncretism between the two peoples, which allowed many Chinese to rise to very high 
positions in the southern districts. The Chinese sections of the empire, given this level 
of decentralized autonomy, pretty much conformed to the will of the state and remained 
loyal subjects, continuing on much as they had during the earlier Tang Dynasty.111 
 Aside from territories held in Manchuria, Northern China, and Mongolia, the Liao 
sought to avoid a full grab at total control and rather extended their influence outward. 
This would be accomplished by either using indirect methods or enforcing a peace 
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treaty after launching a military campaign on their enemies that would allow them to 
retain their autonomy under certain conditions. By the time of Abaoji (known to his 
Chinese subjects as Emperor Taizu of Liao at this point)’s death in 933 Khitan armies 
had driven deep into parts of China, westerly lands north of Tibet, and the Korean 
peninsula. Yet in each of the above cases, they withdrew once they had set up an open 
trade relationship and at least some nominal form of tribute network which flowed from 
the defeated party to the five capitals. The raw materials and luxury goods stimulated 
this economy, and the integration with the nomadic Khitans controlling the trade routes 
(and becoming literate in order to manage this economic web better) made them a vital 
link in the territories north of native-ruled China. Without direct control a relatively small 
number of Khitans could maintain a formless empire.112  
 The multitude of Chinese states in the south had finally begun to coalesce into 
something larger and by 960 the Sung Dynasty had formed. In their quest to reunify all 
the lands holding a primarily Chinese population the Sung struck north with their military 
to recapture the parts of northern China held under Liao rule. The massive Sung armies 
were able to eradicate the small states that had been able to survive as tributaries of the 
Liao, but once they entered Liao territory proper they were utterly crushed by the 
superior speed and mobility of the Khitan army at the Battle of Kao-Liang River. The 
Liao counterattack did much damage to Sung territory but the Khitans lacked the 
numbers to continue the advance and so the conflict to resolve hegemony of northern 
China descended into stalemate. A peace treaty between the two powers was 
concluded, and a stable border was drawn as a result. A bipolar power structure 
emerged in the Chinese world system.113 
 The border would not remain entirely stable due to various outbreaks over 
disagreements, though there would be a lack of full scale war once it was properly 
demarcated. Additionally, the Khitans began to prepare the Liao state, which was 
heavily outnumbered by the Sung, for a defensive posture towards its southern 
neighbor. Along the immediate area of the border rice cultivation was banned (though 
not other forms of agriculture) in order to facilitate the movement of cavalry, which 
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would be significantly hampered by the extensive irrigation needed to supply rice 
paddies.114 Meanwhile, the less settled frontiers of the Liao state began a process of 
further integration of their allies. Many of the minor tribal vassals who had been 
attached to the Liao state started to take lucrative government positions rather than 
remain as tribute paying vassals. This process was noticed with some alarm by the 
bordering vassal state of Korea, who the Sung tried to make an alliance with on the 
pretext of common defense of “civilized values”  but the mobility and striking power of 
the Liao armies coupled with their economic integration within the policies of Korea 
acted as enough deterrent to prevent this plan from becoming a reality.115  
 Finally, after a long dance between cold war type jockeying and occasional flare 
ups, and unexpected victory won by the Liao military finally convinced the much larger 
Sung Dynasty to give up any attempts to overthrow the balance of power, either by 
attempting to diplomatically outflank the Liao or by pushing the irredentist claims on the 
border. The treaty of Shan-Yuan, signed in 1004 finally settled the matter for the long 
term. According to the statues of the treaty: 
 
1. The Sung would pay the Liao annually 200,000 lengths of silk and 100,000 
ounces of silver as a ‘contribution to military expenses’ (effective indemnity for 
the war-phrased as such to diplomatically avoid the word tribute). 
2. An even more rigidly demarcated border. 
3. No cross-border disturbances or interference with the agricultural output of the 
other state. 
4. Neither side could give refuge to the fugitives of the other. 
5. No new border fortifications could be built. 
6. Both sides, in addition to observing the above points, must cultivate good 
relations and respect each other’s territorial integrity.116 
 
For a century after this treaty was drawn up the borders remained stable and peace 
reigned between the two kingdoms. The two emperors went so far as to declare 
themselves of the Northern and Southern courts, Liao and Sung respectively, and to 
refer to each other as brothers. The only way that the Liao state with its significant lack 
of comparative strengths to the Sung in terms of economic might, population, 
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agricultural output, and the like could be considered an equal was because of its wealth 
derived from mobility in its civics and military elements, and formlessness in both its 
organization and diplomacy. It was through these principles-whether they were naturally 
occurring evolutions of policy or a specifically planned grand strategy-that the formless 
nature of Eurasian empire pioneered by the Xiongnu (and of course possibly others 
from eras not recorded-reached its first germination into a codified state policy on 
multiple levels under Khitan administration. The Liao Dynasty, for all intents and 
purposes, was as formless an as empire can get and still be recognizable as a state. Its 
diplomacy was about maintaining profitable resource extraction routes and it enforced 
these objectives by keeping its nomadic warrior base sharp and deployed-ready to 
strike wherever it might need to be needed. That this survived in the face of such a 
large and daunting foe as the Sung Dynasty (as well as numerous other nomadic 
peoples swirling around its periphery) for more than a century is testament to its 
effectiveness. Some scholars estimate, based on surviving records from the Liao, that 
750,000 Khitans were able to maintain a privileged position over 2,400,000 Chinese 
subjects and 650,000 other ethnicities. Altogether a state of 3,800,000 people, led by an 
ethnic minority of economically minimal origin became a broker of international trade 
while simultaneously holding its own in a largely bipolar system against a far larger 
state. Estimates for Sung population range into over 100,000,000 though there are no 
specific numbers for this earlier period of its history.117 
 With a stable, yet formless, border the peacetime elements of Khitan policy and 
their flexible systems’ effectiveness at enacting what in more modern parlance might be 
termed ‘brain drain’ from the Sung or Tanguts became apparent. Soon they attracted 
immigrants, laid off Sung bureaucrats and scholars, and those down on their luck or 
seeking new opportunities. Because of the peace of Shanyuan the two states on the 
eastern border were no longer technically enemies and so many opportunists took 
advantage of the situation and became people who could work for both dynasties, 
circumstances depending. Going to the Liao and then returning later to the Western Xia 
or the Sung was an option which many people took, becoming a type of government 
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temp worker.118 As Zhang Li wrote in the Liao Shi: “I am not accustomed to the local 
customs of the north, to the food and drink, or to the living accommodation, so I often 
feel depressed. And it was simply because of this that I ran away.”119 Such workarounds 
were not only possible, they helped the Liao attract as much talent as possible. 
 Even with such a stable system the Sung Dynasty was not content. As the Liao 
rocked from a tribal rebellion in its northeast the Song seized the opportunity to ally with 
the Jurchen people of northern Manchuria and this Liao Empire eventually unraveled 
under the pressure. Jurchens jumped from victory to victory and soon they had fully 
taken over the heartland of the Khitan state, as well as turning on their erstwhile Sung 
allies and driving even further south than the Khitans ever had. The Jin Dynasty was 
born. It was a construct much more conventional (in Chinese eyes at least) in that soon 
the ruling nomadic class began to settle down and become more Sinified rulers. The 
bipolar system was soon recreated in China-at least until the coming of the Mongols a 
hundred years later. Much of the Khitan nobility stayed behind and ended up serving the 
new Jurchen masters, but many others, including much of the military aristocracy-who 
were still nomadic-packed up their gear and headed west. The story of the Khitan 
techniques of imperialism and great power politics was not yet over.120 
 
3.4…The Khitans Return for Seconds at the Imperial Buffet 
 
Yelu Daishi, a royal descended from the noble Liao lineage and a successful general, 
led many Khitans westward in the wake of the losses to the Jurchen people. Having 
escaped to freedom from Jin captivity he rebelled against the incompetent figurehead 
Liao remnant government and took almost 100,000 Khitans out just in time as that 
government finally collapsed. They passed into the territory of the Uighurs who gave 
them their submission and looked to establish a new base somewhere in Central Asia 
proper.121 Despite the positive reception of the Uighurs it looked like the Khitan people 
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had fallen from glory into obscurity, left to be trampled in the wake of other, newer, 
power brokers. But having survived in large part due to their mobility, the Khitans also 
brought their grand strategies and techniques of rule west with them. The Liao Dynasty 
may have been gone, but its influence was about to be reborn in a new region. 
 After realizing the Jin were too strong to effectively counterattack from the west 
the Khitan refugee army moved further towards Central Asia, where the Karakhanid 
state invited them to annex parts of their former territory that they had lost to rebellious 
tribal army forces. This plan backfired for the Karakhanids however, as the arrival of 
Khitans inspired their Qarlug subject people and ask for Khitan protection against both 
the Karakhanids and their intrusive Seljuk allies. Seeking to exploit this opportunity to 
build a new Khitan empire, Yelu Daishi gathered his forces for an epic battle against his 
combined foes, defeating them decisively at the Battle of Qatwan outside of Samarkand 
in 1143. The shock of this defeat unraveled the coalition against the Khitans and 
enabled them to take over large swathes of territory in Transoxiana.122 
 Once again the Khitan found themselves as a ruling minority controlling vastly 
different subjects who were largely tradesmen and settled farmers. They had not, 
however, forgotten the lessons learned during the earlier Liao Dynasty. Their new state, 
the Kara-Khitai Empire, was a successor in more ways than just the ethnicity of the 
ruling class.  Although retaining a pseudo-Chinese court culture (for the prestige it 
brought these pagan conquerors of Muslims lands as well as tradition)123 the Kara-
Khitai hired locally extensively to man their bureaucracy and made sure to keep their 
nomadic traditions intact, as before. Additionally, they made sure to set themselves to 
appear more as arbiters than direct rulers by appearing to be the mediators of interests 
regarding cities, farmers, and nomadic populations.124 In foreign policy as well they 
maintained very stable borders with their neighbors and most military actions were 
small-scale and focused to establishing tributary networks or prevent the rise of another 
regional power by balancing against them. Most of the neighbors of the Kara-Khitai 
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would end up as domestically autonomous and largely recognized as independent 
states, so long as they kept the supplies and money flowing through trade routes.125 
 For another hundred years this state would continue on, in Islamic Central Asia, 
using the formless tactics Abaoji had developed to integrate into the periphery of 
Chinese civilization. This state would be absorbed by another rising power eventually 
though, the Mongols. It is a testament to the adaptability of the Khitans that many of 
them became quite high ranking nobles and government advisors in the Mongols. The 
primary governing administrator of that empire was a Khitan of the royal line, Yelu 
Chu’Tsai, and the influence of Khitan geopolitical grand strategy would soon make itself 
felt through this new much larger empire.126 
 
3.6…The Mongol World Empire 
 
The most successful group of nomads at conquering a vast empire (which was also the 
only one to control all of the steppes and borderlands from the Ukraine through 
Manchuria simultaneously) was the Mongol Empire. At its height the Mongol Empire 
stretched from Korea to the Hungarian steppe and from the lower Siberian forest to the 
borders of India, Vietnam, and Palestine. This vast pan-Eurasian empire, while always 
decentralized to a certain extent, remained fairly unified until the reign of Kublai.127 
 The founder of this empire, the previously exiled son of a slain minor chieftain, 
was Temujin. Temujin had worked his way up from a minor raiding party leader to 
eventual unifier and leader of all the Mongol tribes, as well as a few non-Mongol steppe 
nomads. At his Khuriltai (a kind of electoral gathering to determine the next leader) he 
adopted the name Chinggis Khaan, often rendered in English as ‘Genghis Khan’ or 
‘Universal Ruler’. The Mongol document of law, the Yasa128, was also formulated. It 
provided religious tolerance and meritocracy across ethnic lines to those who were loyal 
subjects of the Khan. It also guaranteed the safety of merchants, who the government 
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was charged with protecting during travel as well as in general. With the coming of his 
rule came campaigns against the Jurchen Jin state and the Kara-Khitai Khanate. The 
former being gravely diminished (though it would not be destroyed until after the Khan’s 
death) and the latter being totally annexed into the Mongol Empire.129  
 Through both of these conquests the illiterate and pastoral Mongols-who had 
been considering wholesale extermination for the settled peoples near them in order to 
expand their livestock range-came into possession of the talents of many Khitan 
administrators. Being the ruling class of the Kara-Khitai as well as much of the 
bureaucracy of the Jin, but still retaining their identity as pastoral people, they were 
excellent pre-existing intermediaries for the Mongols to use. Indeed, Yelu Chutsai, a 
Khitan court official in the Jin Empire, was co-opted into the administration of the 
Mongol Empire second only to the Khan himself.130 
 Yelu Chutsai was immensely powerful with duties not eclipsed by anyone save 
the Khan. It was he who talked the Mongol ruling class out of their plans for wholesale 
extermination of the settled folk, arguing that dead people don’t pay taxes, make works 
of art, or provide markets for trade. The Chinese were spared from genocide. The 
Khitan legacy was living on.131 
 Meanwhile, the empire was continuing to expand at an unprecedented rate, even 
by the standards of the large geopolitical entities of the Eurasian steppe. After an attack 
on the merchants and ambassadors of the empire by the Kwarezemian Shah the 
Mongols turned west, and after destroying this new foe in a lightening campaign 
combining surprise attacks and massive military movements and deception, entered the 
Caucuses and the Ukraine in a reconnaissance-in-force which caused the subjugation 
of numerous minor kingdoms and tribes, and inflicted a foreshadowing defeat on a 
coalition of Russian and Cuman military forces assembled to stop their progress. By the 
death of Chinggis Khan in 1227 the Mongol military machine was already a precedent 
setting force of conquest on the world stage.132 
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 Mongol imperialism, despite its massive scope, was predicated on the idea of 
indirect rule.133 Local elites where left in charge where they could be depended on. 
When they could not be trusted a loose coalition of Mongol elites, often women, would 
take charge of regional governing. The primary objective was tax collection and 
securing the trade routes. As shamanists the Mongols cared little for religious 
conversion and used Confucians to administer Muslim lands and Muslims to 
administrate China. What came from this was not empire in the more famous Roman, 
Chinese, or Victorian sense, but something based on hierarchy and wealth extraction 
assuredly, but without either the direct political control nor the ‘civilizing mission’ or 
cultural conversion attempts so common to those types of states. It was a partly 
parasitic but also symbiotic relationship which did not require the death or conversion of 
the host.134 
 Given the small numbers of the Mongols and the vast expanses of territory they 
ruled these tactics may have been a necessity, and it was coupled with near total 
ruthlessness in warfare and in dealing with rebellions, but the result was in effect a type 
of large scale free trade agreement and declaration of religious toleration. Perhaps 
(though this can be nothing but speculation) the Yasa had something to do with the 
relative staying power of such a large and loose geopolitical entity. Either way Jack 
Weatherford refers to this height of a ‘Pax Mongolica’ as the first true era of 
globalization and of a sustainable international trading class and of inter-regional 
exchange of ideas, particularly that of the sciences.135 Amy Chua also gives the height 
of Mongol rule an entire chapter as a supporting case study for her thesis of 
‘hyperpowers’ who rule through utilizing multicultural tolerance. Indeed, her central 
thesis of how the indirect rule of major powers is fostered by the accumulation of human 
capital by utilizing a hands-off approach to statecraft is nearly exemplified by the 
example of the Mongol Empire. The carrot was relatively benign governance (which 
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could occasionally still impose massive taxes), the stick was the ruthless terror of the 
mobile armies.136 
 This type of land-based empire is not usually regarded as analogous to how 
offshore balancing or maritime empires are considered. But perhaps it should be. It 
shows clearly that in the space of Eurasia a tradition of formless flexibility brought about 
by nomads could exist in a massive scale and last for a significant amount of time, 
touching many disparate societies as it expanded. To quote the scholar Gary Seaman: 
 
“Although the Mongols created their empire with a technology of cavalry 
maneuver and siege trains rather than with round ships and cannon, they 
showed many political and strategic objectives with maritime states like the 
Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch, who battened off the tribute and trading 
systems they installed in their hegemonies.”137 
  
Eventually the centrifugal forces and divergent interests of the distant sub-Khanates 
began to pull this unity apart. The ascension of the controversial Kublai, who had 
proclaimed his desire to establish an official dynasty over China in 1260 (what would 
become the Yuan) alienated many Mongol traditionalists and further drove the Kipchak 
Khanate (Siberia and Russia), the Ilkhanate (Iran, Iraq, and the Caucasus), and the 
Chaghatai Khanate (Central Asia) further away from the new Yuan (Mongolia, Korea 
and China). Many of these sub-Khanates would retain official status as tributaries, 
though their self-governance was never truly in question and for a long time to come 
they would still endeavor, despite the political division, to maintain the openness of the 
trade routes and the safety the merchants who traveled between them.138 
 
3.7…A Golden Opportunity for the Kipchak Khanate 
 
Despite this overwhelming achievement, the Ulus of Jochi, known more commonly in its 
era as the Kipchak Khanate and more famously in the west as the Golden Horde, 
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always had a somewhat larger degree of autonomy than the other subdivisions of the 
empire, and also had many more semi-independent vassals rather than just lightly ruled 
subject populations. This was due to its faraway location from the center of Mongol 
power and orientation towards Europe. Europe was given much less priority in the later 
Mongol Empire compared to rule over such places as Central Asia, China, and Iran.139 
140  
 It was this soon to be autonomous part of the Mongol realm that showcased the 
nature of indirect imperialism and power politics common to Inner Eurasia’s power 
relations particularly well, as well as serving as a great example of interaction between 
Slavic and Turko-Mongolian peoples. It is the policies of this entity, The Kipchak 
Khanate, which should be examined to understand the particular nature of flexible 
steppe based power politics and how they can affect people radically different from 
them without direct annexations or outright imperialism. Also, this would be one of the 
formative experiences in Russian history-and the Russians would come to be quite the 
primary actors in the post-Mongol eta. The Mongol Empire as a whole may have had its 
tradition of indirect power and formlessness in policy, but it was this western most 
outpost that by its very nature would exemplify these principles the most thoroughly,141 
which is why it, more than any other part of the empire in the limited space we have to 
examine it, deserves such a thorough exploration. 
While the founding Khan of the Mongol Empire, Chinggis Khan, was still alive the 
Mongols had previously conducted a reconnaissance in force into the Russian 
principalities in 1223. The culmination of this first campaign had been the Battle on the 
River Khalka which had shattered the combined armies of the Russian kingdoms. The 
Mongols then withdrew this relatively small scouting detachment to rejoin the main 
armies for further campaigning against the northern Jurchen-Chinese Jin state.  
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Thinking the danger over, the Russian principalities soon returned to their own 
squabbling with each other.142 
The Mongols had yet to strike in true force, however. Under the reign of Chinggis 
Khan’s successor, Ogedei, western expansion, along with consolidating and expanding 
gains in the Middle East, became a higher priority. From the beginning, the conquest of 
Russia and other lands west of the Urals was a multinational affair. The Ulus allotted to 
Jochi had yet to be conquered before his death and so his son Batu set forth with a core 
of Mongol troops and recruited numerous Turkic, Alan and defected Kipchak tribesman 
to strengthen his forces. The Kipchaks, who would later give their name to this 
enterprise, were another Eurasian nomadic people who had taken up residence in the 
steppes of southern Ukraine and confederated with the Cuman people, who were of 
similar extraction. Nominally allied to various Russian principalities they saw the 
Mongols as their gravest threat. This Kipchak-Cuman alliance already functioned in a 
flexible and amorphous way that would in many ways presage what was to come.143 
The Mongol armies under the nominal command of Batu (the veteran general 
Subotai, who had already conquered large tracks of China and Central Asia, actually 
commanded the field battles) proceeded to advance westward deep into the Russian 
forest zone. This attack was conducted in the dead of the winter of 1237, with 50,000 
men using the frozen rivers to rapidly advance upon the northernmost Russian 
principalities.  Such provinces as Ryazan and Vladimir were the first to fall, as they were 
viewed as the most powerful and the ones least touched by the previous Mongol 
incursion. Being seen as major threats meant they suffered disproportionately, and were 
not just taken and sacked, but virtually destroyed. By the time Kiev fell, in 1240, the 
remaining Russian nobles and princelings agreed to swear fealty to the Khan, even in 
the unconquered Novgorod Republic.144  The Mongols went on to invade Poland and 
Hungary, crushing the armed forces of those countries as well as the Teutonic Knights 
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before wintering on the Hungarian plain and withdrawing to vote in the Empire’s 
succession as Khan Ogodei had died while they were on campaign. Although the 
Mongol armies withdrew from Eastern Europe, they did remain on in Russia.145 
The Mongols also used spies to cite their document of law which was made by 
Chinggis Khan, The Yasa, as proof to religious dissenters that they would have 
freedom, to merchants that their trades and wares would be secure, and to peasants 
that they would be protected from the rich. The consequences of non-cooperation, 
however, would be dire. It was in this way that they were able to win support from many 
segments of the population, especially the important merchant and trading classes and 
conclude such a vast and ambitious campaign in little over two years.146 Sun Tzu would 
have applauded this type of intelligence gathering and lightening campaigning that 
utilized his ideas of shock, maneuver, and deception. But the Kipchak Khanate had to 
be governed as well as conquered, and it was here that the principles of the Formless 
Empire really shone through. 
The name Golden Horde, which probably comes from the yellow gers (tents or 
yurts in Turkic languages) of the royal family’s entourage, is primarily a western 
classification. It did not take long for the Ulus of Jochi to become known both within and 
outside its borders as the Kipchak Khanate. Mongols, though composing the upper 
echelons of royalty and hierarchy, were a minority in their new state. Most soldiers were 
Kipchaks or various other Turkic peoples and intermarriage became so frequent that 
even the royal family itself came to represent an amalgamation of its various nomadic 
populations, forming a new ethnicity which would come to be called ‘Tatar’.147 
 The actual organization of the Kipchak Khanate was largely the creation of Batu 
Khan, though it remained in place for almost a century and a half, adapting to changing 
circumstances but remaining fundamentally the same. One of the most unique attributes 
to this state was the lack of any sort of direct rule policy towards the Russian 
principalities. The Mongols and Kipchaks stayed on the steppe, keeping their flexible 
nomadic life and building occasional cities in river valleys for administrative and trade 
purposes. Meanwhile, the Russians were left in their divided factions under their native 
                                                          
145
 Beckwith, 189. 
146
 Vernadsky, 117. 
147
 Ibid., 133. 
63 
 
rulers. Mongol tax assessors and representatives were left among the aristocracy but 
for all purposes the Russians retained their lands and titles.148 What made these 
princelings part of an empire was the indirect methods used to bring about their 
submission to the Khan and his government which was located in the new city Sarai on 
the Volga River.  
 In addition to the building of a few new cities to facilitate commerce and 
governing, the Kipchak Khanate encouraged the numerous peoples of its empire to 
migrate into these cities. Turkic peoples, more settled Mongol aristocrats, Russians, 
Jews, Genoese, and merchants from many places outside of the empire came to set up 
new lives. With the various steppe peoples largely integrated and living a similar life to 
each other on the steppes, the state still derived a large amount of resources and 
control from having settled communities, farmers, crafters and traders. Given the 
dispensation of the aristocracy this could be done without sacrificing the mobility and 
military effectiveness that had made the Horde so dominant in the first place.149 
 
3.8…Political Organization of the Kipchak Khanate 
 
At first, the Khan of the Kipchak Khanate was officially a vassal of the Great Khan in 
Karakorum. As the empire began to fracture during Kublai’s rule and the official capital 
of his new Yuan Dynasty was moved to China, the loose vassalage grew even more 
tenuous. By the death of Kublai no one in the Mongol successor states paid homage 
anymore to the Grand Khan. Being naturally distant however, this affected the Kipchak 
Khanate little and it would end up outlast the other successor states of the Mongol 
Empire. Even upon its breakup it would still be able to subdivide into smaller states 
which had quite a bit of life left in them such as Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimean 
Khanate. The latter would last until 1783.150 
 Part of the reason for this successful and adaptable model, which could wrest so 
much tribute and influence from its neighbors as well as cling to life even in decline, was 
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the internal organization of the Kipchak Khanate itself. The Kipchak Khanate was a 
confederation of vassals within further overlapping structures of confederation and 
vassalage. A roughly feudal structure upheld by bonds of personal loyalty and sworn 
fealty that was forged in the steppes of Mongolia became merged with more official and 
bureaucratic forms of government picked up from previous Mongol experiences in 
Persia and China. Tying this together was a sort of proto-parliament type system 
common in the steppes of Eurasia: the Kuriltai. A discussion based forum, usually held 
in a grand ger, which would meet regularly to converse about domestic and foreign 
policy. The kuriltai could also nominate the successor of the empire. Although restricted 
to the royal family (or in dire cases a noble with some royal ties) the exact member of 
the monarchical lineage to be the successor was still chosen by election.151 
This system could also be manipulated for policy and inter-empire goals by the 
Khan. Batu Khan in particular was quite fond of using his indirect influence in both the 
Kipchak kuriltai as well as the kuriltai in the capital of the main empire (Karakorum) to 
bring about favorable goals for his newly conquered inheritance. Batu used the wealth 
extracted from his Russian vassals to fund his own intrigue. Being a possible successor 
to the throne of Great Khan over the entire empire, his voice carried much clout. But 
rather than gamble on trying to take the ultimate title Batu worked to establish his 
personal allies in Karakorum. Ogodei’s successor, Guyuk had rocky relations with the 
independently minded Batu, but after his death the next Great Khan was Mongke, who 
had served in Batu’s army during his invasion of Europe, and was elevated to that lofty 
position in no small measure due to Batu’s maneuvering and patronage.152  
The Russian princes were under the obligation to travel to the kuriltai as well as 
pay homage to the Khan whenever a new one ascended the throne or issued an edict. 
At great expense and with retinue the princes would make their way to Sarai (or 
whatever nomadic encampment the Khan might be in at the time of the appointment) to 
offer submission and ask for support against other princes or foreign foes. At these 
events the Khan would reward those princes he most wanted on his side, or those who 
                                                          
151
 Vernadsky, 210-11. 
152
 Rene Grousset. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
1970), page 596. 
65 
 
had performed some task that benefited his regime. Often, gifts were bestowed by the 
Khan so these arrangements were not always entirely one-sided.153 
Batu had therefore secured his own advantageous and semi-autonomous 
position while retaining the broader imperial links and the stable pan-Eurasian trade 
links forged by the empire. What he and his successors would do after this point would 
showcase further the uses of indirect power and flexibility so common to nomadic Inner 
Eurasian powers. 
 
3.9…Economic Structures of the Kipchak Khanate 
 
Despite their fearsome warrior reputation, and perhaps in large part because of it, the 
primary activity of the Kipchak Khanate was commerce. The previously discussed 
cosmopolitan cities filled with numerous peoples from the hinterlands and periphery of 
the empire served to connect numerous trade routes. The Mediterranean and Byzantine 
world was connected with the steppe and Central Asia as well as northern European 
with much further east than had previously been possible to directly reach with 
merchant caravans. Sarai boomed as travelers, traders, and ambassadors on 
exploration missions could pick up route in western Russia, Scandinavia, or the Black 
Sea and (theoretically at least) take it all the way to the Chinese coast.154 
 Lest it be thought this all a great triumph of multiculturalism, the entire system 
was of course built on vassalage and the payment of tribute by the conquered peoples. 
As the various nomadic groups in the population converged and became more equal 
the burdens upon the divided Russian principalities only increased. To fuel the rapid 
growth of the new administrative and economic the taxes upon the peasantry and 
vassal kingdoms could only grow. 
 Tax collectors called Baskaks were placed in the principalities, though they were 
often recalled once a Russian prince became a reliable vassal and more economically 
integrated with The Horde. Mongol emissaries and traders were the only direct Mongol 
presence that usually made its way into the Russian regions, as the nearby deployment 
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of nomadic forces just across the border of the forest zone in the steppe implied the 
penalty for disobedience. Therefore, aside from economically, there was little direct 
Mongol imperialism. The sphere of influence governed by the Khans over their non-
steppe and westerly possessions were indirect, with the army of the Horde only arriving 
to quash rebellions, support vassal princes and uphold the fiscal extraction net. Despite 
this, the Khan was acknowledged as the lord of eastern Russia. For two and a half 
centuries this would remain the rough system in place.155  
 As these systems were moving from outright vassalage to stratified economic 
unit, one principality in particular was quick to jump on the bandwagon. Seeing the 
prohibitive cost and risk of non-collaboration and the potential to go from backwater to 
forefront, Moscow was happy to become the economic and political collaborator of the 
Mongol overlords. When Ivan Danilovich (known now to history as Kalita or 
‘moneybags’) ascended the throne of Moscow in 1325 he saw an opportunity to exploit 
a niche as the Khan’s loyal tax collector and make a hefty profit for himself at the same 
time. By removing the Mongols from the process but still being able to render them their 
tribute payments Moscow became the ultimate broker in the inter-imperial relationship 
between the many principalities and the Horde. For instance, when Moscow became 
the Khan’s enforcer it often clashed with Novgorod, especially over silver payments 
from which Moscow took a cut. In exchange the Khan and Moscow could co-operate to 
keep Novgorod out of the hands of Lithuania. This served the purposes of both Moscow 
and the Horde.156 
As the runoff of this profit enriched Moscow the city also had the good fortune to 
be viewed increasingly positively by the Khans of the Kipchak Khanate. They in turn 
bestowed titles and honors on the princes of Moscow and often gave territories 
captured from less loyal princelings to enrich the domain of their most thorough 
collaborator. In this one instance, the relationship between master and vassal became 
much more symbiotic.157 
 The lifeline connecting these various webs of economic activity and 
communication was the postal or ‘yam’ system set up by the Mongols. This system of 
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postal riders with way stations every few hours ride away stocked with fresh horses 
enabled the quick transit of correspondence, contracts, and occasionally important 
goods. The yam was clearly a type of soft power constructed to both economically tie 
the empire together as well as keep the disparate areas integrated. Although an empire-
wide phenomenon, the yam was extended by the Kipchak Khanate to encompass its 
Russian vassals as well. The policy was so effective it was later adopted by Muscovy 
when it became the rising power in the region.158 
In the western provinces, further away from this nomadic base and its more 
closely tied vassals, the situation became much more complex and the foreign policy 
use of indirect action became starkly apparent-if more convoluted. 
 
3.10…Foreign Policy in the Kipchak Khanate 
 
The Republic of Novgorod, nestled deep within the forest zone and never subjected to 
siege or conquest by the Mongol army, found itself in a uniquely precarious situation. To 
its north-west the Germanic-Baltic crusading order of the Teutonic Knights used the 
collapse of Russian princely power to push east. To the south the Kipchak Khanate held 
sway over the remaining Russian principalities. Being a city state whose profitable trade 
routes were threatened (as well as its sovereignty) Novgorod could not stand alone. 
Therefore the city elders and Prince Alexander Nevsky chose to voluntarily submit to 
the Khan rather than become the stomping grounds of a fanatical order. To ensure 
regime survival it was better to live under the Horde than to bow before this extremely 
invasive and conditional Catholic-Teutonic help, especially at the cost of the local 
religion-which would be unaffected by Mongol policies but would have to be changed in 
order to even enter negotiations with the Teutonic Order on an equitable basis. The 
greater Orthodox Church in Russia had fared well under the Mongols, being required 
only to pray for the health of the Khan, and so the clergy feared the Swedes and the 
Teutonic Knights far more than the Horde.159 
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 Having paid his tributes Nevsky then turned west to confront the invasion of the 
Teutonic Knights and their allies. At the Battle of Lake Peipus in 1242 the invaders were 
dealt a crushing defeat and many of the fleeing heavily armored knights fell through the 
ice of the lake. Even with such a victory and a stabilized position, Nevsky turned back to 
the Horde and even made the trip to Karakorum to present himself to Mongke Khan 
upon his ascension to the throne.160 
 In the Caucasus the newly formed Ilkhanate, another Mongol sub-state that Batu 
had even sent troops to support became increasingly a rival. As the greater empire 
started to decay these two mega-states who competed over influence in the mountain 
range became the largest threats to each other. Unlike the Kipchak Khanate, the 
Ilkhanate was a direct-rule system of a Mongol army and ruling class ruling over a 
Persian and Arabic population. The rulers there, after sacking Baghdad and killing the 
last Caliph of Islam, were in no mood for accommodation with their Muslim subjects. 
Berke, the third ruler of the Kipchak Khanate, was personally a Muslim (though his state 
was not) and used his religious tolerance to his subjects and the lack of the Ilkhanate’s 
as an excuse for war in the Caucasus. Indecisive clashes occurred throughout the 
region before the issue petered out. Aside from opening up trade and diplomatic links 
with the primary rival of the Ilkhanate, the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, this issue had 
little impact on the Kipchak relation with Russia…except of course to show the vast 
differences between each Mongol successor state. It is relevant to note that the 
Ilkhanate lasted significantly less time than the Kipchak Khanate, being established in 
1256 and collapsing in 1325.161 
 Further south and west, different rumblings were taking place amongst the 
western Russian princedoms. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, fresh from defeating its 
own invasions at the hands of the Teutonic Order, was on the march for expansion. 
Russian princes on the western periphery of the Kipchak Khanate’s reach were quick to 
realize that an opportunity had opened for them to seek the best deal possible in 
exchange for their vassalage. Lithuania, the other large pagan empire in Europe at this 
time, sent forth similar lenient terms for vassalage to the Russian princes as the 
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Mongols had and now the ball was in the court of the Russians to choose who could 
better secure their interests. The security situation between these two jockeying powers 
who threatened so subsume all of Russia between them offered danger as well as 
opportunity.162 
The flirtation with another regional power such as Poland or Lithuania was cause 
for rival princes to use large allies against each other. As Prince Rostislav drew closer 
to Poland Prince Danylo of Galicia used this defection of vassalage to launch a war of 
expansion against the former’s territories. Equipping his army in the Mongol fashion he 
crushed his regional opposition to become the most powerful Russian prince in the 
west. Once Danylo became established however he pursued a much more balanced 
policy of trying to keep Mongol influence at a minimum while still remaining safe from 
attack. This did not always work and after a Mongol punishing expedition in 1259 he 
affirmed his vassalage. He did however marry into the Lithuanian nobility to keep his 
options open.163 
Danylo was not the only one to engage in this amorphous frontier. Princes allied 
to the Khan would expand the vassal network of their own volition, as then they would 
win favors with the Kipchak Khanate and a large amount of spoils…not to mention being 
supported from counter attack by the Mongols if they failed in these local quests to 
expand their power and territory. Mongol hegemony in the eastern parts of Russia could 
be a shield as well as a burden, but in the west where it was weaker large states like 
Lithuania could make significant inroads. But as Lithuania expanded steadily all the way 
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, using largely the same grand strategy the Mongols 
used, events would slowly come to alter this evolving indirect bipolarity. The fractured 
and divided nature of the Russian principalities would last for almost a century, but all 
the while the star of Muscovy was rising. 
Muscovy had kept its collaborationist posture for almost a century, but after 
tumultuous times for the Horde saw the adoption of Islam as state religion, ravaging by 
the Bubonic Plague, and a civil war over succession, this former city state had both the 
wealth and influence to change the tide. Prince Dmitri, (later Donskoi) a once vassal of 
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Khan Mamai, turned on his former master in retaliation for a lack of support for his own 
ambitions. Mamai had grown suspicious of the now ascending Moscow and his 
suspicions would turn to truth when Dmitri gathered a coalition of princes under his lead. 
This development so upset the previous international order that former foe Lithuania 
offered troops in alliance with the Kipchak Khanate in order to keep the upstart Muscovy 
down. Before this could happen Dmitri met and engaged the Khan in battle on Kulikovo 
Field in 1380. The battle was close and hard fought, but in the end the Russian coalition 
prevailed. Often portrayed as a decisive battle, the impact would not truly be known until 
years later. For although Muscovy was now a robust and independent nation free of 
vassalage, many other Russian states still submitted to the Horde, especially when 
Mamai was killed in a brief civil war and the tricky Toqtamysh took his place. Despite 
this reunification however, the temporary anarchy of the post-Kulikovo Horde had dealt 
them a great blow to both morale and prestige.164 
 
3.11…End of an Era…And Two New Beginnings 
 
The true end was soon to come, though it would not be from the west that the blow was 
struck, but rather from the east. The Horde was about to experience its demise the 
same way they had struck a fatal blow to Russia almost 150 years earlier. The tricky 
Toqtamysh may have established control over a re-unified Horde but his schemes to 
expand influence into Central Asia backfired when he invaded the territory controlled by 
his patron: the great conqueror Emir Timur. After repelling Toqtamysh, Timur drove 
deep into Kipchak territory in 1396 and destroyed the capital cities of  the Horde in Old 
and New Sarai along the Volga, as well as raiding and plundering many of the Russian 
principalities. Toqtamysh’s reunified Horde would eventually collapse into several 
different sub-Khanates such as Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimean Khanate which 
were separated by geography and objectives. Toqtamysh himself would be slain while 
on the run and many of his soldiers would defect to Lithuania, the Timurids, or one of 
the new local successor Khanates.165 This was the true end of the Horde, and from this 
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point on it would be Muscovy who was the expansionist state to whom others paid 
tribute.  
Once Ivan IV (Grozny-or ‘Terrible’) had conquered the Kazan Khanate, in 1552, 
the way east was wide open for the settled states to take up the mantle of flexible, 
mobile empire…at least in the north. Further south and east however the true slayer of 
the Kipchak Khanate had its own story to tell as well. In fact, with the fall of the Mongol 
successor state hegemony and the coming of gunpowder would usher in a new era. 
One of increasingly modern and more familiar looking states, but also states that had 
been undeniably influenced by their experiences at the hands of nomadic foes or 
predecessors. Even as the impact of the nomad began to fade from the central position 
in history, their influence would remain, and they still had some time to remain the 
dominant regional actors. 
 
3.12…Conclusion: 
 
This chapter has shown the relevance for those studying the nature of imperialism 
inside Inner Eurasia to be aware of the pre-modern historical precedents that were set 
there. It is important to establish that this was a frequently used and often effective 
grand strategy of powers in the history of the region. It was a natural evolution to suit 
the capabilities of the nomad and their goals of regime support while maintain a distinct 
and separate realm for themselves. Xiongnu, Khitan, and Mongol/Kipchak people strove 
to retain their mobility and lower their manpower costs by keeping themselves 
somewhat divested from direct rule. Instead they were content to control key geographic 
points, roads and trade routes, and tie it up nicely with a mobile rapidly deployable 
combat force that did away for the need for massive garrisons and fortifications.  
 Upon seeing this flexible and formless system of control the parallels with the 
present day are apparent. Maybe empires in the mold of the Khitan or Kipchak Khanate 
should be looked at more thoroughly than the more typical examples of imperial 
behemoths to understand the many multifaceted ways that power politics can work, 
especially when they have access to great mobility and the ability to advance and 
retreat from formlessness. 
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Chapter Four: The Post-Pax Mongolica Through The Timurid Powers 
 
“Through me the dying house of Chinggis flares up again…When I breeze by like the 
morning wind, the candle of Timur goes out as I pass.” 
 
~Muhammad Shaybani Khan 
 
4.0…Summation: 
 
In the last chapter we skipped ahead to focus on the Kipchak Khanate to the exclusion 
of the other successor states of the Mongol Empire, which we will deal with presently 
from the start of the disintegration of Mongol unity with the ascension of Kublai on 
through to new states which are arguably a kind of spiritual successors. The Chaghatai 
Khanate and the post-Yuan Mongols will be examined. The primary two states after 
these in the post-Mongol dominated order are both Turkic in origin, that of the Timurid 
Empire and, after the brief but very relevant hegemony of that state, that of the 
politically and dynastically related Mughal Empire.  
 Besides continuing our narrative of the evolving indigenous geopolitics of Inner 
Eurasia, the point of this chapter is to show continuity in policy even as the apogee of 
nomadic power-that of the Mongols-begins to slip away into the night. This prepares us 
for the coming chapter which shows the mantle of the formless empire being inherited 
by non-nomadic states for the first time since the height of the Han and Tang Dynasties. 
It also shows the variety of adaptations of changing circumstances that formless 
geopolitics can make and shows continuity along such lines as economic and foreign 
policy in the Inner Eurasian system, even while other factors begin to change in 
directions which move in different directions. 
 Also contained in this section is an admittedly unorthodox appraisal of Timur’s 
geopolitical objectives. Generally regarded as a poor administrator who built an 
ephemeral empire on the feat of skill at war alone, I take a contrary position more in line 
with John Darwin or Beatrice Forbes Manz, who are cited heavily in the coming pages, 
that Timur’s actual empire was much smaller than the realm of his conquests, and that 
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his objectives are much more about enrichment of a core at the expense of a periphery 
than about creating a massive and cohesive state under one law, as was the Mongol 
Empire at its height. This aspect of Timur’s career has been largely overlooked and 
hopefully redressing the balance can show the importance in the Timurid legacy to the 
topic being presently examined. 
 Following on the Timurid stage is the dynastically related Mughals, who take the 
formless geopolitics of Inner Eurasia out for a spin in the foreign territory of India with 
mixed results illuminating both for land and maritime powers alike, as well as illustrating 
the process of acculturation which often occurs in state with more flexible identities. The 
chapter then finishes with an examination of post-imperial Mongolia, its adaptation from 
being the first and only supreme hegemon of the entire region being examined in this 
study, to being a relatively insignificant nation on the margins of the various civilizational 
cores which re-emerged after Mongol collapse. 
 
4.1…The Chaghatai Khanate and Mongol Persistence in Central Asia 
 
The Chaghatai Khanate warrants a specific examination in this chapter dealing with 
later eras because it lasted the longest of all the Mongol successor states and came to 
overlap more with the states of the Post-Mongol era than it did during the ‘Pax 
Mongolica’. In addition, like the Kipchak Khanate, it remained a steppe-based enterprise 
with a clear delineation between nomadic ruling class, warrior elite and townspeople 
and farmers. While the Yuan and the Ilkhanate soon acclimated to local systems and 
the Yasa became less important for how they conducted domestic affairs, Mongol 
tradition persevered quite strongly in these two other successors.166 
Perhaps due to its central location within the trade networks and Mongol-ruled 
realms, the Chaghatai Khanate was the most peaceful of the sub-Khanates. It generally, 
despite its gradually increasing domestic autonomy in the late 13th Century, behaved in 
foreign affairs as a loyal vassal to the Great Khan in Karakorum (and then after Kublai’s 
ascension in Beijing). By the reign of the third Khan, Mongke-Temur, the Khanate had a 
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large amount of autonomy in foreign policy relating to more westerly nations such as the 
Mamluks in Egypt and the Byzantine Empire.167 
Within this state most people lived in a mostly rural fashion, with a strong 
agricultural base provided from the Turkic and Tajik peasant populations. The ruling 
classes intermingled with many of the pre-existing nomads making this segment the 
second largest element of population, and by far the dominant one. Within these 
interwoven elements lay the cities of Central Asia, though this would only be part of the 
state in its beginning. Much like the Kipchak Khanate, the rulers maintained a detached 
and hands off approach to governance. Despite the fact that most of their subjects were 
Muslim they did not even convert to the local religion until 1326, when the last Khan 
who controlled the state’s core territories, which were made at the time of its founding, 
tried to keep the decentralized state on a more unified path by adopting Islam. After his 
death however the area containing most of the trading cities of Transoxiana broke off 
into a complex mosaic of feuding local warlords.168 
This situation of partial fragmentation would eventually enable the rise of a new 
dynamic and expansive state which would build on the core left by the Changatids. 
 
4.2…Timurid Rise and Central Asian Revival 
 
Like a phoenix rising from the ashes only to burn out again soon after, the rise of Timur 
(commonly known in the west as Tamerlane) would not only give the core area of the 
Central Asian trading cities its last truly homegrown and powerful indigenous son, but 
also make them the center of a new political re-orientation. Rather than being tax 
collection depots for foreign nomads and distant interlopers the cities themselves would 
be the core of this newest nomadically driven enterprise. The brevity of the Timurid 
Empire is well understood, but to understand its relevance in the evolution of formless 
empires and geopolitical strategy is not. As it represents the beginning of a transitional 
phase, as well as leaving important dynastic and economic legacies, it deserves to be 
looked at particularly in depth in order to establish the start of when things began to 
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change into something more understandable to geopolitics from a contemporary 
perspective. 
 Timur’s origin is one of minor aristocracy in the peripheral Barlas tribe, which was 
located in present day Uzbekistan. Timur entered the feudal service of Moghulistan’s 
(as the Chaghatai Khanate was increasingly becoming known as due to the Mongol 
ruling class integrating more and more into the local culture) Khan Tuglug-Temur in 
1360 but eventually rebelled when overlooked for a promotion opportunity. He then 
attached himself to the Khan of Khorasan and soon after received the arrow wounds to 
his right arm and leg which would henceforth classify him as “the Lame” or Timur-i-
Lenk.169 170 
 In the fractured realm of post-hegemonic Chaghatai decay the numerous 
independent rump states offered great opportunity to the ambitious chieftain and soon 
he was rising over the lordship of great cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara. With a 
few strategic marriage alliances into the Chingisid line and a simultaneous commitment 
to both the settled and nomadic cores of his power base, Timur rose to control most of 
the territory which had fractured off the western edge of Moghul control.171 According to 
Hookham: 
 
“Timur was active in plunder, pillage and spoliation, and gathered supplies and 
collected resources and won to his side the common people and the leaders 
alike, who obeyed whether they wished to or not…So he gained the realms of 
Transoxiana and subdued the population by force and compulsion.”172 
 
 
As a nomadic tribesman whose capital was a city, and who patroned the arts and 
infrastructure as well as just the trade of his core cities, Timur was already moving in the 
direction of a different kind of conqueror-albeit one still firmly rooted in Inner Eurasian 
traditions.  
 Timur’s empire has required a fairly negative historical reputation based on the 
massive amounts of devastation he inflicted on places such as the Caucuses and Iran. 
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He waged numerous campaigns across territory he had previously conquered and then 
failed to administrate the areas, resulting in breakaways and rebellions which 
necessitated his return to campaign in the region again and again.173 Considering 
however that Timur’s primary objectives were domestic, these peripheral lands should 
be considered less his territories than his unfortunate neighbors and perpetual raiding 
grounds. Timurid campaigns were not for territorial aggrandizement outside of Central 
Asia, but rather the accumulation of wealth and prestige for cities like Samarkand and 
Bukhara. In addition to this objective was the added benefit of taking potentially 
rebellious and predatory Chinggisid nobles out of Transoxiana and into foreign 
campaigns where they could share in Timur’s prestige and looting. This removed the 
displaced former rulers and regional aristocracy from Timur’s unguarded rear and also 
gave them something of a stake in the current political system. In addition to this, the 
policy also prevented the predatory nomads (who were no longer the sole tax collectors 
of Transoxiana) from raiding the locals of their own nation in order to supplement their 
income.174 
 To use a more modern term than is generally not applied to these eras, Timur 
was a patriot. Not to the Changhatai Khanate, whom he largely usurped and relegated 
to secondary status within their own realms, but rather to the region of Transoxiana at 
large. He was de facto emperor (or ‘Emir’, his preferred titled) of Transoxiana, and it 
was up to him to restore, through wealth, prestige, and art, its central location in Eurasia 
both culturally and economically. His objectives were to wreck rivals, redirect trade, and 
to balance the concerns of his nomadic and agrarian core constituencies.175 With this in 
mind a further exploration of his career and his likely purposes can show his critical, if 
brief, role in the evolution of the formless empire in Eurasian geopolitics. No longer did 
grand conquerors in the region dream of uniting the entire steppe and its periphery 
around their personal rule, rather than sought indirect hegemony through targeted 
campaigns with economic and status related motives. 
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 Moving, however unconventionally, in the direction of a centralized state and to 
cosmopolitan patron as me may have been, Timur’s army was still a cavalry-based 
nomadic force of Turks, Mongols, and others of a similar lifestyle. Whole families, 
including warrior women, accompanied the army on campaign and lived as if on a giant 
migration, setting off on deep campaigning with little established supply lines eminently 
doable. According to Arabshah, Timur’s often hostile contemporary historian, the army 
(despite being part of a now almost uniformly Islamic Central Asia) contained many 
pagan and foreign elements as itinerant warriors from all over the continent flocked to 
join up with the successful Emir Timur.176 Nomadic steppe toleration helped further the 
goals of geopolitical control, once again. 
 With his actual hegemony secure in the core and his de facto hegemony now 
extending out into the Middle East, Timur turned to his northern frontier. With his help 
the outcast warlord Toqtamysh (see Chapter 3) was placed as a Timurid ally on the 
throne of the now declining Kipchak Khanate. Barely had any time passed however 
when Toqtamysh turned on Timur and sacked Tabriz while he was away campaigning 
elsewhere.177 
After seeing off this raid and forcing Toqtamysh to re-acknowledge Timurid 
supremacy, Timur brought the remainder of outlying Central Asia and Iran under his 
control, as well as pushing up to the southern borders of the Kipchaks by reducing 
Georgia and its neighbors to vassalage. It was at this point in 1388, while Timur was 
largely mopping up small fractured states, when his most dangerous enemy, who was 
apparently un-chastised from before, struck once more from the back.178 
Toqtamysh’s objectives may not seem apparent, but this is after he had 
temporarily re-established hegemony over the Russian states in the post Kulikovo world 
(Chapter 3) and was clearly trying to re-establish the Kipchak Khanate outside of Russia 
as well. The disputed pasturelands north of Iran were the perfect testing ground for the 
finicky Khan to bid for supremacy against Timur. By 1387 he was already deep in 
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Timurid territory encouraging the revolt of various nobles recently co-opted into the 
Timurid Empire.179 
Rather than immediately rush to engage, Timur saw the threat posed by this third 
column of disgruntled nobles and made sure his various campaigns to establish 
hegemony in his outlying areas was not interrupted. Only once he had completed the 
rooting out of potential problems amongst the nobility did he turn (more than a year 
later) to engage with the forceful annexation of his northern frontier provinces by 
Toqtamysh. In the meantime Toqtamysh sent Timur some envoys to hammer out a 
peace deal, Timur’s response was apparently dismissive according to Sharaf al-Din 
Yazdi: 
 
“When your master Toqtamysh was wounded and fled the enemy, I received him 
like a son. I took up his cause and made war on Urus Khan on his behalf. I 
sacrificed my cavalry and equipment, which were lost to that hard winter. 
However, I continued to support him, and placed this country in his hands. I 
made him so strong that he became Khan of the Kipchaks, and he mounted the 
throne of Jochi.But when fortune began to smile on him, he forgot his obligations 
to me. He chose the time when I was occupied with the kingdom of the Persians 
and the Medes to betray me, sending troops to ruin the borders of my realm. I 
pretended not to notice, hoping he would be shamed into regretting his action. 
But he was so drunk with ambition that he could not distinguish good from bad; 
he sent another army into my country. It is true that when we marched against 
him his advance guard turned tail at the very dust of our approach. Now, when 
Toqtamysh has heard of our approach, he craves pardon, not seeing any other 
way of avoiding the punishment he deserves. But since we have seen him break 
his word and violate his treaties so often, it would be imprudent to trust his 
word.”180 
 
The titanic clash between jilted master and tricky protégé for the two most powerful 
Inner Eurasian states of their time was about to come, and it would have a resounding 
impact on the history of both Central Asian peoples, and perhaps even more critically, 
on the agrarian players who so far had been victims rather than conquerors in the 
system. 
 
4.3...Clash for Hegemony 
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Emir Timur’s force struck into the Kipchak Khanate via the eastern Siberian approach, 
circumventing the mountains and well-defended Caucasus to approach Sarai and New 
Sarai from the east. The vast expanses of Siberia however were not ideal for 
provisioning Timur’s massive army, and Toqtamysh was sticking to the tried and true 
steppe tactic of constant tactical withdrawals and leaving behind nothing but scorched 
earth. Periodically, Timur had to stop his army even when on the verge of engaging the 
Kipchak Khan and organize giant hunts to acquire the food needed by his army. This of 
course exposed his forces to harrying counterattacks.181 
Toqtamysh had now moved so far north that he ran out of steppe and had to 
retreat into the taiga forest of Siberia before wheeling west into the Northern Caucuses 
after being thwarted in an indecisive battle. This slowed his flight immensely and 
Timur’s scouts soon detected signs of the enemy camp in the Terek river valley. In June 
of 1391 the armies engaged. After Timur had changed his observed battle formation in 
the night to something less predictable he charged the slightly numerically superior 
Kipchaks. The fight was desperate, with at one point Toqtamysh himself in a rare 
showing of fortitude charged his guard straight through Timur’s army, temporarily 
dividing it. This potential rout was only stopped (so it was said) by Timur ordering his 
grandson to start preparing a meal in a nonchalant fashion to which they would leisurely 
sit down to eat, which would state to his reserves that they would be neither leaving the 
field nor retreating when so deep into enemy territory. With this in mind Timur’s reserves 
charged at the now over-extended Kipchak forces and put them to flight. Toqtamysh 
fled into exile in Lithuania as the remnants of his army were chased down and 
slaughtered for miles across the region. Thus ended the threat posed by Timur’s most 
dangerous foe.182 
Although Toqtamysh would live on (and even slightly outlive Timur by a year) he 
did so as the auxiliary to Lithuania’s interests in the east and would eventually be killed 
by the joint Timurid and puppet Kipchak forces in an inglorious manner in 1406 after 
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attempting, in alliance with Grand Duke Vytautus, to recapture his position in the now 
shattered Kipchak Khanate.183 
Before leaving to return south, Timur returned to his strategy of plunder and 
proxies, rather than take any additional territory formally from the Kipchak Khanate. 
After thoroughly devastating both of the Sarai cities, he sent forth his units to plunder to 
their hearts content while he placed a puppet Khan on the Kipchak throne. Having 
uprooted the various links in the still-functioning trans-Eurasia northern Mongol trade 
network, Timur not only accomplished the immediate enriching of himself and his army 
as payment for their service in the rigorous and difficult campaign, but also restored the 
Transoxianian trade routes of the south to their former pre-eminence in the economic 
system of Eurasia. Once again, Timur was not building a giant empire or waging wars of 
conquest, but sabotaging other neighboring states to restore economic and political pre-
eminence to the trading cities of Central Asia.184 
 
4.4…Foundations of the Formless, Yet Modern, State 
 
The chief rival now removed from the equation, Timur could now turn to both ravage 
softer targets to the south, and also indulge in the patronage of his beloved Samarkand. 
Public gardens and large mosques shimmering with blue tile rose up and his people 
were often exempt from increased taxation to pay for these power displays. The 
reinvigoration of the trade routes through their lands coupled with the massive spoils 
brought back by both Timurid and Chaghatai nobles into the kingdom made such 
lavishness both possible and likely justified in the eyes of their subjects. Indeed, the 
growing suburbs of Samarkand where named after the other great cities of the Islamic 
world in order to show the subordination, at least symbolically, of those cities to 
Samarkand, with the new neighborhoods of ‘Damascus’, ‘Baghdad’, ‘Shiraz’, ‘Cairo’, 
and ‘Sultaniya’ leading the way. Within these new areas were fountains of iced water 
and fortresses built outside. For the first time ever, an avowed nomadic state founder 
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was constructing fortresses while their army was still nomadic and their territories 
mostly still steppe.185 
 Timur would go on to invade the Delhi Sultanate in northern India. It would 
become his most profitable campaign of them all, driving the war elephants of the sultan 
back on his own armies through the use of caltrops and putting the massive armies of 
that state to inglorious flight. This time no puppet leader or any other pretense of 
vassalage was even considered. It was simply a raiding expedition for the wealth of 
India, and once enough of it was pillaged Timur’s armies departed west to subjugate 
Mamluk Syria and move deep into Anatolia to confront the nascent state of the Ottoman 
Empire. On this rapid five years of whirlwind wars all around the periphery of Inner 
Eurasia, Hookham says: 
 
 “The campaign of Five Years had, in fact, destroyed in four seasons the one 
opponent capable of offering decisive resistance to the Lame Conqueror. It had 
secured the vital centers and stages of the trade routes of the Levant, as well as 
the plunder of the provinces from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf and the 
Indian seaboard. It had brought Timur’s conquests to the marches of Arabia, thus 
challenging the dominion of Bayazid the Ottoman Turk.”186 
 
And so Timur’s final challenge (though he had no way of knowing that at the time, of 
course) was Bayezid “The Thunderbolt”, Ottoman Sultan and decisive defeater of an 
elite crusader army outside of Nicopolis. On the verge of being the conqueror of 
Constantinople, Bayezid first had to face down the onrushing hordes of Timur’s army, 
now augmented by elephants with Greek fire projectors on their backs. Hastily, Bayezid 
and Timur both, after an exchange of increasingly acrimonious letters, rushed from their 
respective directions to meet on a plain near modern day Ankara for battle. Timur, 
knowing he would be going further away from his base of support than his opponent, 
had numerous spies, paid travelers, and traders travel ahead before reporting back to 
him, thus he was able to secure the favorable terrain, including the wells, for his army 
before Bayezid.187 
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 Bayezid was the first truly skillful general Timur had faced since Toqtamysh, and 
had a professional army which could rival Timur’s. However, it was augmented by 
auxiliaries of Tatar extraction of dubious loyalty, and before the battle Timur had used 
the tendrils of his intelligence network to secure their betrayal of their Ottoman master. It 
was this, in the pell-mell and closely fought battle which followed, that turned the tide as 
the more nomadic Tatars turned on their partially settled Turkish allies and gave full 
victory for Timur. Bayezid was captured, and his exact fate remains unclear to this day, 
but he eventually died in captivity. The Ottoman siege of the rump Byzantine Empire 
was called off as a bloody succession struggle picked up in the vacuum. Timur returned 
home in triumph only after a brief excursion to the coast of Smyrna to wipe out the last 
crusader stronghold in the region (thus doing his service as a ‘ghazi’ or holy warrior). 
His grim parting blow, as the remaining Knights rowed away into the sea, was to 
catapult the heads of their fallen companions towards them.188 
 Timur planned on his most ambitious campaign yet-one to the still-young Ming 
Dynasty which had supplanted the Mongol Yuan with a native Chinese dynasty. 
However, after setting out to cross the mountains on his way to Xinjiang he caught an 
illness and, far into old age, expired. The campaign dissipated in the wake of his ending, 
and soon after the outlying regions of the empire began to fall away.189 
 What is to be made of Timur’s career is less about the immediate impact of his 
campaigns, with the obvious exception of his enriching his home region and decorating 
his cities themselves as his monuments to triumph, but more about what would come 
next. For the first time since the Han Dynasty in China someone had blended the grand 
strategy of a state primarily agrarian in character with the tactics and the abilities of the 
nomads. The division between nomad and settled was becoming less clear and Timur 
had opened the door to a new transitional era. It was an opening for which many others 
would follow on through. 
 
4.5…A Legacy Transforms into a Second Incarnation 
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The Timurid Empire is often understood to have effectively collapsed soon after Timur’s 
death, but as has been demonstrated by the nature of Timur’s campaigns, most of what 
was immediately lost to rising factions like the Ak Koyunlu tribesman and regional Turkic 
rulers in Iran was not really part of the Timurid Empire but rather their stomping grounds 
for raiding. The core territory of the Timurid realms, the traditional cities of Central Asia, 
remained for a few more generations under Timurid rule, along with parts of northern 
Iran.190 
 Shahrukh, Timur’s first successor, faithfully governed according to the Yasa of 
Chinggis Khan. Under his administration, as under the dynasties’ founder, nomads were 
given more regional autonomy than settled people, though both communities had a 
significant measure self-governance provided they stayed within what was expected of 
them. In fact, the level of decentralization was so great that the many tribes and cities 
soon became as much a hindrance in their autonomy as they were a decentralized cost-
cutting measure.191 
 Despite the eventual rule of the enlightened stargazer Ulugh Beg, the military 
weakness of the state and its gradual disintegration was becoming more and more 
apparent as the century wore on. The decreasingly loyal subordinates had to be kept in 
check with divide-and-rule tactics. Eventually, though the wealth and prosperity of the 
Transoxianan cities still gleamed, the political power unraveled, and split. Minor 
princelings held on to some territory, while the Uzbeks (themselves refugees from parts 
of the collapsing Kipchak Khanate) invaded from the north. Muhammad Shaybani Khan, 
a Chinggisid, was able to re-establish power over many of the Central Asian cities, and 
so it seemed that Toqtamysh had his posthumous revenge…but the story of the 
Timurids was not yet over. 
 
4.6…Mughal Dawn, Timurid Rebirth 
 
To chart the rise of the Mughals, and thus, dynastically, also the resurgence of the 
Timurid line, historians are fortunate to have an indispensable source which is not only 
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primary, but autobiographical. It was the founder of a new empire, Zahir ud-din 
Muhammad Babur, known usually for expediencies’ sake and historical convention by 
his nickname of just ‘Babur’ (Farsi for ‘tiger’), kept a detailed journal from his youth in 
Transoxiana to the establishment of his rule across much of northern India. Using this 
as our primary (but by no means only) guide to the formation of the Mughal period offers 
a glimpse not only into the actions of someone engaged in Inner Eurasian geopolitics at 
an important transitional moment, but also a view directly into the conscious decision 
making processes of its most pertinent driving actor. 
 Born in 1483 to the royal lineage of the Timurid line, Babur rose to the kingship of 
what effectively had atrophied to a Samarkand city-state at the age of 12. His unstable 
rule, run effectively under his mother’s influence and advice, weathered numerous 
upheavals, including a revolt by the knightly Tarkhan class of elite warriors, tribal 
warfare amongst the other cities and countryside of Transoxiana, and divided factions 
within his own realm of rule.192 
 This was not the ideal situation to learn the art of statecraft, and the boy and his 
family were soon evicted from their inheritance. Despite this, the young Babur learned 
quickly and retaliated, temporarily seizing back Samarkand from the usurpers and 
exerting enough authority to stop his army from looting the population. This second 
reign would, however, be of even shorter duration than his first. Once Babur left the city 
to take Andizhan he would only lose it to the ever southwards-expanding Uzbeks under 
Muhammad Shaybani Khan. Deserted by all but 200 warriors and his immediate family, 
Babur fled south in 1498 at the age of fifteen.193 
 Babur himself started to notice a certain acceleration of changes which presaged 
a new geopolitical era in Inner Eurasia. As he continued his flight south he remarked on 
the noticeable physical changes to the landscape which was manifested starkly in the 
massive amount of fort-building: “Because of the Moghuls and the Uzbeks not a single 
village is without a fort.”194 After yet another failed sojourn to recapture part of the lost 
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Transoxiannan lands Babur then entered dejected exile in Tashkent, composing a line 
to describe his sorry state of affairs: 
 
No one remember anyone in tribulation/ 
No one gladdens anyone in exile. 
In this exile my heart has not been gladdened/ 
No one can be comforted at all in exile.195 
 
After gathering enough patronage to be able to reconstitute a following, Babur 
moved into Kabul, which he would place under his own rule. His following there as well 
as his wealth and relative power also grew, as he now could launch raids into 
“Hindustan” or the Indian Sub-Continent with ease and the booty proved both lucrative 
and helpful in building up a new army.196 Soon, at the gates of Herat, the Uzbeks where 
finally stopped and their southwards expansion was halted. Shaybani Khan (whom 
Babur had taken to regularly referring to as ‘Wormwood Khan’) had won the struggle 
finally. The Uzbek position in the lands they had overrun was secure. Returning to the 
north looked like an increasingly futile enterprise, and so Babur would sate his lust for a 
kingdom elsewhere.197 
 Despite all the losses, Babur’s army was stronger for it. He had adapted to 
learning at the hard end of conflicts well. His small force which he led into India to 
replace the Afghan Lodi Dynasty sitting upon the decaying Delhi Sultanate was well 
equipped with matchlock firearms in addition to its more traditional Central Asian load-
out. Meanwhile, the Lodi Dynasty had technologically stagnated and divided along 
sectarian lines of Afghan rulers and disgruntled Hindu nobles. Though outnumbered 
and with a so far unimpressive record, Babur saw this as the time to strike south and 
take in India what he had lost in Central Asia.198 
  
4.7…India Gets A Taste of the Formless Empire 
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In 1525 Babur made it to the outskirts of Delhi, where a massive yet hastily collected 
Lodi force under Sultan Ibrahim Lodi waited for him, equipped with war elephants and 
daring the much smaller invading army to attack them. Rather than do this, Babur drew 
up a defensive line in Panipat, a town to the north-west.  There his flanks could be 
secured by the town on one side and hills on the other, allowing for a funneling effect of 
the enemy should they come for him. A trench was dug across the front and-something 
new for an Inner Eurasian army-acted as the linchpin of the defense-lines of matchlock-
armed infantry behind a field fortification. This new innovation was still paired with 
traditional horse-archer and heavy cavalry formations that went out to raid the Lodi army 
on nightly occasions and kill stragglers to inspire fear.199 
 Having an upstart enemy so closely camped to his capital Lodi had to attack, and 
so he did. As Babur planned he rushed into a headlong attack, thinking to use his 
elephants to maximum advantage. Babur’s cannons and matchlocks made short work 
of this charge, causing panic and confusion amongst the massive host. The cavalry 
then swooped in from around the flanks and completed a near-perfect encirclement of 
the enemy forces who suffered massive casualties. Sultan Ibrahim and half of his army 
were slain in the aftermath and the Timurid army moved into Delhi. The plunder which 
came from this single campaign alone would solidify the nobles behind Babur and allow 
him to constitute a new empire.200 This empire was seen as a successor to that of the 
Timurids, but it would go down in history by the name the Indians would give it-the 
Mughal Empire-based on their pronunciation of the word ‘Mongol’.201 
 Babur would go on to secure most of Northern India in the next few years, 
winning equally impressive victories over the Hindu noble Rajputs at Khanwa and 
stopping a Bengali counter-attack in the east. In all of these cases his small mobile 
army packing superior firepower was able to choose the location of the battle and react 
to changing circumstances faster than the larger and more cumbersome hosts of his 
foes.202 
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 Babur would not have long to enjoy his final success, for despite still being 
relatively young he succumbed to illness in 1531. His son, Humayun, was 
outmaneuvered by powerful nobles and had to flee the country, leaving the Afghan Sher 
Shar Sur in charge of the empire. While Humayun entered the protection of the Safavids 
in Iran, this usurper turned out to be quite capable. He built the Grand Trunk Road, the 
longest road in India, to better facilitate commerce and communication through the new 
empire, but when he died in a gunpowder explosion and his heir did not last long in the 
aftermath, Humayun was able to return and re-establish the legitimate succession to the 
Mughal throne. Humayun would die the very year of his joint revenge and triumph 
however and so the throne was open now to his son Jalal-ud-din Muhammad Akbar, 
whose reign in many ways would come to embody the nature of the height of Mughal 
rule, as well as the geopolitical nature of the traditions of the formless empire when 
exported out of its natural habitat and into the agrarian littoral.203 
 Akbar, like his grandfather Babur, would be established as ruler of the Mughal 
state at the age of 12, but fortunately for him the circumstances of his coming to age in 
rule would be much less harrowing. His first major challenge was to deal with the Rajput 
threat, which he did. In 1564 the major Rajput areas had been cleared, and during the 
fall of Garha-Katanga many of the noble women committed self-immolation en masse. 
Despite this dramatic act, Akbar saw an opportunity to solidify his rule in a way that 
would set the Mughals apart from the Afghans. The Mughal Empire would not merely be 
ascendant; it would also be an attractive place to live under, regardless of the faith of 
the subjects. This kind of toleration would not only solidify Akbar’s reign with the 
masses, but also ensure the relative weakening of Afghan, Uzbek and Timurid nobles 
who had already proved the consequences of their influence by deposing his father.204 
 Given the previous encounters between Muslims and Hindus in India it perhaps 
seems remarkable that the Mughals could so successfully co-opt the Hindu aristocracy 
for their state, but Rajput warrior ethics were actually a fairly good match for the Mughal 
imported Central Asian system. Generations of Rajputs would serve the Mughal state 
along with the imported semi-nomadic cavalrymen who were the core of the original 
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army.205 As expansion continued though more and more emphasis had to be put of 
infantry and sieges as the army had increasing difficulty in more broken and swampy 
terrain like the Deccan and Bengal.206 
 Akbar drew upon influences the Timurids had picked up from both their Central 
Asian background as well as their time in exile in the Iranian court to create a system in 
India that reflected the kind of strategies of rule and foreign policy that they were familiar 
with but adapted to the Indian circumstances: 
 
“Buoyed by conquest and plunder, Akbar and his advisers built a centralizing 
administration capable of steady expansion as new provinces were added to the 
empire. The Mughal emperor presided over a system that moved money, 
commodities, men, and information freely across the empire. The emperor and 
his advisers were rigorous managers who creatively adapted and responded to 
changing circumstances. Building on this foundation, Akbar’s successors 
oversaw steady growth in imperial effectiveness, power, and resources through 
the seventeenth century.”207 
 
Keeping this “heterogeneous body of free men” that was the Mughal nobility as a 
unified force was this facilitated by constant territorial, economic, and cultural 
expansion.208  
The Inner Eurasian heritage of the dynasty was the direct precursor to Akbar’s 
style of rule, so rather than being seen as a uniquely visionary ruler who tried to bridge 
divides in culture and tradition, perhaps Akbar should additionally be seen in the 
context of where his family came from and the techniques of statecraft which they 
inherited: 
 
“The Mughal Khan-the Great Khan- was different from the Khalifa of Islamic 
theory. The Great Khan was purely a political and military and not a religious 
leader. It was no part of his duty to enforce a well-defined and immutable code of 
divine or quasi-divine system of law as was the case with the Khalifa ground by 
the Shari’at . The Mughal sovereign had no such limitations. He was a political 
sovereign pure and simple.”209 
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Even in a place as foreign from its origins as India, the formless empire was a workable 
model for those with the speed and adaptability to use it. 
 In addition to his searching for religious syncretism and his rescinding of religious 
laws advocating the greater level of taxation from the ‘unbelievers’, Akbar’s long reign 
also had the fortunate circumstance of coming at a time of regional economic 
expansion. As trade routes around the world became more integrated due to European 
exploration and expansion, the vast markets of the Mughal Empire and its many 
exports found new markets, and New World silver flowed in from the Americas to 
greatly enrich the state. This influx of cash initiated a market-driven, rather than state 
directed, capitalist expansion in the early 17th Century. This would lead to the empire 
becoming quite possibly the largest and wealthiest economy in the entire world. Before 
the coming of the British, arguably before the capitalization of any nation save the 
Netherlands, the Mughal Empire had become a monetized and capitalist giant.210 
 
4.8…Selling Out, Mughal Style 
 
Jahangir rose to the throne in 1605, his reign would mark the largest territorial extent of 
the empire, but also the seeds of its fall. This could be seen in both military and 
domestic political factors. 
This process was of course a more modern version of what people like the 
Khitans and Kipchaks before had tried to avoid by remaining connected to their 
nomadic roots, with various levels of success. The Mughals, increasingly integrated 
through their own policies and also more and more cut off from Central Asia, had not 
retained their military and diplomatic flexibility. Well aware of the threat that someone 
could do to them what they had done to those who came before; Central Asian security 
became an increasing concern. But rather than flights of fancy regarding restoring 
Transoxiana to Timurid rule, this was a defensive and fear-based concern.211 
                                                          
210
 Richards, 63, 74. 
211
 Ibid., 110. 
90 
 
 The Mughal Empire had continued to follow its successful gunpowder based 
model, but the large siege weapons used in the south and east lacked the portability of 
the lighter field pieces used elsewhere, and the well-armed infantry had increasingly 
dislodged cavalry as the decisive arm of service. Furthermore, the erosion of the 
Central Asian concerns and lack of direct naval connections meant that the state was 
losing out of technological advancements being made in the rest of the Turkic world, 
particularly the Ottoman Empire.212  
On a campaign north to secure the frontiers of northern Afghanistan (itself barely 
a part of the empire anymore) the ponderous Mughal host, which clearly came to 
resemble something akin to a better armed mob from the Lodi period, could overwhelm 
their Uzbek foes with firepower, but never catch or outmaneuver them. The Mughals 
ended up being led around the country from frustrating action to fruitless pursuit. 
Finally, two years later, they gained two marginal provinces at the cost of 40 million 
rupees. The annual income of these provinces was only a few million combined. 
Meanwhile, the once-friendly Safavids had seized the opportunity of the Mughal’s 
embarrassing quagmire and driven into western Afghanistan, taking Kandahar and 
holding it against massive Mughal counterattack with superior artillery. Combined with 
an army breakdown in the Himalayas, the rule of Jahangir seemed to show the 
beginning of the reversal of previously ascendant Mughal power.213 
It wasn’t just the military failures that were the problem. For a country which had 
lost touch with its original roots, the domestic policies of Jahangir and later Aurangzeb 
would play a decisive role in ensuring that the Mughals inroads into being integrated 
into India would not work be a viable recourse either. 
The one front where the empire was still expanding was to the south. It reached 
its maximum southwards extent under Aurangzeb, though at this point it was largely 
expanding for reasons of capturing a monopoly on the regional textile trade with the 
Europeans and Gulf rather than for the glory of its upper classes and tribute system.214 
Aurangzeb, however, was much more totalitarian than even his increasingly 
conservative predecessors. He reinstated harsh taxes on non-Muslim subjects, 
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attempted to remove powerful non-Muslim nobles from positions of power, angering the 
core Rajput constituency in the process, and curtailed the freewheeling economic 
system that was at the center of Mughal economic might. State ‘censors’ who were 
agents to enforce sharia-type laws on the populace crawled through the marketplaces 
making sure nothing forbidden was on sale.215  
Having a trained but now unemployed cadre of military Buddhists and Hindus 
was bad enough, but internal trouble brewed on the opposite front as well. The more 
traditionally inclined Timurids resented the erosion of their cultural ties, as well as the 
loss of power by the traditionally influential females of the Timurid line. So while the 
empire began to crumble around the periphery for betraying the flexibility and 
dynamism of Babur and Akbar, it also rocked from dynastic revolts from within for much 
the same reason.216 
Despite his attempts at centralization and homogenization, Aurangzeb’s reign, 
which ended in 1707, had the opposite effect as what was intended. As more and more 
provinces became de-facto or even outright independent. The previously societally 
indifferent government had made a consensus that even European merchants felt at 
home in, but the reactionary tone of the Mughals into the 18th Century as well as the 
evident decay did little to slow the decline of the hegemon. A rising group of Hindu 
nobles, the Marathas, were fast becoming the new power. From their base in the west 
they harried the ponderous and increasingly backwards Mughal forces with light 
cavalry, guerilla tactics, and mobile strikes. The mantle of the formless had moved 
once again and soon what little that was left of the Mughal Empire was a rump state 
based in Delhi whose detritus was fought over like scraps between the Marathas and a 
succession of Afghan warlords. This lack of political and military power, coupled with 
still having some of the richest ports and merchants in the world would make much of 
post-Mughal India a tempting target for new colonial powers coming not just from the 
land, but the sea. With the sacking of Delhi by Nader Shah in 1739 (Chapter 5) the 
floodgates were open to the Dutch and above all the British.217 
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So ended an era where the formless met India. Other Central Asian empires had 
come to India before, but the level of impact the Mughals would have, especially 
financially and culturally, would mark them as among the most memorable of invaders. 
For two-hundred years they were the regional power, and considered only the Ottoman 
Empire to be another state worthy of being seen as an equal.  
In absolute terms the Ming Dynasty in China probably outclassed them both, but 
as Mughal trade was overwhelmingly directed west rather than east it hardly mattered 
to them.  Their mark on the Indian economy and society was so pervasive that the 
British chose to co-opt Mughal style governance and fiscal policy rather than simply 
introduce their own, at least initially.218 Elements of the Inner Eurasian style of 
governance matched with, rather than clashed with, the flexible, mobile, and mercantile 
nature of sea power. It was an omen of a general geopolitical trend to come where 
maritime nations would surpass the land states with technology that brought the mobile 
firepower of the steppe to be even more effectively wielded from the sea. 
 
4.9…The Fragmentation of Transoxiana 
 
Shaybani Khan could have taken the Uzbeks to new heights after his expulsion of 
Babur in the early 1500s, but it was not meant to be. He overreached himself in wars 
with the Safavids and was killed at the Battle of Merv shortly after his greatest triumph. 
‘Wormwood Khan’ would meet his end due to his aggression, but not at the hands of the 
Mughals. The legacy he left behind would be a mixed bag. He would reinvigorate post-
Timurid mercantile culture by importing Indian merchants, even while allocating formerly 
Timurid domains to his nobles through redistribution.219 
 Despite his short reign, Shaybani Khan’s reign was important for a variety of 
factors. Uzbeks, themselves migrants from the various Khanates which spring from the 
now-defunct Kipchak Khanate made a large proportion of them ethnically, but at this 
point they seemed much more willing than before to start settling down amongst the 
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farmers in significant levels. This led to an explosion of productivity in the cotton 
production of the region, which was only just then starting to really expand. This further 
sped up the process of formal bureaucratization as farming and production started to 
replace the centrality of herding and trade.220  
 His death however heralded the loss of many of the briefly held Uzbek domains. 
Bukhara became the rump state of the Shaybanid Empire, Kokand and Khiva broke off 
to become de fact independent city states and Bukhara’s awkward attempts to restore 
unity plus Khiva’s incessant raiding on its neighbors only exacerbated what would 
become full scale and lasting division.221 
 In addition, most of these states were divided by internal family feuds and 
rivalries which tore apart any kind of cohesive foreign policy. Small, weak, and divided, 
these post-Timurid state-lets where only saved (for a while at least) by their remote and 
distant location from the aggressions of others. The turning back of an antiquated 
Mughal army by the Uzbeks (as mentioned in the previous sub-section) was one of the 
last large scale triumph over people from outside Transoxiana they would have. 
Eventually this constant strife culminated in a large, draining, and ultimately indecisive 
war between the various Khanates in the region, after which many of them simply 
retreated into slave raiding Russian settlements and jealously guarding their increasing 
insularity. This spurning of traditional Inner Eurasian cultural and political openness and 
flexibility would have dire consequences in the centuries to come. Soon, the once 
colonized Russians would appear on the scene and turn the tables decisively on the 
region-and these once-roaming nomads and traders who had appeared so omnipresent 
and adaptable would have no inkling even of what was to come. 
 
4.10…Meanwhile, Back in Mongolia 
 
Mongolia was the genesis ,or at least frontier, of so many of the case studies examined 
in this study had one last indigenous hurrah to throw before the era of nomadic power 
and formless steppe empire started to come to a close. The pre-modern example that 
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most resembles modern day formless geopolitics (as will be discussed in later chapters) 
was pioneered by a later-Mongol leader who emphasized the very indirect and flexible 
nature that has so far been discussed, yet did so from a stable territory with little need 
for direction expansion into other nations. Her name was Queen Manduhai, or 
Manduhai Khatun. 
 As has been previously mentioned, the once unified Mongol empire started to 
disintegrate after the civil war of succession and the rise of Kublai. The universal laws, 
trade regulations (or lack of them) and tax policies inherited from pre-imperial steppe 
practices were applied consistently. At the time of the empire’s height (and its last 
phase as a truly unified entity) during the reign of Mongke the government exchequer 
contained so much wealth that slipped past the main Transoxiana bureaucracy that 
individual regions could keep enough for their own domestic investments.222   
 The process of change from Mongolian to more regional bureaucratization was 
one of profound impact, particularly in the era of the Yuan Dynasty. Started under 
Kublai (to strengthen his case as he campaigned to get the remainder of southern 
China under his rule) the Yuan after his death rapidly become more and more Chinese 
in character. As this was happening, economic development sprung up along the 
margins of the steppe, drawing in a massive amount of Mongolian immigration into new 
market towns in what would eventually become Inner Mongolia. This was useful for 
Kublai, as he was using the support of his settled constituency to fend off more 
traditional steppe rivals such as Ariq-Boke, and may have even been an intentional 
strategy to integrate populations on behalf of the Yuan government in later eras.223 This 
process eventually led to Mongolia being given civil and provincial administration in 
1307 under the Chinese style title of Greater Yuan province.224 
 When the dynasty collapsed in China due to internal revolt 225 and the native 
Ming administration soon took power over all of the remaining provinces of China 
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proper, the Yuan court fled north to Mongolia. However, they found that while they had 
never truly become Chinese, they had also ceased to be Mongolian. The court of the 
self-proclaimed Northern Yuan quickly sank into irrelevance. Factionalism reigned 
supreme on the steppe and the dynasty’s repeated tired claims of lordship over China 
seemed increasingly pathetic in the face of Ming expansion and the loss of territory to 
Turkic warlords in the western steppe. In fact, many Mongols stayed in the now Chinese 
ruled areas they had migrated to as the Ming offered more prosperity and security than 
the deluded Northern Yuan. This division remains in force today as the distinction 
between Inner and Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia (the province of China) remains 
the more populous of the two.226 As Jack Weatherford puts in most artful terms about 
the Northern Yuan: 
 
“No heroes came to recharge the energy of the sapped nation. No new allies 
came to join them. No armies set out to expand the decaying Mongol rule over 
China. Throughout the fourteenth century the Mongol leadership, especially the 
Borijin [Chinggisid] clan deteriorated. Each generation proved less competent 
and knowledgeable, as well as more isolated and corrupt, than the last.”227 
 
Into this vacuum Ariq-Boke’s descendants returned to Mongolia and became one of the 
ascendant clans. They had not squandered their political capital on becoming perfumed 
and obese aristocrats. However, there would be no resurgence of the clan overall, and 
this potential soon frittered away into just more division. The Northern Yuan was now so 
weak and insecure that Mongols in the employ of the Ming and mobile Ming cavalry 
units of Chinese soldiers alike raided with near impunity, or looted their own trade with 
Beijing and blamed the loss of valuables on Mongol raiders-which only increased the 
raiding of course.228 
 The titular Essen Khan, ruler of Mongolia (if largely in name) was soon 
assassinated opening up an entirely of claimants and a potential for a many-sided civil 
war. It was onto this dire stage that a woman named Manduhai tentatively stepped. 
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 Manduhai had been Essen’s young wife. She was now Manduhai Khatun, or 
female Khan. Her position was vulnerable. The Ming still campaigned and the Xinjiang-
based warlord Ismayil was attempting to place his own puppets into power in the 
Mongolian court. In a society where women may have been traditionally powerful, but 
never before actually the head of state (at least officially) the circumstances did not 
bode well for the post-imperial Mongol nation.229  
Fortunately, Manduhai found a legitimate Chinggisid heir; a small sickly boy with 
the extremely royal Mongolian name of Batu Mongke. Unfortunately, Ismayil had 
already found out about this family line and had abducted the boy’s mother. Queen 
Mandhuhai and her warriors rode to snatch the boy before the same fate happened to 
him and took him back to her primary encampment. She installed the boy in a formal 
ceremony there under the title “Dayan Khan” as joint ruler, and soon after married him 
officially. No one could now dismiss the Khatun, she had shored up her position.230  
Before confronting her two biggest threats though, she had to clean house in the 
north. The Oirats, a tribe of Mongols no longer under Chinggisid authority and from a bit 
further north-west began to migrate into Manduhai’s territory. She turned her forces and 
with General Une-Bolod struck a series of defeats against the tribe who had sought to 
capitalize on her nation’s present weakness.  The Oirats were driven from the field and 
from the lands they sought to claim for themselves, and so the disruption was ended. 
This show of strength from the new ruler however made it more apparent to her 
enemies that she was not to be underestimated, and so they began to gear up for a 
showdown with the Khatun. She would deal with each in different ways, but both 
methods would showcase the dynamism of formless geopolitical policy in ways 
reflective of both its evolution up to that point in history, and also in familiar to us 
contemporary viewers.  
The Chinese general Wang Yue increased tensions on the border by luring 
Mongols into traps with defenseless looking caravans and then launching ambushes on 
them while they pillaged. Though his policy was successful, it led to casualties and 
expenses which detracted from overall purpose of the Ming government, which was the 
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rebuilding and reconstruction of the Great Wall.231 Chinese internal politics had bought 
Manduhai a reprieve from one enemy, so she could focus on another. 
 The warlord Beg-Arslan was killed in an ambush by Manduhai in 1479, but the 
bigger problem, Ismayil, remained. He still had Dayan Khan’s mother, and now that the 
Khan was a teenager the shame of this slight could no longer be put aside for the sake 
of expediency. Besides, Ismayil had been interfering with Mongolian politics for 
decades. Manduhai had had enough and so she selected a small strike force of just a 
few of her best warriors and sent them west over the treacherous territory of Uighuristan 
on a twofold mission-to assassinate Ismayil and to return the Khan’s mother.232 
 This Mongolian strike force was lucky to come upon both objectives in the same 
place, and by surprise. Ismayil rode out to see who the small party of new arrivals were, 
and was shot dead by the expedition leader instantly. The party proceeded to loot 
Ismayil’s camp of its wealth, driving off his nearby supporters in the process, and took 
the Khan’s mother back with them when they departed. She had lived a long time with 
Ismayil and she had grown accustomed to the change. Needless to say the reunion or 
young Khan with mother was complicated and bittersweet, but the job was done and 
Manduhai’s territory now stretched west into the Uighuristan. This left the Ming 
challenge as the only major stumbling block to the newly invigorated nation.233 234 
 The Ming was a foe which could not be so easily dispatched. So rather than try, 
Manduhai enlisted a more soft power approach. The Ming knew she could deal 
immense damage to their frontier settlements and rob them of wealth if she so chose. 
This path would be dangerous for the Mongols, but also for the Ming. With this in mind 
she re-opened official relations with the Chinese dynasty after the multi-generational 
hiatus since the Yuan had ceased to be the rulers of China. In exchange for renouncing 
all claims on the people of China, and stopping the regular raiding in Inner Mongolia, 
Manduhai demanded full recognition of the Mongols as a sovereign entity with equal 
diplomatic status in negotiations with the Chinese and a resumption of trade between 
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the two. Even upsetting the traditional order of the Confucian state system was worth 
security on the northern frontier. The Ming acquiesced to the proposal in 1488.235 
 Manduhai used what little remaining time she had left to issue a decree 
recognizing all who lived the pastoral lifestyle in Mongolia as equals and part of the 
Mongol identity. She was, of course, hearkening back to Chinggis Khan’s Yasa, and in 
so doing she made sure that the various ethnicities that had migrated to the Yuan court 
back in the days of empire were integrated into the nation. These included Turkic 
peoples, Kipchak refugees of the breakup of the Kipchak Khanate, Uighurs, and even 
the descendants of Ossetian bodyguards that the Khan of old once had used. To build 
on this she also reiterated the old Yasa edict that the state would have no official 
religion. Like the Khitans she also made mobile flying base camps which rotated around 
the periphery of the empire securing the trade routes and holding hostile tribes at 
bay.236 
 Once Manduhai Khatun died Dayan Khan would become sole ruler. He would 
continue her policies and so would several generations of his descendants. A small 
nation sharing borders with a great power and hostile neighbors would endure until the 
rise of the Manchus in the 17th Century. This would have important implications for the 
future of states of the region, nomadic or not. Weatherford sums up Manduhai’s reign 
and political system from the perspective of a historian, though his observations are just 
as pertinent to the study of Mongolia in international relations, as well as the general 
concept of the formless empire that this study seeks to examine: 
 
“In contrast to the expansive territorial acquisition favored by prior generations of 
steppe conquerors, Manduhai pursued a strategy of geopolitical precision. Better 
to control the right spot rather than be responsible for conquering, organizing, 
and running a massive empire of reluctant subjects. […] Now, rather than trying 
to conquer and occupy the extensive links of the Silk Route or the vast expanse 
of China, she sought to conquer just the strategic spots from which to control 
them [indirectly].”237 
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Previous iterations of the formless empire had been large and dynamic, but often lacked 
long term staying power. Manduhai showed that nations, rather than empires, can not 
only play the game, but become powerful actors outside of their normal scope by doing 
so. In following the policies which she put into place Mongolia was a preview of a more 
modern period in the history of Inner Eurasia. But before that era could come, the 
geopolitical formlessness of the region would be first diminished, and then seemingly 
destroyed forever by the encroaching technological power and expansion of the settled 
states and their burgeoning populations who had suffered at the hands of it for a 
significant portion of recorded history. 
 
4.11…Conclusion 
 
This chapter has covered a period of time in which the formless empire, usually 
dominated by nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples, begins to integrate across 
civilizational boundaries more often. This process was accelerated by the changing 
nature of technology and economics, with the more maritime states now overtaking the 
land-based ones. The early Ming voyages of exploration into the Indian Ocean by the 
massive ships of Admiral Zhung He, temporary a venture as they may have been, was 
just a glimpse of what was about to happen with the nations of Europe. Whatever the 
cause though, at the end of the era the balance of power had already started to blur and 
the definition of what was formless politics would start to change. 238 
Not only were the nomadic peoples adapting and accommodating the settled 
states, but the settled peoples were learning their own lessons in turn, or re-learning 
them, which would soon bear terrible fruit for the nomads as the pace of technological 
change accelerated.239 Timurids maintained the separation between nomadic military 
and civil governance, all while running a massive trade-redistribution racket across 
Eurasia. Plunder fed the army and what can only be called economic redistricting fed 
the cities. It was a symbiosis along uniquely Inner Eurasian lines.  
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Meanwhile, the Mughals left the realm almost entirely (if not by choice) and over 
the course of time became more and more like the people they had come to conquer. 
Seeing the shifting winds of trade and priority they soon abandoned their Central Asian 
possessions and refocused on developing Indian and maritime commerce, effectively 
evolving into an entirely different kind of state through gradual adaptation.  
 The Central Asian states began to break up and decline. Timur had brought their 
prosperity a new lease, but long after his death the trends of global change had already 
started to pass the region by. Once a center of culture and commerce the various rump 
states of Transoxiana deteriorated into a succession of squabbling and increasingly 
impoverished backwaters.240 
 Mongolia had the most interesting adaptation (from a contemporary perspective 
at least-this example will return for comparison in later chapters) to the changing times 
and increasing power of the settled states. It effectively abandoned dreams of direct 
empire entirely and went full force down the path of indirect control. As has been shown 
previously, this was not new to Mongol policy by any means, but previous examples of 
Mongol indirectness usually involved direct conquest, at least initially, and expansion. 
Manduhai Khatun showed that in light of changes in the balance of power, Mongols 
could adapt accordingly and use the strategies they had perfected for defensive as well 
as offensive purposes. 
 No matter the geographic and circumstantial divergence that made these 
examples of an era in flux apparent, they shared one thing in common-the situation was 
changing, and the settled littoral states were on the rise. This reversal in the balance of 
power would re-orient Inner Eurasia, but not first without a fight. 
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Chapter Five: End of Nomads, Rise of States, and the Transference of a 
Geopolitical Legacy 
“Military strategists say: Those who show force arrogantly will lose; those who do not 
know the other will lose. Our army has committed all these mistakes. […] We cannot 
predict the day when I can wipe away this shame and take revenge.” 
~The Yongzheng Emperor’s Edict to General Yue Zhongqi regarding a Zhungar defeat 
of a Qing frontier army, 1731. 
“The vanquished always seek to imitate their victors in their dress, insignia, belief and 
other customs and usages. This is because men are always inclined to attribute 
perfection to those who have defeated and subjugated them.” 
~Ibn Khaldun 
 
5.0…Summation: 
 
When the end came for the formless empires of the nomadic confederations and armies 
of the steppe it would not be so much because of the failure of their own system, but 
rather of its large-scale adoption by the settled agrarian states which were so often their 
foes. Already we have examined how the Han Dynasty and early Muscovite Russia had 
varying degrees of integration within the systems of previously nomadic powers in 
Chapter III. Moving into the post-Mongol and Timurid eras a large change begins to 
occur; that of the partial adoption of formless geopolitics by the settled states at a critical 
technological juncture. The initial seeds of gunpowder and mercantile innovations, 
which were scattered throughout Eurasia due to the Mongol conquests and 
administration of their vast domains, had taken root in the vastly populated and often 
militarily beleaguered agrarian societies and bureaucratized states. 
Over the course of what is often termed the early modern period, the military and 
commercial balance of power gradually shifted to the settled states. The Mughals and 
their earlier Timurid ancestors were semi-nomadic elites who eventually became more 
and more sedentary, creating a type of transitional bridge between the nomadic 
formless and the more conventional state’s practice of similar strategies. But in this 
chapter the focus now moves to two states which are still with us today in the 
contemporary world, as both actors and originators of contemporary geopolitics, and 
102 
 
thus mark a direct lineage from this charted past: Russia, China, and even a little 
appearance by Iran. But before getting into those two colossi of Eurasia it is worth 
looking at the general strategic and tactical changes which occurred to make these 
states which suffered most from nomadic peoples turn the tables so decisively, though 
in the case of Iran, only temporarily. 
 
5.1…Gunpowder Shifting in the Wind: The Balance of Power Changes 
 
In the previous chapter the influence and changing nature of a state’s tactical options 
were discussed especially in relation to the adoption of gunpowder weapons becoming 
more and more widespread throughout all of Eurasia. Combined with greater mercantile 
and agricultural productivity and increasing naval technology, which enabled many more 
trade routes to become redirected to the maritime realm, the previously victimized 
settled states where seeing a logistic upgrade to complement their increasing military 
capacity. Even so, they would not attain true military dominance on the whole until the 
18th Century, when both Russia and China entered the real core territories of their 
longtime nomadic rivals for more than temporary excursions.241 242 This codification of 
the more conventional state would not however come away untouched from its 
interactions with the nomadic foes it so desperately tried to destroy. 
 Gunpowder weapons, attached to a more sophisticated and resource rich 
societal apparatus, would indeed be a decisive element of nomadic downfall, but even 
that paled in comparison with the new and more flexible understandings of geopolitics 
that were being developed in both China and Russia (and indeed, elsewhere). It is now 
time to examine how the settled states would both bring an end to the formless 
geopolitics of before and also bring about its new beginning. From the perspective of 
Eurasian land powers, the vast spaces still called for the utilization of proxies, 
ambiguous space, and unrivaled mobility. 
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5.2…Between Chinese and Manchu Worlds: The Qing Dynasty and China’s 
Eurasian Invasion 
It was the Qing dynasty, the last of the imperial dynastic age of China, which would 
most clearly come to define contemporary Chinese border and foreign policy in both its 
nature and its physical shape. Like the Khitans it was born in a foreign land, but unlike 
them it would shape the entire destiny of what we now call the unified Chinese state, 
even including its present day borders. 
The Jurchen people, who we previously met in Chapter III as the evictors of the 
Khitans from their first empire as well as the establishers of the Jin Dynasty, which was 
in turn destroyed by the rise of the Mongols, had not completely disappeared. Like the 
Khitans, many of them had been co-opted into the Mongol ruling apparatus. Unlike the 
Khitans, however, they stayed in their Amur River Valley area. With the collapse of the 
Mongol Yuan Empire in China the Jurchens could again re-assert sovereignty. At this 
point there were groups of Sinified Jurchens, ‘wild’ northern Jurchens, and Jurchens 
who maintained close contacts with Mongolia and China. The Mongol yam postal 
service remained in service throughout the Jurchen realms. The Ming Dynasty often 
projected military power into the southern realms of Manchuria to make sure that the 
Jurchen people remained cowed. Followed by the construction of numerous fortresses 
along the frontier, the costs of this policy eventually spiraled into a liability for the Ming, 
and they abandoned the project and withdrew their frontier further south in 1435.243 
The Jurchens experienced much of the Chinese culture, which they had now 
spent centuries out of direct interaction with through a type of “Mongolian filter” which 
influenced many independent chieftains to consider re-building their Eurasian style 
decentralized confederacy.244 In the late 17th Century this desire to be more than a few 
disparate tribes fighting for the scraps of what trade the Ming would give them grew. 
 In the Aisin-Goro  clan of the Jurchen was one young warrior seeking revenge 
for the death of his father at the hands of a rival tribe. He had been tutored by a Ming 
Chinese tutor, and was both literate and aware of the Chinese ways, but was also 
raised to be a proper horseback warrior. This was Nurhaci. As his quest for vengeance 
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unfolded he won battle after battle against the other tribes. His primary foes fled to the 
Ming, where that declining dynasty, fearful of the new power held by the Jurchens, 
acquiesced to demands by Nurhaci to put these exiles to death. It is around this time 
that a proper unified nation began to emerge for the first time since the old Jin Dynasty 
of the 12th Century. The term ‘Manchu’ started to replace Jurchen around this time, 
describing this rebirth of the Jurchens as a power.245 
Though his state was fragile and he dared not yet strike south for full on war with 
the Ming Dynasty, Nurhaci decided to occupy his warriors by moving west and 
incorporating the Eastern Mongol lands into his domain. As justification he is claimed to 
have said:  
“The languages of the Chinese and Koreans are different, but their clothing and 
way of life is the same. It is the same with us Manchus and the Mongols. Our 
languages are different, but our clothing and way of life is the same.”246 
 
To make sure he had the right amount of sinew holding together this new and flexible 
state, Nurhaci organized the Banner System. The ultimate combination of budding 
modern bureaucratic state with traditional Inner Eurasian decentralized organization, the 
Banner System was a way for warriors of all tribes and ethnic backgrounds to retain 
cultural autonomy with regards to the state apparatus, while being loyal to the 
Emperor/Khan (title dependent on person addressing) personally. Loyalty was ensured 
by making an elite warrior rewards system which valued prestige from battle but which 
brought the promoted warriors closer and closer to the Manchu ruling establishment, 
which they now had a stake in.247  
Having now secured his kingdom, Nurhachi turned on the Ming, but the fighting 
was inconclusive. The raids on the Ming redirected trade and tribute to Manchuria, and 
the Ming counterattacks were largely ineffective. Nurhaci seized the critical Liao River 
Valley in the south, where the Khitan Liao had once ruled, and thus finally had an 
agrarian base from which to farm surplus food. Soon after this success however 
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Nurhaci died in 1626.248 It would be a testament to his state-building abilities however 
that both the state he founded and the dynasty he propagated would not only long 
outlive his death, but both become symbols for formless geo-strategy in their own ways. 
When the Manchu people swept south to claim the reigns of the collapsing Ming 
state and set up their own dynasty, they did so using a combination of the mobile 
warfare of their semi-nomadic society and the technological ability of China itself. Well-
armed with gunpowder weapons but lacking fixed positions which could be threatened 
by sedentary Ming forces, the Manchus were able to skillfully maneuver their way to 
power in both war and diplomacy despite being massively outnumbered by even the 
remaining forces of the old Ming Dynasty. 
 Once they had been united by Nurhaci, the Manchus held domination over the 
mixed forest-steppe zone of the Manchurian and Maritime Siberian frontier, and abetted 
both the lands of the Mongols and the northern edge of the now increasingly decrepit 
Ming Empire. They soon co-opted many of the remaining independent Mongols into 
their imperial scheme as well and thus could exert control over the northern and 
western steppe through proxies, particularly their Eastern Mongol allies. Combined with 
their widespread adoption of firearms, their mixed semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural 
base, and their many Mongol allies, who had an almost equal status in the regime as 
Manchurian peoples, it looked like the Manchus were now well on their way to re-
birthing the Liao Dynasty by creating a confederated counterpoint to Chinese civilization 
in the north.249 
Manchurian rule was in some ways a successor of their ancestors the Jin and the 
continuing influence of the Mongols as stated by Perdue: 
“In short, the Mongols contributed a great deal to the early Manchu state. They 
provided military allies, horses, and a tradition of legitimation reaching back to 
Chinggis Khan. Along with the Yuan official seal came the concept of a universal 
empire encompassing many peoples, an ideal of rulership that vastly 
transcended either the state of the Manchu’s ancestors, the Jurchen Jin, or that 
of the Ming.”250 
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The Manchus, unlike the Khitan Liao, would continue on to much greater levels of 
success, more akin to replicating the Mongol achievement in China, but with its own key 
differences. 
Quite fortunately for the ambitions of this new Manchurian power, the late Ming 
were crippled with corruption and shaken by the cost of having to fight off a Japanese 
invasion of Korea in the late 16th Century. Not to mention the re-building of the Great 
Wall resulting from Post-Yuan Mongolian resurgence, and was nowhere near as robust 
as the old Sung Dynasty had been to the Khitan expansion. After a palace coup and the 
collapse of the Ming government due to rebellions the mayor of Beijing invited the 
Manchus to fill the power vacuum, which they and their armies were more than happy 
enough to do in 1644.251 
Horsemen used gunpowder weapons and superior maneuverability to breach the 
Great Wall, and charging south removed both the last vestiges of the Ming Dynasty in 
Beijing as well as quelling the uprisings which had started to occur in the power vacuum 
caused by the total collapse of the dynasty. To make the process as smooth as possible 
the Manchus adopted a general amnesty program for any Ming officials and literati who 
submitted to the new order.252 
After establishing control over northern China it seemed almost that the southern 
Ming and its de facto leader the pirate admiral Coxinga might hang on, but the 
Manchus, unlike the Khitans, made sure to fully build a centralized state in the Chinese-
dominant provinces to better harness the resources there and were able to bring the full 
realm of China under their unified rule. Legitimacy was conferred on the Manchus by 
adopting an official dynasty name, Aisin in Manchurian, Qing in Chinese. Several 
decades of war in the south ensued, which would culminate with the unification of the 
former Ming realms under the absolute control of the part-Mongolian part-Manchurian 
Kangxi Emperor in 1678.253 
The Qing Dynasty was born, and with it came economic revival, a reassertion of 
military power, and a grand strategy which hybridized both Chinese security concerns 
and Manchu expansionism. The western frontiers were, however, not yet pacified. And 
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while the Manchurian rule of China would become quite conservative and effectively 
Chinese, their foreign policies and grand strategies would take their own mixed path.254 
After a brutal western campaign utilizing both Chinese know-how and Manchu 
military skill and frontier adaptability, China’s modern western borders were finally 
formed. Nomadic and non-Chinese people were often integrated into the ruling elite 
much like the Mongols in the north, and a mixed regime was adopted towards pacifying 
the border. The major differences now were twofold. The first was the technological and 
economic advantages now enjoyed by more settled (or in the case of the Manchus, 
conquest-settled) people towards the famously intractable nomadic peoples. Thus was 
laid the foundations of the more modern and conventional state to make inroads into the 
far more amorphous political realm of Siberia and Central Asia, even if that state was 
itself a modified child of formless policy.255 The second was the northern border itself. 
Because, while China in all its various dynastic forms had always been the land power 
hegemon its own region, it was about to meet its first real settled-state foreign 
competition; a nation whose expansion from the opposite direction mirrored the vigor 
and ambition of its own. 
 
5.3…The Awesome Terror of Muscovite Russia: From City State to Empire 
 
Russia’s own version of the formless grand strategy would be to use space as both 
defenses in depth as well as power projector. Once Russia, like the Manchu Qing, 
adopted both the mobility of nomadic cavalry coupled with the technology and logistics 
(especially relevant in the realm of firearms and cannon technologies) of the rapidly 
developing settled societies of the 17th Century, they were on course for expansion, 
formless style. Rather than constructing a circular buffer zone round the core, as the 
Manchu had done, the principality of Muscovy (the dominant city in post-Mongol Russia, 
largely due to collaboration with the Mongols against the other city-states) which would 
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eventually become the Russian Empire, embarked on an unprecedented landward 
expansion of colonization and conquest.256  
 None of this is to say that the balance of power had shifted so dramatically as to 
make Russia’s territorial growth a cakewalk. In fact, the composite bow used by steppe 
nomads remained the superior weapon over gunpowder until the 19th Century. The 
difference was simply that it required a massive time investment to learn properly. 
Firearms, on the other hand, were relatively easy to use-and coupled with the larger 
population base of the settled societies could make a quite overwhelming combination 
against the far less populous nomadic peoples. Russia outnumbered much of its 
eastern opposition by a significant margin, now it could go into battle with them on a 
much more even qualitative level as well.257 
 Due to its previously discussed rise as the Golden Horde’s tax collector (Chapter 
3), Muscovy had consolidated its dominance as the first among many Russian 
principalities. After the crushing of resistance of Novgorod and other potential rivals 
Muscovy was the sole indigenous Russian power. It was not, however, the sole Inner 
Eurasian power. Due to its command of resources and military abilities though, 
Muscovy was arguably now the dominant Central Asia-connected fulcrum power west of 
China.258 
 This was largely evident after Tsar Ivan IV “Grozny” or somewhat inaccurately in 
English, “Terrible” opened up Siberia to Russian expansion. His campaign against the 
Kazan Khanate to the east was the decisive moment. The Khanate, a remnant of the 
old Golden Horde/Kipchak Khanate (as well as the even older Volga Bulgars) which 
now was split between Sibir, Astrakhan, the Crimean Khanate, and Kazan, stood at the 
gateway to the Urals. East of it throughout the Siberian forest and north of the steppe 
there was no other significant state-entity-all the way to the Pacific Ocean. Though it 
had been occupied by Russia before, under Ivan III (“The Great”) it had merely been 
lightly vassalized, and soon regained its independence. While it is unlikely that Ivan IV 
was aware exactly how little resistance lay east of the Khanate, the Russians would 
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soon discover it for themselves. It is certainly possible, giving Muscovy’s integration with 
defecting Tatar elites and military units, that they had some inkling of this fact, but either 
way the campaign to crush this meddlesome surviving appendage of the old Horde was 
launched in 1552. It only took a few months for the city to be breached and its 
surrounding lands to fall to the Russians.259 
 In what may seem like a highly conventional conquest was in fact highly tinged 
with the formless legacy of the geopolitical region the Russians were entering. Even 
though now they were the conquerors rather than the conquered, and their society, 
outside of the military, was quite divergent from that of the Turco-Mongolian peoples, 
Russian post-war policy was decidedly more reminiscent of the Kipchak Khanate than 
any more typical western equivalent. For example, though initially the typical 
medieval/early modern pattern of Christian vandalism and forced conversion of non-
Christian subjects, the peace settlement for the newly annexed Kazan was soon 
codified to be religiously plural. The Muslim Tatars and pagan hangers-on were soon 
liberated from the initially religiously over-zealous actions of the conquering army by 
royal decree, and missionary activities were curtailed. In order to better take over the 
people and trade routes of the Upper Volga without the threat of continuous rebellion or 
economic disruption, it was determined that it would simply be easier to accommodate 
the new ethnic minorities with a more decentralized policy.260 261 
Once the splintered leftovers of the Golden Horde were swept aside there was 
no effective barrier, aside from daunting climate and distance, for Russia to expand both 
its economic base (largely through the fur trade) and its territorial control all the way to 
the Pacific. These borders which would grow so that they could, if need be, contract for 
defense, were spread by Cossack horsemen who used much of the mobile co-opting of 
their ersatz Mongolian overlords to expand. Unlike those former power-brokers, 
however, they left forts and settlements in their wake. The Cossacks were largely 
composed of stateless brigands, dislocated Tatars, Russian peasant runaways, and 
anyone else from the region that joined up. In exchange for their domestic and regional 
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autonomy they served the Russian state in both the Ukraine and Siberia, and as time 
went on, as military units on any front, and were largely deployed as the semi-nomadic 
cavalry force of the settled Russian state.262 
This is not to say that Russia, like China, found expansion as a purely security 
driven enterprise. In fact, defensive security concerns could hardly account for the 
massive explosion of Russia’s frontiers which made even the Manchurians look 
positively modest in their epic scale of hegemonic conquests. A key difference fueling 
Russian expansion was simple profit. The fur trade was a great opportunity to make 
copious wealth and so unlike the Qing, Muscovy/Russia was not content just to make a 
buffer zone, and it had to keep growing for the benefit of the state. The fur trade often 
became depleted and the natives either hired or enslaved to the do the work often fled 
or died in the process.263 
The blurred line between Siberian natives and new Russian settlements, 
exuberantly expansionist as they were, was itself a unique and formless method of 
expanding geopolitical power. After all, the Russians kept to the forests until the mid-
18th Century when their greater population numbers and access to technology allowed 
them to take on the steppe tribes which still existed in the plains to the south in direct 
battle. Before Russia could exercise its new dominant colonial role however, it would 
come into conflict with the other settled behemoth of Eurasia.  
The formless empires of the Qing and the Russians were about to meet. A 
process which would not only expose both powers similarities and differences to each 
other, but also set off another round of battle as the last remnants of the autonomous 
nomadic actors struggled to survive the coming end times for their way of life as it was 
crushed to pieces between the two advancing hegemons.264 
 
5.4…The End and a New Beginning 
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The collision of Chinese imperialism by proxy through the Manchus and Russian 
imperialism by proxy through the Cossacks finally occurred in the Amur River valley, 
which lies within contemporary Primorsky Krai in the Russian maritime east. A Cossack 
fort had been constructed to claim the river basin, but the Manchurian leadership of the 
new Qing Dynasty found this uncomfortably close to what they regarded as their 
ancestral homeland and launched their forces in a counterattack in a rare display of 
power northwards, rather than westwards or southwards.  
The beleaguered Cossacks were soon surrounded, under siege, and decisively 
defeated. Russian forces in south-eastern coastal Siberia surrendered to peace terms 
dictated by China and a northern border between the two Eurasian giants was codified 
in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. This would keep Russia far north of the Amur region 
until the mid-19th Century when they were able to capitalize on the instability and 
increasing weakness of the Qing regime after the Opium Wars.265 
 Now that the two giants had met, the former and current nomads between them 
became endangered societies. The 17th and 18th Centuries were times of increased 
settlement of Siberia and the steppes by Russians and the border regions of Manchuria 
by the Chinese. Despite the formless Inner Eurasian influences adopted by both 
powers, it seemed possible that the formless borderlands had been forever crushed 
between them as their expansions finally brought them together. It would have been 
premature to celebrate the death of those people who played a large role in inspiring the 
methods of expansion used by both settled powers who were now on the rise, for there 
were still a few rounds to go before the new order could be stabilized. 
Most threateningly to the new Qing (and, indirectly, Russian) order would be the 
battles against Galdan Khan, a Mongol warlord who tried to unify the Mongol tribes into 
a power once again. His numerous campaigns to create a Dzungar-dominated Mongol 
state made him the last gasp of relatively large nomadic resistance to the new waves of 
settlement and conquest by the Qing Dynasty. His ruthless policies of pursuing state 
creation had almost the opposite effect by increasing the dissatisfaction among more 
peripheral tribes of his confederation. To groups like the Khalka and Eastern Mongols, 
the non-Chinese origin of the Qing Dynasty and their battlefield prowess made them just 
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as legitimate overlords as Galdan and his distant Tibetan allies. The Qing decided to nip 
this potential threat in the bud by harnessing this internal discord and showing off to the 
Western tribes how open they were. The military banner system founded in the Manchu 
state before it took over China, which consisted in numerous ethnic military divisions 
with significant social and cultural autonomy and a high level of prestige, was ideal for 
recruiting these disaffected Mongols and using them to claim that the Qing had just as 
much right to the western steppes as Galdan Khan did. It also served to stipulate in their 
terms of service that they had to cut any homage to obedience to the Dzungar-allied 
Dalai Llama.266 267 
With his own polygot and semi-nomadic army, the Emperor Kangzi set out on 
campaign in 1688 to end the rise of Galdan and establish Qing hegemony deeper into 
Central Asia than had been done before. At first Kangxi was happy to allow submitted 
oasis city states and nomadic tribes along the trade routes to submit and keep their 
domestic autonomy, as is common with policies of Eurasian geostrategic formlessness. 
Galdan proved more effective at this indirect type of warfare and he would often 
withdraw into the steppe, and then re-emerge when the Qing forces had left only small 
garrisons as they moved on and bring the region under his control.268 
Kanxi saw the futility of engaging his more mobile foe in this way, and thus 
adopted his own version of a false retreat to use on Galdan. He claimed to have been 
tired of fighting and offered Galdan to come to Beijing to sign a treaty of peace. As 
Galdan’s forces moved east closer to Beijing to what they thought would be a peace 
settlement, Kangxi attacked. Galdan lost many of his warriors and the Manchus chased 
his shattered forces back into Central Asia. Eight years later he would be beaten again, 
the Qing mobile artillery (small cannons mounted on the backs of camels) playing a 
decisive role in decimating the trapped Mongols. After this second bout of carnage 
Galdan and very few of his followers fled into exile, where he soon after expired.269 
The Dzungars were not quite finished yet. Half a century later a second Khan, 
also going by the name Galdan, took a more independent path towards the Qing than 
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had been established in the peace following the original Galdan’s death. This 
necessitated a second campaign that would finally finish the Dzungars off for good in 
1745. The divided Dzungar tribes lost their legitimation that year when a pro-Qing 
government was installed in Tibet and the religious institution there withdrew from the 
alliance with the Western Mongols. Only then did the Dzungars finally and truly submit 
to the Qing.270  
This enabled large Qing armies to advance further westward than ever before; 
prompting the eventual capitulation of what now has become China’s westward border. 
With the Manchu rulers  also came Chinese settlers and farmers, as well as economic 
policies to solidify state control. This disruption on the order, though tying the frontier 
much closer to Beijing, actually disrupted the trade and mobile commerce based 
economy of the region to such an extent that this once wealthy part of Eurasia became 
a backwater subsidized by the central government and largely held for security, rather 
than economic, reasons.271 
It is worth noting that Galdan Khan himself was aware of the endangered nature 
of his type of state on the Eurasian stage, as well as the emerging bipolarity. On 
numerous occasions he made overtures to the Russians for weapons and support to 
help him resist the Qing advance. Russia was too weak in the east at this point to help, 
even if they had wanted to. But since both the fur trade and the links with the Qing were 
profitable, Russia rebuffed his diplomatic advances. He was crushed by the Qing with 
tacit Russian approval.272 The Treaty of Nerchinsk would hold strong as both powers 
seemed more concerned with ensuring control over their expanded borders than 
interfering with each other. 
 This border insecurity was about to show itself in another way. Galdan may have 
been gone, and so eventually his empire, but the need for mobility and pasturage still 
drove many people on the steppe. With an unprecedented amount of control finally 
seeming to have descended upon the region, the various peoples there that were still 
comparatively nomadic used confusion over which empire they belonged to in order to 
retain some amount of autonomy and freedom. Therefore, even during the process of 
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making the borders more defined and solid, the people between them still found ways to 
blur the lines imposed on them for their own self-interest.273  
Arguably, this was not always in contrast to the interests of the now dominant 
settled states, who could always use claimed overlord-ship of some mobile ethnic group 
of people to make some sort of hegemonic claim to a new region. Qing policy towards 
many regions of its frontier post-Galdan retained this general attitude, as did Russian 
policy south of the Siberian forest belt and towards the Eurasian steppe. The biggest 
example of this was a tribe who was affected and trapped between both powers: the 
Kalmyks. 
The case of the Kalmyks is of particular interest. Robbed of the power over their 
settled periphery by the rise of the new Eurasian states, the Kalmyk peoples still 
showed an amazing amount of formless adaptability in the confining spaces between 
the Russians and the Qing. Originally known as the Oirat, an eastern Mongolian tribe, 
the Kalmyks were a sub-branch which migrated west to flee internal disputes among the 
Oirat as well as the Qing conquest of Mongolia. They and their herds traveled all the 
way to the Volga in the Russian Empire, where they began raiding outlying Russian 
frontier settlements and settling in the region. By the mid-17th Century they were 
established in a new region, seemingly free of the new Qing regime on the less secure 
frontier near the Urals.274 
Rather than take the time to expulse them by force in this still-peripheral region of 
the Empire, the Russian government decided rather to co-opt these people into its 
sphere of influence as a buffer against other still-roaming nomads. The Kalmyk Khanate 
made itself wealthy through controlling the vital trade routes between the Russian and 
Chinese frontiers, and did its best to maintain alliance and kinship networks with the 
other still-nomadic people. This system, and this uniquely majority Buddhist political 
entity in Europe, would last for a century atop the same region where the Kipchaks once 
held court in Sarai.275 
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With the centralizing policies of the Catherine the Great however, and the 
increase in Russian and Germanic settlement in and near Kalmyk lands, the situation 
began to reverse itself from a favorably exploited niche for a remnant-nomad people to 
a more precarious one. Fearful of losing their semi-autonomy, many (though by no 
means all) Kalmyks decided to return to the eastern steppe and western Mongolia. In 
1771 with the flight of so many re-creating in reverse their original epic trek across 
Eurasia and back to the now Qing-dominated lands they once fled, Empress Catherine 
abolished the Khanate and formerly re-integrated the lands back into Russia proper.276 
 
5.5…Settlement and Agriculture: The Codification of Victory 
 
It wasn’t just the borders of the settled states that expanded into Eurasia, it was in many 
cases their way of life as well. The seeds of this change in lifestyle were laid out in the 
original and regionally seminal treaty of 1689: 
 
“After 1689, refugees, deserters, and tribes people had to be fixed as subjects of 
either Russia or China. Maps, surveyors, border guards, and ethnographers 
began to determine their identities internally and externally by stabilizing 
movement across borders and enabling the suppression of groups who did not fit 
imperial definitions of space.”277 
 
The destruction of the ways of life of many of the indigenous inhabitants of Inner 
Eurasia wreaked by these policies was immense. The free-flowing caravan and trade 
system that gave the region much of its prosperity was terminated by the border and 
customs agents of the new bureaucratic state. The freedom to move from pasturage to 
pasturage was severely curtailed by the construction of fortresses and new towns of 
farmers, often from the center of the new regime.278 Chinese and Russian peasants and 
their subsidiary agrarian peoples would be the makers of the economy from now on, 
moving in to exploit the new niche opened up the great reduction if not outright 
elimination of the nomadic threat. After thousands of years of being on the shorter end 
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of the military and even often political equation, the settled people had finally appeared 
to achieve total victory.279 
Surely, nomadic pastoralism as a percentage of economic means for people 
inside deep Eurasia had begun an inevitable decline. But the geostrategic practice that 
had been so well honed by the peripheral nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of the 
heartland had not disappeared into the sunset with them. We have examined how the 
settled states gradually adopted more and more of the nomadic methods of diplomacy 
and warfare to at first keep them at bay, and then supplant them entirely. But the 
geopolitics of formless space would not be totally disregarded merely because their 
main inventors had secured the frontier. Such political systems were also useful against 
other settled states. After all, the geography of Eurasia had hardly changed, even if the 
political and economic elements that had evolved on it had. An example of this involved 
neither Russia nor China, yet lurked quite near another front of the expanding Russian 
state. 
Unlike Siberia, the Caucasus did not represent much of a settlement opportunity 
for Russians, not comparatively anyway. Most of the people there were already settled 
and agriculturally based. What inroads were made by the empire tended to be by co-
opting local ruling elites as independent vassals of the Russians.280 If the Ottomans 
could be influential through regional proxies, so could the Tsar. 
Russia did not drive deep into the region until much later compared to its 
Siberian expansion as well. This was largely due to the existence of both the Crimean 
Khanate (still hanging on all this time since the breakup of the Kipchak Khanate but now 
as an Ottoman dependency) and the Ottoman Empire itself. Largely indirectly, the 
Ottoman Empire was surely the most dominant power in the region and the mere threat 
of its involvement kept Russia far away from too much southern movement, at least until 
the mid and late 18th Century. Looking at the great power situation from an Inner 
Eurasian based perspective, the power of Russia was not yet apparent. In actuality, the 
Ottoman Empire would still be considered the dominant power on the western half of 
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Eurasia and Russia would be tied with Iran. And even that balance would first be 
changed in favor of the former rather than the latter before Russian hegemony would 
really be felt. 281 
Before we move on to the further Eurasian dominance exerted by both Russia 
and China in the modern era it is important to investigate this one flash in the pan, 
where the mantle of the formless empire was passed, if ever so briefly, to another 
settled state; that of Iran. 
 
5.6…Nader Shah and the Last Gasp of Tribal Nation-Building 
 
The Safavid Dynasty of Iran was already a peripheral player in formless politics to a 
certain extent. Its military aristocracy was dominated by Turkic and Caucasian tribes 
and semi-nomadic warrior peoples who had come to call the area in and around Iran a 
home of sorts in the wake of the Mongol and Timurid conquests. Trapped between the 
behemoths of the Mughal and Ottoman Empire and with an economy still shattered by 
the many predatory depredations which it had been subjected to, Iran found itself less of 
a power projector and more of a struggling entity outshone by its neighbors and under 
constant assault from the north and north-east.282 
 The Safavid Dynasty, which was founded in 1501, had a few really strong rulers, 
such as Shah Abbas I, but in its later years it suffered from a significant amount of 
decline, especially caused by the incompetent leadership bred into the heirs by being 
raised almost exclusively in the harem.283 After a revolt of the Afghan military auxiliaries 
in 1722 Isfahan was occupied and the central government collapsed. The Shah was 
taken prisoner by his erstwhile armed forces, and both the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
seized the chance to readjust the borders of Iran in ways that benefitted their territorial 
designs. The son the Shah, Tahmasp II, declared himself ruler and prepared to make a 
                                                          
281
 Khodarkovsky, 530. 
282
 Stephen F. Dale. The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 3-16. 
283
 David Morgan. Medieval Persia: 1047-1797 (Harlow: Longman Group Limited, 1988), 145-9. 
118 
 
last stand in the central mountains of the country. Iran as an independent entity looked 
as doomed as it had been at the start of the Mongol conquests.284 
 It was into this dire situation that the last great Asiatic conqueror would arise. A 
boy named Nader (“Prodigy”) had been born around 1698 in Northern Khorasan to very 
humble if not downright impoverished origins among the semi-nomadic tribes which 
were often employed by the Safavid government to protect their frontiers from other 
groups of people. These tribes had a culture that was a combination of Persian settled 
attitudes and the Central Asian Turco-Mongolian tradition. Inauspicious origins indeed 
from the perspective of Iranian attitudes of the time, but as Nader Shah’s official 
biography claimed in regards to his birth: “The sword takes its merit from the natural 
strength of its temper, not from the mine from which the iron was taken.”285 
It was on this frontier, defending from a raid from enemy tribes as a young 
mounted musketeer that Nader started a meteoric rise through the military hierarchy of 
the Safavid state. By the time that the Afghan warlord Malik Mahmud had seized 
Isfahan and the Shah of Iran he was of sufficiently high rank to become the leading 
military figure in the resistance against the dissolution of the Iranian state.286 
Claiming his loyalty to Tahmasp II, Nader set out to stabilize the military situation. 
His forces, modified along his own tactical lines emphasizing the mobility of cavalry and 
the accurate use of the heavy-caliber flintlock musket (which was far more accurate and 
long-ranged than the more famous European models287) as well as light artillery carried 
and used from camel-back, reflected both the increasing technological sophistication of 
the settled areas outside of Inner Eurasia but also the classic models of a nomadic or 
semi-nomadic steppe army. Using this new force, Nader struck at defecting or disloyal 
nobles in the west before marching on the Afghans in Isfahan. After a rout and brief 
siege Malek Mahmud was captured and executed.288 
Nader did, however, respect the fighting abilities and potential of the Afghans and 
thus he pursued them east after their flight not only to make sure they could no longer 
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be a legitimate threat to Iran, but also to create supplicants and vassal states out of 
many of the tribes, which gave him access to new recruits for his army.289 290 
Ottoman attempts to ally with the remaining Afghan powers opposed to this 
newly resurgent Iran had to be deal with as well before Nader could turn and oust the 
two predatory great powers which had staked new claims in Persia. With this task 
completed he marched west and proceeded to put the Ottomans to flight in a series of 
lopsided victories. By 1730 there was a de facto truce and re-establishment of the 
border to its pre-crisis extent. Hoping to encourage Nader to launch more attacks on 
their common Turkish foe the Russians evacuated Dagestan as an act of goodwill and 
opened up direct diplomatic channels with the Iranians.291 This enabled the Iranians to 
set up yet more proxy-allies in their northwestern frontier. The Armenians were co-opted 
by the extension of brought financial and domestic privileges in order to establish a loyal 
border column between Iran and the Ottomans. Georgia seemed secure, or at least 
under nominal Russian hegemony, and thus Nader turned south in an attempt to take 
Iraq and break Turkish hegemony in the Middle East for good.292 
 Despite the success of his other policies on this front, the Iraq campaign turned 
out to be a disaster due to the incompetent military intervention of the Shah, Tahmasp 
II. Tahmasp led an army against the Ottomans in an attempt to achieve some battlefield 
glory for himself, in all likelihood to check Nader’s dominance of the military, but was 
decisively defeated. Nader had to campaign for a few extra years to return to the status 
quo he had worked so hard to build before, including a completely disastrous invasion 
of Iraq that itself required a successive campaign to stabilize. Meanwhile, using the 
Shah’s incompetence as an excuse, Nader imprisoned both the Shah and his son and 
acted as regent, before finally declaring himself Shah in 1735 and thus was able to 
enter directly into foreign negotiations with himself as the head of state.293 Nader the 
tribal chief and general had become Nader the Shah, which is what he would be known 
as for the rest of his career and posterity. 
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Nader Shah’s domestic policy was subordinate to his wars and diplomacy in 
terms of priority. Despite this, his approach to the pressing internal issues of Iran at the 
time showed the traditional flexibility of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples and the 
kinds of influences they could have over the more traditional states they often ruled. 
Nader Shah’s religious policy was highly motivated from his practical and often even 
anti-religious outlook.294 He tried to end the diplomatic and cultural isolation to which 
Iran had been subjected by revising the militantly anti-Sunni practices of the Shi’a 
majority. Nader instituted a ban on the traditional cursing of the first three caliphs and 
various other religious practices that made the Shi’a creed so vile to the majority of the 
world’s Sunni Muslim populace. He also attempted to make the state religion neither 
explicitly Sunni nor Shi’a, and thus could claim to his majority Iranian populace that he 
was Shi’a but to foreign dignitaries claim that he was Sunni. Given that Sunnis were 
also a significant portion of his armed forces this policy made sense for his more central 
goals as well.295 
With his position now secure, Nader Shah decided that it was finally time to 
launch a purely offensive sequence of policies. His objectives were to achieve some 
kind of financial and territorial gain for the Iranian homeland, which had been so 
devastated by the decline and fall of the Safavid Dynasty. He also probably knew that 
his large polyglot army thrived on loot and conquest, and that the ravaged lands of 
Persia would not suffice for this. Nader marched into Afghanistan to seize Kandahar not 
only to secure a troublesome imperial flank, but also to prepare for a drive onto Mughal 
India.296 
The Mughal Empire Nader Shah was planning on paying call to was not the 
mighty and flexible behemoth we witnessed the creation and establishment of in the last 
chapter. Rotting from within due to decentralization and the power of regional 
governors, the empire also had to deal with the rise of the Marathas and resurgent 
militant Hinduism that came with it. With the Maratha leader Shivaji riding roughshod 
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over the now increasingly outdated Mughal army the empire had contracted to its 
northern core territories.297 
Nader Shah’s army invaded India from Afghanistan in 1737 and drove towards 
the Mughal capital of Delhi. Having a very small force and no heavy cannons, Nader’s 
plan was to use the old nomadic trick of luring the opponent out with a feint, and 
drawing them into a trapped field engagement. After threatening the Mughal army’s 
supply lines, Nader was able to get his foes to leave their fortifications and attack him 
directly. Here, on the open battlefield of Karnal, Nader was able to use his light field 
guns and mobile cavalry wings to maximum effect. Though the Mughals brought forth 
war elephants, they were easy targets for the artillery, and the large lumbering Mughal 
cannons fell into the hands of Nader’s light cavalry. The rest of the trapped Mughal 
army was mowed down by the concentration of musketry brought to bear on the center 
by Nader’s superior firearms. In the aftermath the Mughal Emperor was captured and 
Delhi was itself sacked by Nader’s army.298 
Nader did not try direct rule on the Indian sub-continent. He left the current ruler 
in charge (though substantially less wealthy and more humiliated) and settled for the 
annexation of everything west of the Indus, not a colossal amount considering that he 
had crushed the armies and taken the capital of his enemies. What he instead 
demanded was loot and trade monopoly on the Afghan-Central Asian routes. This he 
achieved to such an extent that he could rescind even his exorbitant taxes to the people 
of Iran for three years. Economic recovery was strong enough due to this temporary tax 
remittance that even devastated Iran started to finally see an improvement in the 
general economy of the farmers and rural residents.299 The Mughals, on the other hand, 
were no longer a credible threat to Iran and their weakness was exposed for all to see. 
It was the large scale conversion of a once grand empire into a de facto Delhi-based 
city state. Most relevantly for the future, the British East India Company, which had 
previously been kept in check by Mughal power, now took stock of the totally changed 
political situation in India.300 
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  After this success, arguably the pinnacle of his career, Nader Shah drove into 
Central Asia proper, and once he had received the submission of many of the post-
Timurid princes in the region, was content to leave after making the right vassals and 
ensuring access to the regional trade routes.301 Once again, Nader was showing that 
even as lord of a settled state in a time of rapidly changing technological and economic 
balances, that the legacy of the formless empires of the past, while altered, surely was 
still very much in existence. 
 Nader himself would eventually succumb to both malaria contracted on campaign 
and increasing mental illness. With the tax holiday over and his interest in securing 
Dagestan against any future Russian incursions he increased taxes exorbitantly to pay 
for his increasingly bogged down campaign to pacify the Caucasus tribes of that region. 
These harsh levels of taxations provoked rebellion, which in turn provoked massive 
retaliation on the part of the government. Finally, after Nader blinded his son and heir in 
a fit of rage at his unilateral execution of the deposed former Shah and resorted to 
building pyramids of human skulls in rebellious areas, his own army elites turned on him 
and assassinated him in 1747.302 
 With the chaos caused by his sudden death and the general upturned order his 
latter reign had contributed to, Nader’s multinational and semi-nomadic army began to 
break up. Karim Khan took the reins of government in Iran and Agha Muhammad took 
his Afghan contingent east to take control of Afghanistan. Agha Muhammad would 
eventually clash in battle with the Marathas, bringing Nader’s original style of warfare 
with him and fighting for the withering rump of the Mughal state. Other protégés of 
Nader took power in places such as Georgia and the Caucuses.303 In his own way 
Nader had left a legacy, even if it was overwhelmingly in the realm of warfare. It was, 
however, to the last obvious gasp of a dying way of geopolitics…for the time being at 
least. 
 
5.7…Conclusion: 
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Gunpowder, more efficient farming, and the rise of mercantilism had all done their parts 
to break the nomadic stranglehold on mobility and qualitative military power. Even so, 
while the balance of power shifted decisively in favor of the large agrarian states, the 
methods that they used to facilitate that shift were often wholly or partially derived from 
the strategies most often used by the nomadic powers they sought to displace. As it 
was, many of the ruling classes of the new settled societies were in fact partially 
nomadic or at least frontier in origin. Nurhaci came from the Manchus, the descendants 
of the Jurchens, and a people who were largely nomadic but with a small amount of 
agriculture supporting them. Nader Shah came from a semi-nomadic Turkic tribe on the 
Persian periphery which guarded the borders of the state from other nomadic bands. 
The Russians, while not having a nomadic origin, carried over much of the policy ideas 
formulated during the reign of the Kipchak Khanate (covered in Chapter III) especially in 
their desire to rule key trade routes and their utilization of the nomadic Kalmyks as 
proxies and the semi-nomadic Cossacks in pursuing actions towards both their southern 
and eastern frontiers. 
 All three of these examples waged war against nomadic foes, who, on the whole, 
were the last practitioners of the medieval type of formless geopolitics, and thus cut 
their teeth to be in a way their inheritors, as well as their displacers. They also waged 
war on settled states using lesson learned from said nomadic foes. In terms of military 
power and the combination of nomad like mobility with settled technology, the 
Cossacks, Manchus, and Nader Shah all showed innovation and adaptation and a 
merger of geopolitical worlds. Now, with the rise of Russia and China (and temporarily 
of Iran) it was time for a new kind of formless policy to arise. The settled state was 
about to increase its new role as the purveyor of this doctrine in Inner Eurasia. Indeed, it 
was the culmination of Sunzi’s thinking in a way, since he originally wrote The Art of 
War for the agrarian settled states of pre-unification China. A full circle movement that 
had finally arrived to something more akin to its intended audience more than 2,000 
years after the supposed date of its publication. 
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Chapter Six: The Invasion of the Littorals 
 
“The Situation of Russia in Central Asia is similar to that of any civilized state that enters 
into contact with savage nomadic tribes that lack any form of social 
organization…Consequently, the state must decide: to put an end to its efforts and 
leave its borders under constant threat, which means prosperity, security, and cultural 
progress all become impossible; or push further into the wild territories, whereby the 
increasing distances increase the difficulties and trials.” 
 
~Prince Gorchakov, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, 1864. 
 
“In the puppet regime they sought a form of colonial state that represented a new kind 
of collaboration between imperialist and subject, a formula for a colonial ruler neither 
formal nor informal that would accommodate nationalist demands for sovereignty and 
self-determination.” 
 
~Louise Young on the creation of Manchukuo 
 
6.0…Summation: 
 
The immense irony of both the history of Eurasian geopolitics in general, and the 
continuing evolution of the formless empire in particular, was that by the time the large 
and powerful settled states had finally come to achieve hegemony over the troublesome 
interior peoples of the continent they would face a new and equally large threat from an 
entirely new phenomenon in the region’s history: its invasion by littoral naval powers. 
 The same technological change that had enabled China and Russia to finally 
establish military security and dominance on the frontier was being taken even further 
by the maritime nations in northern and Western Europe, North America, and eventually 
Japan. Much as the cavalry-borne nomads once harried, subjugated, and broke into the 
internal affairs of the large Eurasian land powers using their superior mobility and 
strategic flexibility, so too would the naval powers be able to achieve this feat using the 
powers granted by modern navies and industrialized economies. The same tactical 
advantages of speed, control of space, and concentrated firepower which brought the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of Eurasia so much success for so long, despite 
relatively small numbers, would work just as much in favor of the advanced maritime 
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societies. The difference was that these powers were more alien, and adapted to 
increasing contact with the Eurasian heartland with differing levels of success, all of 
which proved temporary once the much more thoroughly adapted land powers of China 
and Russia recovered from the initial shock of their displacement by the new upstarts.  
 Despite these shocks to the system, for the first time since the Mongol Empire a 
Eurasian hegemon would rise to dominate much of the continent, and like the Khitans it 
would rise not once, but twice, and its reign would be far briefer and much more 
challenged than that of Chinggis Khan’s Mongolian achievement. This was Imperial, 
and then Soviet Russia. But if would be a long and hard struggle even for the brief 
amount of time enjoyed at the top by both 19th Century Russia and its territorial, if not 
spiritual, successor which would be filled, perhaps suitably, with many ambiguities 
rather than clear cut successes and failures. 
The Littoral invasion’s most lasting impact would be on the societies that often 
barely survived its coming, and that would have devastating consequences for people’s 
freedom of movement and autonomy in the wake of their expulsion. But before this 
increase in control by China and Russia, the once central but now peripheral people of 
Eurasia, (Turks, Mongols, and others) would be able to play important roles once again, 
both in fighting and collaborating with the various great powers, indigenous and foreign 
alike. Through the warp and weft of espionage, war, and diplomacy, the effect of such 
titanic (and often even ignored by posterity outside of their region) struggles would have 
global consequences. Perhaps the most relevant aspect of this would be in the 
evolution of modern warfare and the return of rampant mobility to the battlefield, as is 
illustrated in the evolution of Soviet combat doctrine. Many of these events would also 
temporarily restore Manchuria and Mongolia, once the vital linchpin of peoples and 
power under the influence of the Xiongnu, Khitan, Mongols, and early Manchus, to 
center stage, even if now all the most potent actors would be strangers to the region 
using them as proxies. 
 First, we must begin where we last ended, at the height of dominance by the 
agrarian powers. In their quest for secure borders they would set the frontiers of the 
next stage of Eurasian drama, as well develop a certain level of overconfidence in their 
own abilities which would lead them wide open from an unexpected flank. This is also 
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where both Russia and China, whose experiences if anything seemed to be moving 
towards convergence in the 18th Century, began to radically diverge from each other, 
both in terms of relative success and power, as well as the methods they used towards 
their vast borderlands. 
 
6.1…China Crests, Russia Rises 
 
The Qing Dynasty’s campaigns in the west had secured Uighuristan, increasingly 
known in this era by its contemporary moniker of Xinjiang or “New Frontier”, which was 
obviously not very new or much of a frontier to its Turkic inhabitants. Yet it was not just 
another province of China, but rather an administrative zone managed using many of 
the adapted techniques which the Qing and Chinese policy making in general, had 
picked up in their long experience with nomadic allies and adversaries.  
 A gradualist approach to colonization began that emphasized almost 
imperceptibly increasing levels of Manchurian control was employed towards the 
western and northern regions after the expensive failure of replacing regional warlords 
with Manchurian and Han governors in the mid-18th Century.  The Banner System 
discussed in Chapter 5 was much more effective at slowly integrating certain useful and 
usually warlike peoples into the ruling elite. This was an embracement of the Dynasty’s 
Inner Asian heritage in policy making, as C. Patterson Giersch puts it: 
 
“Due in large part to unique ideas and approaches, the Qing conquered and 
ruled a vast domain that was two times greater and significantly more diverse 
than their predecessor, the Ming.”304 
  
The Emperor Qianlong saw regime security in this arrangement. The immediate frontier 
was always the threat to the Han, so he could provide security to his Chinese subjects 
while simultaneously giving him a large non-Han recruitment pool to shore up his alien 
dynasty.305 Not being as fully nomadic, as the Mongols and Khitans had been, meant 
easier integration with the locals, but it came at the price of being more dependent on 
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pleasing the native subjects…and of course lacking the ability to as easily flee if things 
turned sour.  
 The economic changes resulting from the strengthening of the settled powers in 
Eurasia led to the nomadic people reducing their ranges. No longer able to raid or 
migrate at will it became more important to switch to trading, often at great 
disadvantage, with the Chinese and the Russians. The overland trade stimulated by the 
Qing campaigns and garrison towns created an exploitable niche for Russia to turn 
south. Having made it to the Bering and Okhotsk Seas in the 17th and 18th Centuries, 
Russian settlement had still not confronted their old foes out on the open steppe, but 
with the professional military and massive firepower of the army after Tsar Peter I’s 
reforms and the chance of access to new Chinese markets, they soon annexed 
Kazakhstan and were on the border of Transoxiana by the dawn of the 19th Century.306 
 Meanwhile, the ever troublesome Mongols had finally been reduced to nothing 
but an exploitable border population. The Banner Demands had offered great 
opportunity to the best warriors of the Mongol tribes. This of course left the tribes weak 
and the state strong. The people who remained in both Inner and Outer Mongolia 
continued to live through pastoralism, though with increasing powers from Buddhist 
monasteries and missionaries from Tibet siphoning off yet more young adults. The 
success of these missions was the result of the economic devastation which resulted in 
the twofold reduction of pastureland with the arrival of Chinese merchants and attendant 
loan sharks who made money off the fiscally naive Mongol herders. Inner Mongolia was 
better integrated and did a bit better, but Outer Mongolia became in effect a land in 
captivity, where the Mongols themselves became a type of criminal underclass in their 
own country.307  
 It would be barely half a century since the wrapping up of Qianlong’s successful 
pacification of Xinjiang, and not much more than a century from the Manchu conquest of 
Mongolia, when this carefully built house of cards would receive its first shaking. The 
coming of European navies, led by Britain, was the rude awakening that after thousands 
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of years of pursuing security to the north and west, the successions of states 
cumulatively called China had ignored the vast and most open frontier of all; their 
seaboard coast. The brief but far ranging explorations of Zheng He in the Ming Dynasty 
had never established a Chinese blue water naval tradition despite great promise and 
technical capacity, and this, combined with the previously impenetrable and hostile 
space of Inner Eurasia, had left them cut off from the rampant industrialization going on 
elsewhere.308 
 The finite details of the Opium War and its successors need not concern us here 
outside of a basic overview and the effects it had on the international order. What is of 
relevance is how apparent the weakness of the giant seemingly powerful Qing state 
appeared to foreign powers.  
 The British Empire and the East India Company had reached a point of mounting 
trade deficit with the Qing Empire. Increasing the selling of opiates from India was a way 
to offset this balance. Meanwhile in China, the New World silver trade from which the 
state had become financially tied to was starting to break down. Seeing a general 
decline in financial stability across the nation, the Qing used the burgeoning opium trade 
as a scapegoat for the nation’s woes and initiated a crackdown. This increased the 
costs to British traders, but the real blow came with the confiscation of British ships and 
the destruction of 20,000 chests of opium seized from their cargo.309 
 The Qing military thought itself adequate for any military response from far-away 
Britain, but it had fallen behind the times. In a quick succession of conflicts the British 
Navy with its steam powered warships firing explosive shells decimated the Chinese 
fleet and enabled troops to land at various points on the mainland coast of China. The 
Qing response, despite obvious numerical superiority, was constrained by having to 
retain the deployments of so many troops inland because of the commitments of their 
massive empire.310 
The intrusion of Britain, and then France, followed not long after by a less militant 
but equally economic incursion by the United States, sparked a myriad of reactions 
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throughout East Asia. Korea shut itself off from the world, Japan’s government tried to 
become a modern state, but was toppled by a coalition of southern clans who then 
pursued a radical and ultimately successful course of modernization, but it was the 
massive market of China that the maritime powers really wanted access to-and for all 
the power the Qing state had acquired, it simply could not keep them out. This is not to 
say that the Qing state had been wrong in its priorities in the slightest, for despite the 
spectacle of burning and exploding sailing junks blown apart by the modern guns of the 
steam powered Royal Navy, the main threat was another Eurasian land power still 
lurking on the landward side-and it was noticing the delicate state of its rival’s 
fortunes.311 
While China had been growing complacent in its frontier victory, Russia had kept 
growing stronger. If the mid-19th Century was a time of perpetual decline in Chinese 
regional hegemony, it was also one of the constant rising of that of Russia-and Russia’s 
region was a large percentage of Eurasia proper. Successfully retaining its Eurasian 
land power and unique access to frontier space from which to expand from, Russia had 
also joined the European nations. Straddling the heartland and the littoral, in geopolitical 
terms, it was both established internationally as well as integrated regionally and thus it 
could wield many advantageous over increasingly lackluster China.312 313 
 Seeing the loose hold the Qing had on their outer regions of their own homeland, 
Manchuria, as well as the poor showing of Qing armed forces against modern arms and 
the unequal treaties that Beijing was being obliged to abide with, the time seemed ripe 
to attempt to gain the Amur River Valley. And this time would be no repeat of the failed 
Cossack invasion in the 17th Century. Thus when Nickolai Muraviev became governor-
general of Eastern Siberia he sensed an opportunity. The foreign incursions had 
touched off the largest war of the 19th Century, the Taiping Rebellion. Eastern China 
was a sea of destruction and despair and the government of the Qing court was so 
desperate it had even taken to using the hated foreigners to train and even command 
some of its armies. Of course it is worth noting that the Qing state was still capable of 
crushing this colossal rebellion, and its hold on Xinjiang remained strong through this 
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period of sudden and seemingly irredeemable weakness, but while it had focused on 
the immediate threats of the foreign navies and the internal rebellions it had left its 
northeastern flank wide open.314 
Muraviev plunged right into the gap. Throughout the 1850s exploratory missions 
and even shallow water naval gunboats worked their way through Outer Manchuria, 
charting and claiming as they went. Even Russia’s quantified loss in the Crimean War 
(1856), which entailed it scrapping its Black Sea Fleet and halting its southward 
expansion against the Ottoman Empire in the west, did not stop Muraviev from 
continuing operations in maritime Manchuria. Perhaps it even added further impetus to 
do so. Though the main theatre of the war was to be the Black Sea region, a joint 
Anglo-French force cobbled together from various Pacific deployments, attempted to 
take Petropavlovsk. After the unexpected suicide of the commanding officer and repulse 
from a small militia, the farcical assault withdrew to its ships and fled back south. The 
war would remain henceforth confined to the western half of Eurasia for its duration-only 
ending when Russia was removed as an immediate threat to British and French 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. 315 
But despite this, Muraviev’s work was a success. Two years after the conclusion 
of that conflict Russia in fact found herself the beneficiary of the Treaty of Aighun. This 
treaty made Russia the de facto protector of the Qing regime from British and French 
designs (on paper at least) in exchange for annexing all of Outer Manchuria, some 
185,000 square miles. This would become modern day Primorye as well as parts of 
other modern Russian oblasts and the site of Russia’s first major Pacific port, 
Vladivostok or “Ruler of the East.”316 
As China contracted in territory, Russia continued to grow across the board. 
Transoxiana, that centerpiece of Inner Eurasian Empire and the former seat of Emir 
Timur’s vast domains, had entered rough times and no longer held anything near its 
levels of former power or wealth. When Shaybani Khan had ejected the Timurids he had 
redistributed much of their confiscated wealth among his own family and allies, creating 
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a vastly powerful nobility which then proceeded to plot and scheme causing the various 
regions to divide along the lines of what can only be described as independent city 
states with vast territories of pastureland between them. Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand 
where the main state-lets to form from the increasingly fractured Uzbek realms and they 
were possessed of longevity if not dynamism, lasting through the 15th to the 19th 
Centuries.317 As was covered in Chapter Four, over the course of this large time frame 
more and more of their population became settled agrarian farmers, and thus the states 
actually benefited from the taming of the nomads occurring due to Russian and Chinese 
expansion from a security perspective. Of course, without the freedom of movement 
provided by the nomadic states, their already declining trade routes dried up into 
nothing and the cities which were once at the heart of cosmopolitan commerce became 
impoverished and isolated backwaters. Now, despite having crops such as cotton to 
export, most Eurasian trade was conducted by sea.318 319 320 
But the Russian state, concerned about British involvement in the region in the 
aftermath of the Crimean War, and coveting the cotton plantations to its relatively open 
southern border, decided to make the mid and late 19th Century the time of its biggest 
pushes of expansionism to date. This would represent the left wing of the giant pincer 
movement enveloping China which had already begun in Manchuria. The disastrous 
and ethnocentric policies of the Uzbek ruling class over their diverse subjects as well as 
the relative taming of the nomads had opened the way somewhat, but Russia’s 
undeniable power at this time was the most important factor as its forces moved ever 
southward. As Seymour Becker put it: 
 
“Beginning in the 1820s, the advance of Russian troops southward from Siberia 
in search of secure boundaries and reliable neighbors ceased only when 
Russia’s frontiers and her sphere of influence were finally anchored in the 
Central Asian oases, including those of Bukhara and Khiva.”321 
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By this time the populations of the rump Khanates were majority sedentary, with rough 
estimates for Khiva being in the range of 72-22%322 in favor of sedentary farmers. There 
were still, however, enough nomads interested in raiding to create perpetual border 
insecurity issues. Regarded by the government back in St Petersburg as a mere 
nuisance at first, these became a vital concern for the state-much like the acquisition of 
Outer Manchuria- after the quantified loss of the Crimean War and the increasing fear of 
British agents operating northwards from India. This would inspire the first major 
advance on the Khanates themselves in 1864 against Khiva and Kokand and then a few 
years later a new advance with Bukhara, the strongest, as the main target.323  
 The campaigns went well, Russian rifles and logistics closed the gap of speed 
usually held by the defenders in Inner Eurasia and the cities were in turn occupied. 
Rebellions were put down rapidly and the Russians could dictate the terms of peace as 
they willed. Interestingly they did not go to outright annexation, instead making vassals 
and clients from their newly conquered lands. This had the effect of stalling British 
complaints in the region as well as reducing administrative costs.324 325 
 The legitimization for this post-war expansion was given by Prince Gorchakov: 
 
“To put a stop to raids, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of 
more or less perfect submission. This result once obtained, these tribes take 
more to peaceful habits, but in their turn they are exposed to attacks of the more 
distant tribes.”326 
 
This seemed to be an acceptable way to frame policy to the British, already 
contemplating doing much the same to Afghanistan even after their humiliating repulse 
there some decades before. The haughtily named ambassador to Russia, Lord 
Augustus Loftus remarked in 1872: 
 
“I believe the Emperor and the Imperial Government are anxious to abstain from 
extending Russian territory in Central Asia, whilst at the same time they are 
desirous of obtaining a complete control over the small states of which Central 
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Asia is comprised…by avoiding collision to obtain entire influence over Turkestan 
by conciliatory means through the existing rulers of the several states.”327 
Anglo-Russian tensions still simmered, but Imperial Russia’s kind of expansion seemed 
easier to swallow at this juncture than a typical kind of annexation. This type of 
understanding did not however allay the threat each side felt towards the other, as we 
shall soon see. 
Despite this push from the Kazakh steppe into realms more settled with cities 
and agrarian economies, the methods of indirect rule changed little at first. The 
Russians were content to leave the local elites (or more obedient relatives of the former 
elites) in power and in charge of domestic affairs as long as they controlled the foreign 
policy of the states, could settle within the territories of the former khanates, and build 
railroads connecting their new domains with Russia proper. Tashkent itself became a 
city which the Russians ruled directly in an enclave style and the main military 
headquarters of operations in the region, but the newly conquered khanates were 
treated with relative laxity despite their now prostrate status. However, Russia looked 
towards the crumbling Qing frontier with both a sense of alarm and one of opportunity. 
 
6.2…An Indirect Clash of the Titans 
 
A bizarre three way competition now began in the mountainous southern regions of 
Inner Eurasia. This conflict would not end in fiery conclusion however, but rather 
through the offset of a new power intruding elsewhere from an unexpected direction. 
 It started, as so many things in the greater region of inland Eurasia do, by the 
actions of a semi-nomadic warlord with imperial ambitions. This was Ya’qub Beg, a 
tribal leader from Turkestan. It was in the mid-19th Century, when Qing rule still held on 
strong in Central Asia, that Ya’qub managed to seize the Oasis towns of the Uighurs by 
ejecting the garrisons by outmaneuvering them in the sparse western sands. Cut off 
from immediate resupply the Qing had to withdrawal from the westernmost extremity of 
their empire. This allowed the feisty warlord to set up his own mini-state.328 
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 Perhaps it was the nature of the times, with modernism and nationalism on the 
rise, or the small space he had to work with between the now dominant established 
powers, but Ya’qub Beg lacked the instinct for flexibility which was the hallmark of all 
previously successful Eurasian conquerors. His rule of the Uighurs was strict and 
religiously fanatical. It drove off many of the traders the oasis town needed to 
prosper.329 While feelings towards the Qing remained highly negative, the local attitude 
towards Ya’qub Beg became ever more negative as the economy began to wither due 
to his actions. Even the devoutly Muslim guardian of Sartuq Bughra Khan’s shrine 
wrote: “Of the Khitay, I hate them. But they were not bad rulers. We had everything 
then. There is nothing now.”330 
 It is interesting to note that despite the omnipresent European threat to the 
coastline and the growing potential for a Japanese threat, the Qing marshaled a huge 
amount of forces to deal with Ya’qub Beg’s rebellion. The justification given by the 
government for this set of priorities shows clearly the Eurasian geopolitical focus which 
the state still retained even after fifty years of humiliation at the hands of the maritime 
powers. It is also possible that the same geostrategy developed on the steppe, which 
was used far less successfully against the European powers, was still working to keep 
the western frontier secure even as the situation changed elsewhere.331“As goes 
Xinjiang, so goes Mongolia; as goes Mongolia so goes Beijing.”332  This succinct maxim, 
though undoubtedly meant to cajole a domestic audience, would turn out to be a fair 
approximation of the near future for the dynasty. 
 With an upgraded and reinvigorated army, and with the Taiping rebellion long 
since crushed, the Qing troops moved west in 1878 and in 70 days crossed the desert 
and destroyed Ya’qub’s forces with devastating firepower. The warlord died soon after 
in mysterious circumstances and the Qing forces were back in control, to a much 
greater degree than they had been before.333 The Qing had finally pulled off success in 
the realm of military modernization.334 
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For all its failures on other fronts, the Manchu rulers were dead set on controlling 
the western frontier, rightly seeing it as a potential nest for British and Russian spies if 
control was lost of it. With the 1878 expedition they were back on the scene as Central 
Asian powers. As The Cambridge History of China notes: 
“Although Ch’ing authority in Inner Asia was superficial, it was strong enough to 
guarantee the safety of increasing numbers of Han immigrants from China 
proper, who settled in Inner Mongolia, throughout Sinkiang, and on the eastern 
fringes of Tibet. Seen as a whole, despite rebellions and European 
encroachment and the sagging fortunes of the Manchus, the years from the 
1790s to the 1860s were the great period of Ch’ing imperial power.”335 
 
One could make the case that with the crushing of Ya’qub Beg, the Qing restored and 
then retained that power of China in the western regions on through to the next century.  
The Qing also suspected that Ya’qub Beg was sponsored by the British and that 
if they did not deal with him soon either they or the Russian Empire would take 
advantage of his presence to shave off parts of Chinese territory. This fear was proven 
valid when the uneasy détente between Britain and Russia was on the verge of 
breakdown due to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. As Britain marshaled its navy to 
defend Constantinople from encroaching Russian armies which had already laid most of 
the Ottoman Empire’s forces to waste in the Balkans, Russia responded by placing 
more armies in Central Asia for a planned three pronged invasion of British India. Britain 
counteracted by engaging in a ‘forward policy’ by pre-emptively invading Afghanistan 
(the traditional route of Central Asian conquerors into the sub-continent) and deploying 
forward units to control all of the choke points through the mountain ranges.336 
 The cost of Russia’s troop deployments only seemed to exacerbate the potential 
of Muslim rebellion and incurred a great cost during a time when the newly unified 
nation of Germany was rising to world power status on its western flank. Meanwhile, the 
initially successful British invasion of Afghanistan, or Second Anglo-Afghan War, had 
bogged down into an expensive debacle. The two powers began to negotiate and saw 
the Congress of Berlin as an opportunity to come to a settlement which guaranteed the 
neutrality of Afghanistan (though its foreign policy was to be controlled by Britain in 
great power relations) as well as Russia being allowed to construct massive amounts of 
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rail networks through its vassal khanates, without British objection. These railroad lines 
enabled Russia to exert a much stronger level of control over its new dominions. 337 
 But it was a gradual process of tightening down on the occasionally rebellious 
khanates, and still they largely controlled their own domestic policy. Bukhara in 
particular played it close to the Russians and was rewarded with little internal 
interference. One ominous aspect for the khanates, however, was Russian settlements. 
Not just the military/depot system of Tashkent, but in cotton plantations (now a booming 
industry in Central Asia due to the cutoff of American cotton due to the American Civil 
War and subsequent blockade of southern harbors on that continent) and the insertion 
of factories owned and operated by Russians along the new rail lines. This in turn led to 
the expansion of Russian customs offices and legal counsels. Not all natives were 
displeased. The native Jewish population, who were treated as less than second class 
citizens before, welcomed the Russians, as did many merchants.338 
 In finally achieving control over its open southern flank, Russia had succeeded in 
the dreams of Tsars since Ivan the Terrible. The construction of railroads through the 
territory, as Mackinder had noticed not long after it was done, was a vital ingredient in 
rendering the vast spaces as (or even more) mobile for imperial designs than had the 
Turkic and Mongol cavalry of old had been. Rapid deployment without massive 
occupation, that perennial hallmark of the formless empire thought quashed by earlier 
Qing and Russian victories, was now back, reintroduced by Russia using new 
technology for an old purpose. With the increasingly apparent weakness of the Qing, it 
was now obvious that the Russian Empire had achieved a state of hegemony over Inner 
Eurasia of a kind not seen since the unified Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan through 
Mongke Khan.339 
Russia did have a few setbacks of course. It was blocked in Afghanistan and 
Xinjiang, but only just, and after having used proxy warlords to steal some land from 
China’s western flank successfully, if less than it originally wanted,340 and having 
achieved all its expeditions had set out to gain, plus a hefty profit due to the increased 
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demand for cotton following the American Civil War, Russia was on the rise. Further 
east however, in its quest for an ice free harbor on the Pacific, the Russian state would 
find itself not so fortunate, and the fate of two great Eurasian empires would strain to the 
breaking point from a new intruder into their deadly dance. 
 
6.3…The Inland Rays of the Rising Sun 
 
Not having an equivalent of an India (a primarily coastal yet still attached to Inner 
Eurasia type of land mass) under its control one might assume that Japan would be an 
unlikely candidate for a competitor to Russian or Chinese hegemony. Indeed, it would 
not have anywhere near the level of effect of long term success that either of those 
powers did. But that had less to do with the nature of its actions in the inland regions of 
the continent and more to do with its hubris elsewhere. As it was, this new power rose 
and intruded at just the time when the weaknesses of the big Eurasian giants were 
beginning to show themselves. China would be the first to feel the blow. 
 Ironically it would come at least partially due to China’s comprehensive attempt 
to retain its Manchurian frontier from Russian aggression. The introduction of industrial 
technology had shown just how economically valuable the resource rich provinces of 
the Qing Dynasty homeland had the potential to be. But it was not only the land which 
beckoned for exploitation. The population had exploded as well.341 
 Using the Han as permanent migrants, as had worked so well to harness Inner 
Mongolia to the Chinese base of the state, had been previously rejected by Beijing as 
being unsuitable for the cultural preserve they wanted Manchuria to be. The loss of 
Outer Manchuria, however, seemed to jar them into setting aside this concern. In 1860 
they had begun to allow Han settlement as far north as Harbin.342 Hoping to create a 
large and permanent pocket of population which would make Russian influence hard to 
increase, the Qing found it an easy sell with many impoverished farmers more than 
happy to escape the tight state controls of China proper for at least the opportunity that 
Manchuria represented. The first effect of this migration, aside from a regional 
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population increase of somewhere in the millions, was a breakdown in the recruitment 
quality of the Manchu soldiers under the banner system. The second was that despite 
the settlement, central authority seemed not to take.343 
 This movement of population did scare Russia however. The newly constructed 
city of Vladivostok was vulnerable, and the population of this new eastern maritime 
branch of Siberia was far smaller than that of Manchuria. In what would become a 
familiar refrain towards its easternmost flank, Russia began to respond to Chinese 
migration to Manchuria by beginning construction on the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the 
1880’s. The Pacific would be brought within Russia’s sphere of mobility just as Central 
Asia was starting to be.344 
 The weakness and potential wealth of Manchuria was apparent to the resource 
poor yet rapidly industrializing Japanese, but the expansion and hegemonic strength of 
Russia threatened to grab away any concessions the faltering Qing state might give. 
Furthermore the Qing still held delusions of their own primacy in East Asia, particularly 
their vassalage of Korea where a new internal faction of Korean nationalists advocated 
breaking Qing control and joining in alliance with Japan were being persecuted by the 
pro-Qing government. The time to act had come. With its modernized army and navy 
Japan would dislodge China from its increasingly obsolete privileged regional 
position.345 
 In 1894 a Japanese backed coup overthrew the Korean regime. The Qing 
marched to war against Japan to restore its hegemony on the peninsula. In a quick 
series of engagements the Chinese fleet was crippled at sea and its armies put to a 
succession of defeats on land by the smaller but tactically and technologically superior 
Japanese forces. Beijing and the only maritime part of Manchuria, Port Arthur, was 
captured and the true weakness of the Qing state was exposed to a far greater extent 
than even the Opium Wars had shown. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) China 
renounced influence over Korea and ceded Taiwan, The Pescadores, and the southern 
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part of the Liaotung Peninsula (named for the river valley that was the center of the Liao 
Dynasty) of Manchuria to Japan, as well as being forced to pay a large indemnity.346 
 This forced open China like never before, and all the European powers 
clambered for naval base concessions. Japan was a bit too nearby for comfort though 
and France, Germany, and above all Russia forced Japan to relinquish its gains in 
Manchuria in the Triple Intervention. Now the Eurasian hegemon saw its chance to 
move into Inner Manchuria and complete its conquest of the central inland routes of the 
continent. The expert Russian diplomat Sergei Witte347 managed to finagle many 
concessions from the Qing in exchange for getting the Japanese to back out of 
Liaotung. Most important was the takeover of the Port Arthur concession and above all 
the right to build railways throughout Manchuria connecting this ice free Pacific port 
directly to the Trans-Siberian Railroad.348 
 All these foreign concessions enraged the Chinese. Already nationalists like Sun 
Yat-Sen where blaming the ‘alien tyranny’ of the Manchus for China’s inability to adapt 
to industrial civilization like Japan had. Attempts by Han bureaucrats to reform the 
system met with derision from the court, and the Dowager Empress Tzu-Hsi removed 
many of them from office and even tacitly supported the anti-foreign mob violence which 
broke out, known to posterity as the Boxer Rebellion. The rebellion was crushed by the 
multinational force assembled to relieve the besieged foreign garrisons. Most tellingly, 
the largest contingents of foreign forces were the Russians and the Japanese. The 
Empress was forced to concede defeat and China had to give out yet more crippling 
concessions. Most critically for the fate of the upcoming struggles for Eurasian 
hegemony was that using their new railways, 150,000 Russian soldiers had come to 
occupy Manchuria, all but officially detaching it from Qing rule.349 Meanwhile, Outer 
Mongolia was becoming a vacuum devoid of all but nominal Qing authority and Russian 
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traders and diplomatic personnel were already penetrating this more inland frontier, if in 
a less direct way than Manchuria.350 
Finally, Russian armies had achieved two notable objectives in the history of the 
Formless Empire. They had started to infiltrate the homeland of their once Mongol 
conquerors, and they had finally achieved what the Cossacks had failed to do in the 17th 
Century in the occupation of Manchuria. But if Qing weakness had enabled this 
advance, Japanese strength would now check it. Japan saw how the power to gain 
most from its war with China had in fact been the Russian Empire, and now it sought to 
redress the balance.  Britain, the other Littoral intruder, felt much the same, and so in 
1902 a pact was made to break up the overwhelming land power of the Russian 
Empire, the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Now the two sea-based nations were balancing 
against the in land hegmon which kept much of Eurasian clamped down under its 
rule.351 
Japan demanded that Russia cease interfering in Korea and withdrawal from its 
massive deployment into Manchuria. Russia, confident in its position yet also insecure 
about its still relatively recent gains in maritime Siberia due to Japan’s rising power, 
refused in 1903. The reasons for this refusal according to S.C.M. Paine echo not just 
with the geostrategic thought of this era in Russian history, but of the cumulative 
experience Russia had acquired since turning the tide on the Kipchak Khanate at the 
Battle of Kulikovo: 
“Russia faced unique national security problems. Historically, its expansion had 
been the elusive quest for defensible borders largely absent on the great plains 
of Russia. But expansion created only very long and remote borders that proved 
extremely costly to defend. Enormous funds had to be funneled away from the 
civilian economy to defend the empire.”352 
 
An empire approaching Mongolian scope in size and scale was much harder for even a 
semi-industrial society to keep hold of if it was a centralized and sedentary state. No 
matter the lessons learned from nomadic peoples and the success of the state in 
expansion, the cracks of the industrial era were starting to appear. Fear of the exposed 
frontiers of Primorye meant that even if Russia had wanted to evacuate Manchuria, they 
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could not, at least in their own way of geopolitical thinking. And so the stage was set, 
Japan began to plan to evict Russia before it added Manchuria to its ever growing 
empire. In fact, over the course of the fifty years from the Treaty of Shimonoseki to 
Japanese surrender in 1945 a colossal proportion of Japanese foreign policy would be 
directed, directly or indirectly, towards both Imperial and Soviet Russia. The first stage 
of this proxy-war had started with the Sino-Japanese War, and from here on out it would 
become a much more obvious battle for supremacy in Eastern Eurasia. It was almost a 
precursor to later U.S. Cold War containment policy, and it was far more influential for 
the evolution of the Formless Empire.353 
 What mattered is that the while the Russian navy was decisively sunk at sea, 
their army received a series of defeats on land which crippled much of their offensive 
fighting power. Tellingly, all of the land battles took place in Manchuria proper. The war 
ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, in which Russia agreed to evacuate 
southern Manchuria, cease all interference with Korea, and cede its lease on the 
Liaotung peninsula to Japan, as well as ceding its territory on the southern half of 
Sakhalin Island. Both sides became suspicious, however, that the arbitrating power of 
the United States was playing them off each other for its own interest. Suspecting, 
rightly or wrongly, that the Americans wished to apply the Open Door policy they 
advocated for China proper to Manchuria via an American railroad magnate given 
permission to construct lines through the area by the Qing, Russia and Japan began 
just a few years after the war to collaborate on keeping out any influence from outside 
powers. Soon the private railroad scheme was blocked by both powers using legal 
methods and Manchuria was regarded as a split venture, north and south. In exchange 
for its many concessions in the war, Russia was given a guarantee by Japan that it 
would respect the de fact control which Russia increasingly had over Mongolia.354 
 Both powers, having found a rough regional balance of power for the moment, 
now turned back to dividing up their primary prey. The faltering Qing was no more 
popular in even their home traditional base frontier provinces than in China proper. As 
Japan’s South Manchurian railway jurisdiction connected the resources of Manchuria to 
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Korea (annexed to Japan in 1910) it began to create jobs and opportunity. Immigration 
from China proper increased, swelling the new cities of the region with Han workers and 
increasing its population. In a decade the population swelled from 9 million to 20 million, 
mostly Han, and traditional Manchu culture began to fade.355 
 Meanwhile, the Russians left only with their northern toe-hold on Manchuria, 
refocused on the comparative backwater of Mongolia. After the centuries of suffering at 
the hands of Chinese merchants the Mongols welcomed the Russian merchants and 
diplomatic officers with open arms. There were very few Mongols and even the tottering 
Qing was still a behemoth oppressor, so the connections and potential assistance of the 
Russians was most welcome. These connections paid off in 1912, when-finally 
overwhelmed by internal rebellion and lack of legitimacy in the face of foreign 
concessions, the Qing state crumbled. The six year old Emperor, Pu Yi, was dethroned 
as head of state and a republic proclaimed.356 Mongolia seized its chance by declaring 
its own independence and driving the few Chinese troops stationed in the region out 
with weapons supplied from the Russians. Though no one recognized the 
independence of Mongolia, including Russia, and the authority of the spiritual leader (or 
Bogd Khan) was ineffectual outside of the immediate area of that land’s only city Urga 
(present day Ulaanbaatar), Russia had compensated in former Qing space, if not in 
wealth and potential, for its losses in Manchuria.357 
 In this period of complete loss, indeed, the very end of the Qing Dynasty, China 
had one quantified victory. British attempts to do much the same to Tibet as had been 
done by Russia towards Mongolia met decidedly mixed success. While the British 
expedition was able to set up some amount of administrative control over Tibet, the 
push inwards made the Tibetans at large turn closer, rather than farther away from 
China.358 
 The Republic of China was as fractious as a supposedly unified state could be 
without total collapse. The republic of Sun Yat-sen was rife with internal division based 
on ideology and located in the south of the country while warlords controlled both the 
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northern and western areas, Han and frontier alike. The country became pregnant with 
Japanese spy rings and patronage networks towards certain amenable warlords. 
Russians too infiltrated as advisors for various warlords, if to a lesser extent. The proxy-
war for hegemony of Eastern Eurasia was revving up to start again. Most effective of 
the intrusions was the Japanese influence over Marshal Zhang Zuolin, who set up his 
power base in Manchuria. Seeing this as an opportunity to gain the rest of the province 
the Japanese went about making themselves Zhang’s patron power, and his relative 
success in holding onto his Manchurian fiefdom was helped, rather than hindered by the 
Japanese railway concessions crisscrossing the land.359 
 Russia had little time to gloat over the collapse of its huge and long term epic 
rival. Nor could it properly prepare for the coming storm of conflict over the carcass of 
the former Qing Empire when crisis brewed on other fronts. The doom of Imperial 
Russia would not come from the east or Central Asia, but rather from its supposedly 
much more fixed and stable western borders. This of course was the First World War. 
While Japan and Russia participated on the same side, it was a total war for the latter 
and light naval operation for the former. While Japan took the German concession port 
of Qingdao and some Pacific Islands, Russia fought desperately for its very survival 
against the armies of the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, and above all Germans, 
sustaining massive losses. The epic collapse of 1917 was as much a shock to the 
regions of Inner Eurasia as had been the fall of the Qing, except that the echoes of this 
fall, coming as it was from a great power rather than one who had been in terminal 
decline for almost a century before, would have its effects felt over a much wider scope 
of territory. Interestingly enough, because of revolts breaking out in Central Asia due to 
the burdens of taxation and conscription because of the war, Russia had taken direct 
control over its vassal Khanates in Transoxiana just 29 days before the fall of the ruling 
government.360 
 
6.4…Chaos Reigns as the Hegemon Falls 
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With the October Revolution and the subsequent Bolshevik coup, many parts of the 
Russian Empire sheared off into de facto independence, either under warlords or 
regional movements. Just as Russia had once aspired to be as powerful as China and 
had ended up not only catching up to it but surpassing it in scope and influence, so now 
would Russia follow China’s political disintegration by surpassing the levels of chaos 
and destruction the former’s revolution had caused the territory of the state. Because of 
the massive size of Imperial Russia we need not concern ourselves with every front 
between White and Red, what matters most are the two fronts most directly connected 
to the geographic scope of this dissertation, Siberia and Central Asia. 
 Both Siberia and Central Asia were remote from the core of the old state, and the 
new Soviet state controlled only the central urban belt of its predecessor, and at first 
that was tenuous too. Siberia had been quite free for Russia under the Tsars, now in a 
time of Bolshevik domination of the center of Russia’s economic and cultural regions, 
this sparsely populated and resource rich region was the largest bastion of the White 
movement. Cossacks (who fought overwhelmingly for the Whites on the Ukranian 
steppes as well) and the forces of the Czech legion held the area in relative 
independence by controlling the only reliable route of ingress and egress, the Trans-
Siberian railroad. Equipped with heavy artillery toting armored trains backed up by 
cavalry forces, Siberia had the chance, however, briefly, to go its own way.361 
White anti-Bolshevik forces gathered loosely in Siberia under the banner of 
Admiral Kolchak, and the Allies of the still raging First World War came to assist them 
under the pretense of rescuing the stranded Czech Legion and securing weapons from 
the Reds. It is telling that the allied power which contributed the most time, money, 
troops, and effort to this enterprise was none other than that of the Japanese Empire.362 
 It was Allied supreme commander Marshal Foch who thought of the idea of using 
Japanese troops to effectively re-open the eastern front against Germany. Seeing the 
daunting task of sending entire armies across the thickest east-west axis of Eurasia in 
amidst the chaos of the enfolding Russian Civil War, Japanese leadership asked for a 
high price for such an action-in effect total domination of Manchuria and de facto 
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influence over Far Eastern Siberia, including the demilitarization of Vladivostok.363 
Looking at the various logistical and political difficulties, a more scaled down 
intervention would take place. As Ullman summarizes: “There was no greater possibility 
of ‘open conflict’ between the Japanese and the Germans then there was that Germany 
would ship dismantled submarines from the Baltic to Vladivostok.”364 Despite the scaled 
back objectives from the dreams of Allied board rooms however, Japan had ambitions 
of its own in the region. 
 What was originally supposed to be a joint occupation of Vladivostok, with the 
Americans, rapidly escalated into an opportunistic-if poorly planned-attempt to wring as 
many concessions from Siberia as possible. The pretext for this rampant increase of 
involvement from Japan was the Bolshevik government in the west renouncing the 
agreements that the state had previously made with various powers, including Japan.365 
Contemporary international law professor Ninakawa Arata put it bluntly: “Now that China 
is helpless and Russia on the verge of disintegration, Japan has no formidable 
rival…”366 
 The objectives of Japan in this intervention were eminently familiar to the 
formless nature of how nomadic peoples once oriented their policies. Officially no 
territory would be directly annexed to the Japanese state; rather, the military would 
provide a bulwark of force for administrators and above all local proxies to re-orient the 
eastern region of Siberia towards Japan’s economic needs while retaining a large 
degree of domestic autonomy under local rulers. Even with the conclusion of the First 
World War and the ebbing of the threat of German occupation and resource acquisition 
in Russia, the amount of Japanese troops were only barely scaled down, and still 
ranged as far west as Irkutsk to secure the flank of Admiral Kolchak’s regime as well as 
solidly (with reluctant American assistance) in control of the Trans-Siberian railroad. 
From Vladivostok weapons and advisers flowed west and from Irkutsk and through 
Primorye plans were made to have resources and markets flow east.367 
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 The problem was that Japan had little experience in this type of policy. 
Manchurian railways aside, all its territorial acquisitions had been through annexation 
and direct control so far. Most lacking in its strategy was the instinct for choosing 
reliable allies who could deliver more than short term results. This was most telling in 
the particular warlords Japan found itself in bed with east of Kolchak’s direct control.  
 General Grigori Semenov was a product of Siberia if ever there was one. Half 
native Buryat and half Cossack in ancestry, he had been active in the pre-war 
operations to funnel weapons and support to the Mongolian independence movement in 
1912. He had distinguished himself as a cavalry raider behind German lines on the 
Baltic front of the war and later had served successfully in the Caucasus against the 
Ottoman Empire. Now he was effectively a Cossack chieftain in eastern Siberia, along 
with a ‘court’ of advisors, many Japanese.368 
 Unlike Kolchak, based in Omsk, and then, when that fell to the Bolsheviks, 
Irkutsk, Semenov was not interested in setting up much of an official government and 
preferred raiding and looting no matter people’s political inclinations. Receiving a 
generous paycheck from the Japanese he and his followers established themselves as 
wealthy and violent raiders, though not much else. It is worth noting however, that this 
mobile raiding band did keep the Soviets at bay for longer than might be expected, and 
was made up of a relatively diverse group of peoples.  Waves of migration, mobile 
cavalry columns, and logistics backed up by armed and armored trains returned the 
fluid geopolitics of nomadic and Cossack style power to the region, if at least 
temporarily and with gross abuses by an unloved despot.369 In addition, taking over 
Semenov and putting him directly in the Japanese pocket took him away from the 
potential of being influenced by the other allies, making him a reliable proxy.370 Among 
the people of Siberia a new term arose which became all too familiar – 
‘atamanschchina’-the rule of terror by Japanese backed warlords.371 
Despite these positive echoes of traditional Inner Eurasian strategy the edifice 
crumbled almost immediately when the Japanese withdrew their support and Semenov 
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fled to Manchuria. They had failed to maintain long lasting networks of cooperation or 
be able to wield influence indirectly. Admiral Kolchak himself commented to his British 
advisers in 1919 that it was Japanese policy to support a number of weak Russian 
forces rather than back a single strong opposition leader-like himself one presumes. 
The White movement was effectively undermined by its largest outside backer. British 
support for Kolchak was effectively undermined by this Japanese backing of rogue 
warlords through armaments and paying the salaries of their Mongol troops.372 373 
 By the early 20s support was flagging for what in Japan became known as the 
‘Siberian Intervention.’ Kolchak’s attempts to hold off the Soviets collapsed and he was 
executed as Bolsheviks marched on Irkutsk. No overt advance occurred into the Pacific 
Maritime area due to Japanese occupation, for the Bolsheviks figured leaving it as a 
buffer for the time being would encourage Japan to depart rather than engage in further 
escalation. They were correct. Burdened by the cost and the meager returns, Japan 
began a phased withdrawal from Primorye. The Far Eastern Republic which had grown 
under their protection did in fact develop a regional economy oriented towards Japan, 
but it knew the writing was on the wall and hoped to negotiate a phased integration into 
the Soviet Union in 1922, so it asked the United States to pressure Japan to complete 
its scheduled withdrawal as fast as possible.374 
 Japan was only happy to comply at this point after four years of fruitless guerilla 
war and an obvious lack of gaining any foothold which could survive their inevitable pull-
out. In exchange for upping its time table it did manage to wring out a few concessions, 
such as Allied willingness to look the other way as it shifted its Eurasian arms and 
spying rings south to Manchuria and received acknowledgement of freedom of action 
from the other powers with its much more potentially lucrative Manchurian proxy, Zhang 
Zuolin.375 The Whites who had demanded the withdrawal were quite taken aback by 
how suddenly the pull-out became once these guarantees were assured and absorption 
by the Soviets became a given.376 But before this withdrawal was completed Japan 
                                                          
372
 Ullman, 272-5. 
373
 Jamie Bisher. White Terror: Cossack Warlords of the Trans-Siberian (New York: Routledge, 2005 [Kindle Ebook]), 
location 2306. 
374
 Dunscomb, 135, 148. 
375
 Ibid., 155, 202. 
376
 Ibid., 193. 
148 
 
would use Siberia for staging one more operation, this time directed not towards the 
Bolsheviks, but the Chinese. 
 The Russian Revolution had opened the way for China to finally strike back. With 
the recall of Russian troops from Mongolia, Chinese soldiers soon entered the country 
and proclaimed it to be back under the control of their state. Soon Republican troops of 
the Kuomintang were making Mongols kowtow to them publically in the traditional 
imperial act of submission.377 
 A protégé of Semenov (himself now preparing a retreat for exile in Manchuria), 
Roman von Ungern-Sternberg, was organizing an attack on the Chinese in Mongolia. 
He was a Baltic German-Russian nobleman who had seen service in the First World 
War, where he had met Semenov. Violently unstable, virulently anti-Semitic and anti-
communist, and with delusions of restoring the Mongol Empire with himself as Khan 
while riding to Moscow in a sea of blood across Eurasia, he was probably not the most 
ideal proxy for the Japanese to use. Nonetheless, many Japanese officers and soldiers 
covertly joined the multiethnic force of this seemingly up-and-coming “Mad Baron” as 
his enemies dubbed him. This force included mercenaries of all types, White Russians, 
a few Chinese, and at its core Mongolians.  All his Russian officers were required to 
learn Mongolian to communicate with their troops. This force set out south of eastern 
Siberia for Mongolia in 1921.378 
 After a few failures to dislodge the Chinese from Urga, Ungern-Sternberg finally 
took the city by storm perpetrating a truly Mongol style sack and pillage to the only city 
in Outer Mongolia. The Bogd Khan was freed of his house arrest and made the spiritual 
head of a once again independent Mongolia. The remaining Chinese broke and were 
ruthlessly captured and killed out on the steppe by the Mongol cavalry. Now the reign of 
terror began as Ungern-Sternberg publically executed and tortured anyone perceived to 
be plotting against him while he seized the livestock of the locals.379 The liberator of the 
Mongols had become their tormentor in a very brief amount of time, and many Mongols 
fled northwest to Bolshevik lines to join up with Soviet allied partisans under Damdin 
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Sukhbaatar, a Mongolian independence fighter trained by the Russians before the First 
World War.380 
 The central government of the Republic of China ordered the warlord Zhang 
Zuolin to march west and remove the Baron before the Bolsheviks did, but himself being 
a Japanese proxy he was content to take the money the government set aside for the 
cost of the expedition while opening up diplomatic channels with Ungern-Sternberg. To 
his credit, Zhang did try to bribe The Baron to leave Mongolia, but this offer was 
refused.381 
 Baron Ungern-Sternberg decided he could not wait for the Soviet counterattack 
and drove northwest to meet his enemies in pre-emptive campaign. In a series of 
cavalry battles the Baron found himself outmaneuvered by Sukhbaatar’s Red Mongols 
and Bolshevik allies, who used traditional false retreat and ambush tactics against him 
in ways reminiscent of the 13th century behavior of Mongol armies.382 The Baron was 
driven back once, returned to more initial success the second time, but was finally 
defeated in detail by Soviet reinforcements using aircraft. While the Mad Baron was 
trapped fighting against the inevitable in Siberia, Sukhbaatar’s Red Mongols drove into 
Mongolia proper, taking over the regime and setting up the Mongolian People’s 
Republic, the second country in the world to become officially communist.383 384 
 Abandoned and wounded by his men after they failed in assassinating him by 
raking his tent with machinegun fire, and wearing nothing but a jacket and multiple 
shamanic talismans, Ungern-Sternberg escaped into the steppe only to be captured and 
bound by Mongol herders seeking revenge. He was left tied up with his face in an ant 
hill until found by a Soviet patrol. Taken to Novosibirsk he was given a trial for counter-
revolutionary activities where he denied none of the charges and was summarily 
executed.385 
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 Mongolia had in fact now been detached from China, even if China would not 
admit it until after the Second World War, though clearly not in a way which favored 
Japan as was intended by Ungern-Sternberg’s financial backers in Tokyo. As a price for 
its assistance the Soviet Union annexed the Tuva Republic from Mongolia’s northern 
borders and few in Mongolia proper questioned that they had traded one neighbor’s 
domination for anothers, even if now officially independent. After the death of 
Sukhbaatar, his successor Choibalsan, working closely with Lenin’s successor Stalin, 
would become an infamous lapdog to the dictates of Moscow. The Bogd Khan would 
cease to have any relevance, his death soon after these events had no proclaimed heir 
to the office, and the extremely powerful Buddhist monastic system once set up by the 
Qing to tame the Mongols would have its assets seized by the state and lose its 
influence in society.386 
 Japan had managed to squeeze Northern Manchuria and mineral concessions 
on Northern Sakhalin from its Siberian ordeal, and finally pulled troops out of its last 
Russian bastion on that island in 1925. But it had failed to gain a foothold in either 
Siberia or Mongolia. Manchuria was always the richest prize by far however, and so by 
the standards of a new littoral power entering the hinterland of Eurasia, this was a 
quantified success made possible by the temporary collapse of both traditional regional 
hegemons. It was enough to make Japan begin to plan a bid for the whole region. But 
before getting ahead any further, it is time to examine the other front of Russian 
collapse and revival, Central Asia. 
 
6.5…Russian Hegemony Holds in the Oxus and Spreads East 
 
Russia and China had both lost immense amount of influence and relative power to 
Japan in the eastern extremities of Eurasia, but both countries, and in particular Russia, 
would hold on to their gains in Central Asia with a tenacity born of keeping hard fought 
gains.  
 The Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover left a vacuum in Central Asia 
where the local Khanates carefully plotted either a return to independence or a way to 
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gain back more of their former autonomy. Nearby Bolshevik takeovers seemed to show 
how little they were willing to accommodate former Imperial Russian clients on the basis 
of ethnicity or culture. Thus it seemed even more a threat to domestic autonomy than 
the old government did.387 In response Bukhara declared that it would mobilize its army 
as well as that it would refuse to nationalize property or banks within its jurisdiction. 
Bolshevik attacks southward to dislodge the troublesome Emir initially met with 
failure.388 
 The Soviets, reeling from their loss of so much territory to the Germans and 
embattled on every front even when the First World War ended, needed desperately to 
shore up their southern flank, especially because British involvement had become more 
noticeable since the collapse of the former government. The British had entered in 1918 
under the pretext of keeping Germans out from the region but had stayed to support 
various anti-Bolshevik fighters in the region and to flood the Emirates with spies.389 The 
Soviets needed a local base in the region to overcome the logistical disadvantageous of 
operating there and the potential of British troops crossing the border and so turned to 
the old Imperial stronghold in the region, Tashkent. Tashkent was reinforced, secured, 
and set up as the regional base for all Soviet operations in Central Asia. Since the 
original Soviet governor had attempted to defect to the Whites and set himself up as a 
regional warlord the government was adamant that the city be well garrisoned and 
secure. This relative fortress city would pay back dividends on the investment placed 
into making it Red Russia’s forward base in the region. Control of Central Asia was 
going to become far more direct than ever before.390 
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 Soon the Emirates were cowed and dismantled. The Communist Party 
coordinated rebellions in Bukhara and Khiva which then invited in Soviet troops as 
liberators. By the early 1920s the base at Tashkent had sent forth a variety of 
campaigns that had brought all former Russian territory and clients in Central Asia 
under Soviet control. With their newfound direct power the government issued 
collectivization orders and rebellions sparked in the rural hinterland. This type of guerilla 
war was more of a challenge to the regime than the re-conquest of the region’s cities 
was and so they turned to former de facto ruler of the now defunct Ottoman Empire who 
was living in exile in the Soviet Union, Enver Pasha, for help. Enver would gain the 
loyalty of co-ethnic Turkic peoples for the Soviets in exchange for them backing him to 
return to power in what was now the Republic of Turkey.391 
 Once he was in the field however, Enver double-crossed his patrons and became 
the leader of what was now known as the Basmachi Rebellion. He soon was in charge 
of the rebellion, leading raids of Soviet supply lines and receiving the endorsement of 
the deposed and on the run former Emir of Bukhara. Soon under his leadership the 
rebellion was able to take towns and small cities and occupy them. Equipped with an 
entourage of veteran Ottoman officers, weapons imported from Afghanistan, and a 
German style staff system, he represented the most dangerous threat the Soviets had 
yet faced in the region. Only in 1922, when all fronts except Siberia had died down for 
the Bolsheviks, did the state scrounge up the necessarily massive amount of force it 
needed to defeat Enver in a decisive campaign. His armies disintegrating after a series 
of engagements with this new Soviet army, Enver and his few remaining followers 
launched a suicidal cavalry attack on the enemy line, dying in a hail of bullets near the 
Afghan border.392 
 The new state of the Soviets had triumphed. It had retained Central Asia and in 
fact increased the level of state authority there. Though it took a much more direct form 
of control over the region, which led to such problems as the Basmachi Rebellion, it had 
learned how to use the railways and the value of rapid mobility and deployment. It was 
the inheritor of Imperial Russia in more ways than one. It even kept the language of 
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local autonomy, if not the practice, by declaring that it would create nation-states in 
Central Asia which would reflect the indigenous character of the places. This was a 
show for an audience abroad, however, as the states were well integrated into the party 
system based in Moscow. The national states themselves, being based on ethnicity, 
were nothing at all akin to the multiethnic and fluid norm of indigenous Central Asian 
states. And so it seemed that by 1924 the last echoes of the indigenous formless 
geopolitics of the region had died.393 Soviet rule, with its ultra-modernist tendencies, 
was far more akin to Western European type direct colonialism than Imperial Russia, or 
any regional predecessor, was. Their rule had the hallmarks of the more conventional 
colonial relationship between rulers and ruled such as travel restrictions and forced 
education in the colonizers tongue. All other changes in Eurasian geopolitics before this 
point were far more gradual, this new era was quite an abrupt change of course.394 
 If the fluid ambiguity that characterized Inner Eurasia had gone into remission in 
Central Asia, it had now resurfaced in a place where it first had been extinguished-
Xinjiang. The death of the Chinese revolutionary leader opened up the way for his 
succession under Chiang Kai-shek, under whom the government took a far right turn. 
The Republic, known for its corruption, was decreasingly popular in the frontier 
provinces and soon a young warlord known as Ma Zhongying, or “Young Ma” seized the 
area of Xinjiang for his own control and made moves towards turning Xinjiang back into 
‘Eastern Turkestan.” The whole area of north-west China and Xinjiang was run by a 
series of warlords with the ‘Ma’ title, (shorthand for Muhammad), and all were Muslim 
Hui people sharpened by struggle with both communist and Tibetan tribal foes. Young 
Ma, however, was not interested in loyalty to the republic and sought his own Muslim 
kingdom.395 
 At the time of Ma’s usurping of the region, the central government was busy in its 
‘Northern Expedition’, a giant military advance from the Republic’s base in the south into 
the domains of the northern warlords. Though it took his eye off of Central Asia, 
Chiang’s bold move abolished the independence of the northern warlords during its two 
                                                          
393
 Becker, 5633-5794. 
394
 Sonja D. Schmid. “Nuclear Colonization? Soviet Technoppolitics in the Second World War,” in Gabrielle Hecht, 
ed, Entangled Geographies: Empire & Technopolitics in the Global Cold War (United States: M.I.T. Press, 2011), 
page 128. 
395
 Hopkirk, 3161-69, 3462-70. 
154 
 
years of operation (1926-28). The Soviet Union, seeking allies for any future conflict 
with Japan, backed Chiang and his wobbly collation with Chinese communists, and 
began to support the Chinese Republic with weapons. The most powerful warlord, 
Zhang Zuolin (at this point his astute governance had actually paid off all regional debts 
and created a quantified economic boom in Manchuria) was expected by the Japanese 
to stop the nationalist advance with their support. Due to his numerous wars of 
conquest however, the once strong regional economy was beginning to falter, as was 
his military machine. When he was defeated outside Beijing by nationalists he had 
outlived his usefulness and was assassinated by Japanese agents by bombing his 
personal train. Thinking his eldest son-an opium addict-would be a more pliable 
replacement, Japan moved to install Zhang Xueliang as leader of Manchuria. This in 
turn would backfire immensely as the son took an even more independent path from his 
father, executing several Japanese advisors publically and trying to gain close ties to 
foreign powers such as the United States. Xueliang soon after declared his public 
support for unification under the nationalist (Kuomingtang) government of Chiang Kai-
shek. Altogether, the Northern Expedition was a resounding success that shored up 
Chiang’s base. Brimming with confidence he broke with his communist allies, initiating a 
general purge of great violence within the party and throughout the country. The Soviet 
Union balked at the display of treachery and withdrew their support. Chiang prepared to 
turn west and finally bring Xinjiang under full government control.396 397 
 The Soviet Union needed its own warlord in Xinjiang. Large numbers of nomadic 
peoples had migrated from Soviet Central Asia to Xinjiang to escape forced 
collectivization and were seen as potential threats by the paranoid Stalin.398 Young Ma 
was rejected as a fanatic likely to whip up sectarian strife throughout Turkestan if 
allowed to become too powerful. More dangerously, from the Soviet perspective, than 
the specter of Muslim revolts was Ma’s increasingly apparent contacts with Japanese 
intelligence. If Ma became an ally or proxy of the Japanese it would effectively put the 
critically important Baku oil fields within range of Japanese bombers.399 Thus the 
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Soviets decided to collaborate with Sheng Shicai, the Kuomingtang general sent west 
by Chiang Kai-shek to restore control of the province. They could remove Young Ma 
and turn the Kuomingtang victory against the Republic of China in one go.400 
 What happened next showed that the USSR was indeed developing its tactical 
doctrine in line with the new technology of the times as well as the tried and true 
methods of formless geopolitics, even if they no longer practiced those doctrines in 
Soviet Central Asia proper. Governor Sheng’s army (made up of almost as many White 
Russian Cossacks in exile as Chinese) advanced west into Xinjiang, while a Soviet 
force wearing no insignia or national emblems, crossed the border from the west 
heading east. Between these armies, Young Ma’s horsemen were massacred. Soviet 
armored cars and strafing planes, having now taken up the role of the mounted archers 
for the 20th Century, decimated the Muslim horsemen. Ma had disappeared, likely into 
Soviet captivity. Sheng seized control over Xinjiang in 1933 ostensibly for the 
Kuomintang, but in effect he had signed a secret treaty with the Soviets in exchange for 
their support. This treaty made him clear all his policies first with the Soviets first and 
turned Xinjiang into a de facto puppet protectorate for the USSR, not unlike what 
Manchuria had officially become for Japan two years earlier.401 
 
6.6…The Strange Case of Manchukuo 
 
The already quite extensive sway held by the Japanese over Manchuria was under 
threat by the previously mentioned unexpectedly independent posture of the new 
warlord, Zhang Xueliang. In addition, the stock market crash of 1929 had placed greater 
pressures on resource poor Japan, whose industry lacked both the space and the 
materials for an expansion of heavy industry. The Railway concessions were no longer 
enough, a more absolute hegemony was to be established.402 
 Though a settled, littoral, and agrarian power, Japan took a page from the book 
of Eurasian migrations in its plans to harness the eastern edge of Inner Eurasia to its 
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empire. It would be a frontier space for disgruntled and impoverished farmers coming 
from Japan. Mass migration would tie the region absolutely to the empire. Already, 
Manchuria contained many foreign migrants who would likely support the construction 
of a new non-Chinese state, the virulently anti-communist White Russian émigré 
community and the dwindling numbers of Manchurians among them.403 
 On September 19th, 1931, after staging a bombing of the Mantetsu railway, the 
Kwantung Army (army division of the Imperial Japanese Army responsible for 
operations north of Korea) began an invasion of Manchuria. This was done without 
orders from the civilian government, but the public and the nation soon capitalized on 
the opportunity the semi-rogue army had given them. Within a few months the entire 
region was under control, save a few pockets of bandits and communist guerrillas out 
on the frontiers. A lightening campaign by a quick moving foe (Japanese army had 
armored cars, light tanks, and cavalry of its own) had overcome larger enemy forces to 
establish control in Eurasia. A familiar story, except this time the aggressive power was 
an alien naval power. The regime that would be set up in Manchuria, however, would 
show that the Japanese had begun to learn from the earlier experiences of quantified 
failure in Siberia and Mongolia.404 
 Cooperation with locals, especially elites, became a key factor in the making of 
what was passed off as a new state, a homeland for the Manchus named Manchukuo. 
Officially proclaimed in 1932, the local merchants and affluent settlers were brought into 
the state, as well as the Russian White exiles. The exiled former emperor, Pu Yi, was 
invited to become monarch of the new state and was installed as Emperor of 
Manchukuo.405 
 Immediately, massive amounts of investment were transferred to the country. 
Heavy industry and general industrial output soon reached parity with homeland Japan, 
investments were returned two or threefold, and the Manchukuo Yuan, a currency not 
recognized by most of the world as the state itself was not recognized and Japan had 
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left the League of Nations in protest of the condemnation of the world powers to its 
invasion of Manchuria in the first place, reached parity with the Japanese Yen by 1937. 
Investment was opened up to other powers who recognized the state and companies 
used their profits to pursue large amounts of diversification, profits coming back from 
various industrial projects often being reinvested in the massive soybean and fishing. To 
shore up the still-ambiguous borders with the USSR these opportunities were often 
used to get Japanese farmers to settle specifically near the borders of the state to 
provide a solid bulwark of protection as well as frontier economic integration with the 
now booming cities of Harbin and Mukden.406 
 Meanwhile, in addition to disproportionate wealth growth through trade compared 
to China proper, the cultural development of this puppet state began to bear certain 
similarities to its geographic forebear, the Liao Dynasty. While it didn’t have a rotating 
capital system and the government was not based in tents, it did straddle the lines 
between ethnicities, state building, imperialism, and consciously trying to retain a 
separate identity from China despite the largest single grouping of people being Han 
Chinese.  Most interestingly in the context of the past of Manchuria was the attempt to 
preserve the way of life of what hunter-gatherers and nomads the state had left. 
Connections were drawn up between Siberian shamanism and Manchurian folklore with 
the traditional Japanese religion of Shintoism. The forests of Manchuria were protected 
by an extensive conservation program and Pu Yi himself was declared to have been 
reborn through the Japanese goddess Amaterasu and one of the state religions of 
Manchukuo became Shintoism, even though that religion held no followers outside of 
the Kwantung Army and the Japanese settler community.407 
The single most striking individual example of this formless identity of this state 
was that of Kawashima Yoshiko, born into the royal family of the Qing and Nurhaci as 
Aisin Gioro Xianyu. An extended relative of Pu Yi, Kawashima had been brought up in 
Japan and used by that nation’s intelligence service as a valuable spy in the region. She 
had briefly married the leader of the Inner Mongolian independence movement, who 
was also a pawn in Japanese plots to carve apart China into their own vassal states. 
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After the invasion of Manchuria she moved to the new region her extended family was 
ostensibly now the head of state of and acted as both a spy-and once she became 
famous enough to have her cover blown, an outright anti-guerrilla leader in the less 
secure parts of the kingdom. In a fitting last gasp for the Manchurian Qing royal family, 
she led a force of cavalry recruits made up of Manchus, Chinese, and Mongolians in 
operations against both communist bands and bandits. Once the pacification of the 
countryside was largely complete, she became a public personality in the state 
recording radio broadcasts and even her own songs.408  
With the outbreak of full scale war in China proper in 1937, however, the 
Kwantung army was put in charge of raising funds for operations, which they did by 
becoming patrons of the opium market which has aggressively marketed towards the 
Chinese population. Events like this and many others409 as the booming economy of 
Manchukuo was harnessed more and more to Japan’s ever outwardly spiraling wars 
drove the once intelligence, military, and propaganda asset that was Kawashima 
became sharply critical of the direction of the regime. Despite being dependent on 
Japanese protection, the pride of the Qing still shown through from time to time when 
the façade of their supposedly equal partnership was exposed in stark detail. Still, the 
state was remarkably good at keeping most of the populace loyal and productive using; 
in the social sphere at least, a relatively hands-off approach. Japan had learned much 
about dealing with the geopolitics of Inner Eurasia. These lessons were soon repeated 
with the creation of Mengjiang, effectively a Manchukuo for Inner Mongolia also 
containing its own royal family, military units, and the like. It is likely had Japan been a 
victorious power in World War II many regions of China, if not China in its entirety, 
would have been organized in this fashion. This model of indirect control was in fact 
exported to South-East Asia after Japan’s massive maritime conquests in 1942.410 411 
Yet while Japan had been honing its political acumen to deal with the region its 
long string of military victories had made it complacent. While the various struggles to 
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survive and military setbacks had made the Soviet Union the new regional vanguard of 
military innovation. Indirect administration is a core value to running a formless empire 
successfully, but it is only half of the equation, the other is a rapid mobile military which 
emphasizes speed and firepower. While Japan’s conquest of Manchuria did fit this 
description, it was nothing compared to the evolution of the Soviet Union’s military 
doctrine since the end of the Russian Civil War. Though this disparity would not become 
clear to either power until both had tested themselves against each other. 
 
6.7…Mongolia Witnesses the Rebirth of Steppe Cavalry, Mechanized Style 
 
A shockingly overlooked battle, from a historical perspective, would occur in the very 
birthplace of the formless empire which would sound the end of the infantry armies 
which had come to dominate Inner Eurasia and give the large settled states which now 
controlled it the one weapon that would make them as flexible and potent a force as the 
Mongols had been in the 13th Century: the wholly mechanized army. It would come as 
the long and cold indirect struggle for hegemony between Russia and Japan finally 
flashed hot in 1939, and it would be one of the most important battles in the history of 
the evolution of Eurasian battle tactics.412 
The Soviet Union began to clamp down on the notoriously porous Siberian 
frontier, and seemed willing to placate Japan on most issues for some time. This in turn 
led the Japanese to assume that it was weak and thus they adopted a belligerent 
posture. As the British ambassador to Moscow quipped in 1934: “Soviet-Japanese 
relations are good, but Japanese-Soviet relations are not so good.”413 
Stalin’s current army purge did not help the perception that the giant nation was a 
paper tiger. Sensing imminent liquidation General Lyunshkov, and NKVD commander, 
defected across the Primorye-Manchukuo border to the Japanese in 1937. The 
information he gave them on parts of the disputed border led a Japanese force to 
launch a night attack which killed and captured all Soviet units on a disputed hill.414 
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The Soviet army in the region, due to inept handling as its upper ranks had been 
purged, launched a series of clumsy counterattacks to retake the hill. For days the 
armies battled and despite much larger numbers and larger amounts of artillery, the 
Soviets failed to dislodge the Japanese. Finally, the Japanese government, not wanting 
to divert troops from the massive military operations in mainland China, put the brakes 
on the operation and withdrew from the disputed heights. The territory may have been 
ceded to the Soviets, but the Russian military performance had only seemed to confirm 
the sense of superiority of the Japanese army, who had held their position and suffered 
significantly less casualties than the Russians.415 
There was another section of disputed territory further west, this time between 
two puppet states, Manchukuo and Mongolia. This Khalkan Gol region was a hot spot 
for the migrations of Khalkha Mongols seeking pasturage. Not used to modern states or 
fixed borders they traveled along the border with their herds. The powers then realized 
they did not quite agree on where exactly the borders of their clients were located in the 
region. The village of Nomonhan was the only permanent town in the region and soon 
became the focal point for the two sides. Once again, Japan took the more belligerent 
position, sending a detachment of Manchukuo native cavalry to occupy the town. 
Mongolian cavalry then engaged them in battle along the frontier. It seemed like a re-
enactment of early Qing expansion into Mongolia in the 17th Century, but for the 
massive modern build up taking place behind both sides of the line.416 
The re-enactment ended with a massive Japanese offensive that overran Soviet 
headquarters, killing many of the commanding officers and appearing to be on the verge 
of crushing their forces there. The Soviets withdrew, but using their superior mobility, 
were able to check the Japanese advance. Like in Siberia, both sides withdrew leaving 
the Soviets in the field. Not willing to trust that the Japanese would stay put, Stalin 
called for Grigori Zhukov, a decorated cavalry commander and proponent of tank 
warfare, to take charge of the forces in Mongolia. Upon arrival he immediately ordered 
air raids on the Kwantung Army’s forward positions which threw the Japanese, used to 
air superiority as they were, off balance. They responded in massive force a few days 
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later with a crippling mass fighter/bomber attack on Soviet air bases throughout 
Mongolia destroying upwards of a hundred Soviet planes. It was a prelude to another 
attack which began a few days later, once again meeting initial success.417 418 
The battle raged for days and Zhukov lobbied for armored reinforcements. He 
was going to use massed columns of tanks to swing around and envelop the advancing 
(if slowly) Japanese army using the speed and firepower which mobile armor could 
achieve out on the steppe. At this point, right before the official breakout of the Second 
World War, this was a new doctrine to be used-the concentrated as decisive push for a 
tank offensive. This contrasted with what was more common, the using of armor as 
infantry support, as the Japanese did.419  
A coordinated counter-attack hit both Japanese flanks as intended. Mongolian 
cavalry drove off the Manchukuoan cavalry scouts and Soviet tanks completed a near 
total envelopment of the Japanese army. What little was left broke out and retreated 
back to Manchukuo.420 It was one of the decisive victories in Inner Eurasian history and 
finally checked the landward advance of Japanese arms which had begun in 1894. The 
high tide of Japanese power in Eurasia had been met, but with war in Europe only (as it 
turned out) two days away, Stalin was as anxious to come to peace over the border as 
were the Japanese. The first example of large scale limited war between industrial 
powers had been fought, but to anyone familiar with the history of empires in Inner 
Eurasia, decisive battles and campaigns in the service of limited objectives was really 
more of a return to the norm which existed before unchecked Sino-Russian 
hegemony.421 
The non-aggression pact which both Japan and Russia signed dramatically 
altered the war. Had Japan joined Germany’s 1941 assault on the USSR that state 
likely would have been crushed.422 It was only Japan’s turning south and striking the 
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maritime powers in 1941 (a decision they reached in no small part to what they called 
“The Nomonhan Incident”) that allowed Zhukov’s army to rapidly redeploy, using 
railways and speed across virtually the entirety of Eurasia, becoming the critical 
reinforcements that stopped the German advance on Moscow that very year and saved 
the Soviet Union from calamity. Zhukov himself learned from his bold experiments on 
the Manchu-Mongol border and became the engineer of many of the Soviet Union’s 
most impressive victories against the Germans, using the firepower and mobility which 
became his trademarks. Of all the powers in the Second World War, only the United 
States would successfully fight simultaneously on two fronts. The Soviet Union was in a 
much more dangerous geostrategic position, and so was able to fight Japan, Germany, 
and then Japan again at separate times. This was made possible by the combination of 
railroads and armed forces mechanization.423 Russia’s position as hegemon was about 
to return and it had mastered space like never before. It went on to play the single 
largest part in Allied victory against Germany, just as Japan’s decision to bring the 
United States into the war would make that country the single largest contributor to 
Japanese defeat. Even though no large scale land war broke out in Eastern Eurasia, 
Nonmohan had affected the entire course of the war’s Pacific and European fronts.424 
 
6.8…The Hegemons Return 
 
With the Red Army totally victorious over arch-foe Germany by 1945 and Japan’s navy 
effectively sunk and all its best army units and equipment stripped from the China Front 
and Kwantung armies to fight disastrous battles in the South Pacific, Japanese 
influence on the Eurasian landmass was about to expire. Hours after the second atomic 
bomb was detonated over Nagasaki a massive Soviet army, once again shipped in 
speedy fashion over most of Eurasia, crashed into Manchukuo. The sad remnants of 
the once mighty Kwantung army were utterly destroyed and other assaults hit the 
Japanese in their previous gains at Russia’s expense, the Kurils and South Sakhalin. 
The battle hardened and thoroughly mechanized Soviet armies, with the state of the art 
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IS-2 heavy tanks and T-34/85 main battle tanks which emphasized speed and 
maneuverability425, crossed Manchuria and into Korea within weeks. Japanese settlers 
either killed themselves or were repatriated to Japan after the war while prisoners 
became fodder for the labor gulags of Siberia. Pu Yi was captured and turned over to 
the Chinese communists, while Kawashima Yoshiko was eventually apprehended by 
the Nationalist forces and executed in 1948. The White Russian community and its pro-
Japanese spy network too met grisly fates, with the old Cossack Ataman Semenov 
entertaining his NKVD guests for a dinner party before they arrested him and sent him 
off to execution in the country he had exiled himself from. The most successful attempt 
by a littoral power to create an empire in Inner Eurasia had last all of 14 years and 
ended in a matter of weeks. Japan once became an island-only nation with no mainland 
holdings while the Soviet Union gained influence in Manchuria, North Korea, and their 
old maritime territories back.426  
Stalin had apparently learned a thing or two over the decades, and rather than 
retain an empire in Manchuria as the Tsars had wanted he dismantled some of the 
heavy industry found there as war booty and left some, along with all the Japanese war 
materiel captured, to communist leader Mao Zedong. Soon after gaining control over 
former Manchukuo the Chinese communists rushed south, much as the Manchus had 
once done, and defeated the Nationalists in a series of decisive victories utilizing both 
loaned Soviet armor and partisans and guerrillas. By 1949 the Republic was in exile on 
the former Japanese colony of Taiwan and the Communists were in near total control of 
the mainland, with partisan operations still ongoing in Tibet. After sweeping through the 
Gansu corridor to remove the Kuomingtang warlords from Xinjiang, (Sheng had been 
removed after turning on his Russian masters right at the time the Nationalists and 
Russians became allies in the war) the Communist party began to adopt the same 
outlook on the importance of frontier securitization their Qing forebears had had.427 
 
6.9…Conclusion: 
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Right at the height of power in Eurasia, when Russia and China had established 
hegemony and security over their border regions after centuries for one and more than 
two millennium for the other, their system came wildly crashing down on their heads. It 
was not because their former enemies who had become subject peoples had 
counterattacked successfully, but rather that outside maritime powers had broken in and 
re-oriented the system to suit their own ends. Chief among them for the regions this 
study looks at was the British and the Japanese, particularly the latter. 
Firearms and changing economic systems had moved the technological edge to 
the maritime states of Western Europe and North America, and then later Japan. The 
forces that had once tamed Eurasia were not adopted to fight these new alien intruders, 
who could move and deploy with a speed faster than any steppe nomad due to the 
power of steam powered navies. Only in resistance to these powers did these old 
continental hegemons learn how to innovate themselves, but the collapse of their own 
regimes when trying to do so only increased the unraveling of the system they had 
worked so hard to create. Japan even became good at the game after initial reverses, 
creating in Manchukuo a multi-ethnic state and commodity driven state, which 
resembled at least superficially, a modern exhumation of the Liao Dynasty, its 
geographic forebear. 
What Japan learned politically Russia would learn militarily, which in this 
particular era of the early to mid-20th century seems to have been the more decisive 
branch of strategy for the formless empire. Once the powers had recovered from initial 
intrusion and had some time for regime consolidation, war in other realms of the world 
had initiated the decline of above all Britain and Japan. When the Eurasian powers 
began to recover they did so with a vengeance. Particularly the Soviet Union, whose 
experiences in the Russian Civil War, with armor experiments, and at Nomonhan had 
led it to develop a robust mobile military more than capable of dealing with the 
challenges  of pan-Eurasian hegemony and warfare on distant fronts in a mostly land 
locked country. Zhukov in particular showed a flair for nations-wide grand military 
movements and battles which was truly Mongolian in scope. A single nation being able 
to wage large scale wars in Europe and Asia in close temporal proximity by shifting 
forces rapidly across the continent was an achievement thought lost to the height of the 
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Mongol Empire when Batu and Kublai waged their separate, yet connected wars of 
conquest in Russia and China. The settled societies, now modern states, had first won 
with technology and economics alone, now they could emulate and even surpass the 
abilities of the nomads in maintaining military hegemony. 
The long era of chaos unleashed by the fall of the Qing and Romanovs was over, 
and Russia and China were once again the undisputed victorious powers over the 
region, with the former being the stronger party by far. But if the Soviets thought that 
they had finally achieved total Eurasian hegemony with a pliant Chinese vassal 
thoroughly in their sway and permanent borders of stability, they were about to be 
disappointed. 
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Chapter Seven: Rebirth through Smothering 
“Men and nations have from time to time concluded that some single faith is destined to 
prevail throughout the world and that institutions professing and applying that faith are 
fated to become universally regnant.” 
 
~Adolph A. Berle 
 
“Comrade Stalin showed us how to build socialism in a backward country: it is painful to 
begin with, but afterwards everything turns out just fine.” 
 
~Haffizullah Amin, President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 
 
“Ethnic, regional, and local conflicts and aggressive separatism in states cause the main 
threat to universal security since the end of the Cold War, especially if this kind of 
confrontation turns out to be a powerful influence in the hands of some states, which 
seek to maintain and protect their own interests and zones of influence or to change the 
strategic balance of power in their favor.” 
 
~Islam Karimov 
 
7.0…Summation: 
 
The triumph of state power in its most authoritarian, ideological, and hyper-modernist 
form inside the two giant Eurasian states who most dominated the inland reaches of the 
world’s largest continent would come to exterminate the flexibility which so symbolizes 
the nature of the Formless Empire’s politics. The Cold War would become a dark age 
for the dynamic indigenous geopolitics of the region-but also a period of relative 
stability. It was, however, the most temporary of respites when taken in the grand 
scheme of things. 
 The unity of the two former rivals, Russia and China, was short lived despite a 
newfound commitment towards ideological unity through Marxist doctrine. As countless 
other practitioners of various messianic religions and revolutionary doctrines had 
already found out-ideas are a poor substitute for the realities of competing interests 
between states. Once it was apparent that China’s interests no longer lay with being a 
de facto vassal to the USSR and it would no longer willingly do so, the divide was swift 
and absolute often came to direct clashes on the borders or indirect clashes through 
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proxies in such places as Afghanistan, which once again would become the 
troublesome border zone of Inner Eurasia. 
 But even this cataclysmic rupture in the communist world would be nothing 
compared to the epic calamity which awaited the Soviet State which had put so much 
effort in shoring up its borders and centralized method of rule. When that state 
collapsed it shed off territory at an unprecedented rate. Central Asia was independent, 
but this came with the cost of artificial ethnic identities, rampant environmental 
destruction, and mutilated borders drawn up generations before by an out of touch 
political class. Despite these handicaps, Central Asia had been injected with many 
benefits from the Soviet period-some of which mirrored older forms of governance 
under the various Turko-Mongolian ruling houses. Relatively secular governance, an 
openness to regional cooperation and regional trade, and in some cases recognition of 
ethnic plurality. Central Asia had a new beginning. 
 So did Russia. Acknowledging the independence of its former colonies, Russia 
adapted (or, one might say, re-adapted) to wielding its power in an indirect manner. 
Massive security interests still lurked in the region and in a variety of actions it became 
both more economical and realistic to return to a time when hegemons needed only 
speed and striking power rather than occupation and assimilation to wield their 
influence.  
 China went another way, retaining its position in Central Asia while opening up 
relations with the now independent states of the region. Clamping down it followed the 
old Han Dynasty policy of western lands under direct rule and a further ‘Western 
Protectorate’ to secure those gains beyond. In effect, the present contemporary 
situation, with which we will end this chapter mirrors a return the first case study of this 
project: the bipolar system of the loosely, lightly populated, but immensely mobile and 
powerful Xiongnu Empire in the north sharing an intermittent rivalry with Han Dynasty 
China. The Xiongnu has been replaced by Russia and the dynastic system with the 
People’s Republic-but if anything the technologies of the modern world have given the 
Formless Empire new relevance and a rebirth from its Twentieth Century remission. 
 
7.1…Central Asia as Peripheral Province 
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In the era after the Second World War and before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Heartland of Inner Eurasia would reach its greatest levels of colonization and control by 
outside powers. The dreams of the Han Dynasty and Ivan the Terrible had finally been 
realized and the rancorous tribes and flexible statelets who had once been the engines 
of economic growth and large-scale security were defeated. But to add even to the 
ephemeral victory won by Late Imperial Russia and the Qing Dynasty it was not only the 
tribes who had been defeated, but the space itself and the weakness of authority with 
which even those previous conquering powers had wielded over their more distant 
possessions. There was no question now, state power in the most modern definition of 
the term was here to stay and the freedom of movement that had so defined the 
steppes of Eurasia was confined only to the militaries of the two powers that had finally 
triumphed-or so they thought at first. 
 The Second World War had finally locked down the troublesome Far East of 
Siberia. Once so open that Lenin had to in effect purchase security from other powers 
by offering the United States and Japan competing concessions now the area was 
rebuilt by the labor of Japanese prisoners of war, while Vladivostok became a restricted 
naval base allowing no foreign entry. Eventually, economic normalization with Japan 
would commence, restoring the tenuous trade links of the pre-war era while leaving 
behind their unequal legacy.428 
 Siberians, who had never been treated well under the imperial system, actually 
gained rights under the Soviets as opposed to the now quiet Central Asians.429 It came 
at a cost; however, as the confiscation of shamans drums by commissars of the party 
came to be seen as a direct replay of the actions of orthodox missionaries. Mining 
became a massive boom industry in the region, particularly gold, and the central 
government began to work on massive damming projects in the rivers of Siberia.430 
 During the early delineation of the Central Asian Republics the mullahs and local 
potentates had lost out. In the prewar era the USSR had accomplished many reforms, 
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such as mandatory education for children, the political emancipation of women, and the 
encouragement of university attendance. Massive agricultural expansion, particularly of 
cotton and other irrigation-thirsty crops alongside certain heavy metal industries and the 
Soviet space program would however lead to cesspools of toxic waste and 
environmental devastation, particularly to the Azov Sea. There were both benefits and 
drawbacks to Soviet rule and these policies served to tie Central Asia closer to Russia 
proper as never before-and considering that there were certain benefits the region 
acquiesced with uncharacteristic yet understandable cooperation.431 
 The Soviet Union was recovering from the massive losses and efforts of the 
Second World War and economic and technological innovation was promising to move 
towards the future promised by the revolution. It was the Kruschev era enabled the first 
satellite to orbit the earth, the first man in space, and a denunciation of Stalin and his 
political legacy, and a relative relaxation of the state network. Things seemed solid in 
the Soviet heartland.432 
 In Mongolia the attempts to find an urban proletariat (and in light on not finding 
one, making one) under the Stalinist strategies of Choibalsan had failed due to an 
economy still dominated by pastoralism. A more gradual approach was adopted and the 
world’s second communist state became one of the most stable, albeit under the 
tutelage of its northern neighbor and still while fearing the machinations of its southern 
neighbor. Across the border, in Chinese-ruled Inner Mongolia where even more 
Mongols lived, the Chinese thought to quell any nationalist yearnings to join with Outer 
Mongolia by re-introducing Ming Dynasty history of the Inner Mongols as the more 
civilized of the tribal branches who stood as China’s gatekeeper to potentially turbulent 
northern realms. Whether it worked or not as propaganda is questionable, but the Inner 
Mongolian frontier seemed stable for the time being.433 
 In the inland frontiers of the newborn People’s Republic of China outside of 
Mongolia however, things were not so stable in the immediate postwar era. The Qing 
and the Kuomintang had both kept a loose hold on the region, and as we have seen this 
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allowed the Soviet Union to also infiltrate the region of Xinjiang and gain some indirect 
influence there as well. Chairman Mao was not pleased with this immediately apparent 
unequal relationship between these two supposedly egalitarian states, so one of the first 
geopolitical projects of the regime was the same as many other new dynasties, to bring 
order to the western frontier. Tibet also still had an ambiguous relationship with the 
government ever since the British had opened relations with the Dalai Llama on a 
somewhat separate basis from the rest of the government in 1905. 
 China struck back. The first target was Tibet. The catalyst for decisive action was 
the outbreak of the Korean War.434 Before committing their troops directly to stem the 
tide of Allied counterattack from the botched North Korean invasion of the south, China 
would re-assert its hegemony over Tibet and also shore up a flank with the potential 
rival of the newly independent India. The fighting was brief. In a manner of weeks, and 
despite some of the most forbidding terrain in the world, a rapid advance convinced the 
Tibetan government to surrender. Little was done, however, except assert hegemony, 
until the Korean War itself was long over. Then in 1955 collectivization was enforced on 
the territory leading to widespread revolt, full military occupation, CIA involvement in the 
form of supplying weapons to the rebels, and the flight of the Dalai Llama to India.435  
 China was back on the march into the frontier. Now it was time for the already 
controlled yet potentially trickier problem of Xinjiang. Initially, the region had been 
loosely governed- as previous regimes had done- by General Wang Zhen, after the 
Korean War the government changed course and instituted a purge of all ‘Turkic’ party 
leaders in the local administration. This was followed by unsuccessful attempts to 
collectivize much of the nomadic economy outside of the cities which did nonetheless 
increase party control over the actions of the notoriously bad proletariats of the nomadic 
population.436 Eventually the nomads, who had little concept of class warfare, where 
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combined with co-operative farms to make joint herding-farming units which encouraged 
the nomads to adopt more defined and less expansive ranges for grazing.437 
 This was soon followed by a massive influx of Han Chinese immigration and 
economic development programs. Considering the rapidly strengthening position of the 
PRC in what was acknowledged to be its sovereign territory, Mao felt strong enough 
that in 1954 he ordered the Soviet Union’s advisers out of the region and accused them 
of treating the frontier region like ‘semi-colonies’ and negotiated the selling off of their 
public stocks in the regions industries.438 
 It was in this most unlikely of eras, where the past was disregarded for dreams of 
the future, that the Chinese communists turned to a certain historical figure to legitimize 
their rule over such a diverse variance of population. Once the outlying regions had 
been brought largely under control-the government of China began to extol the virtues 
of a great foe of the Chinese nation-Chinggis Khan. For bringing unity to different lands 
and peoples as well as encouraging inter-cultural cooperation and establishing the first 
international postal service, he became almost a role model of the state which was at 
that very moment destroying the ways of life of pastoralists and ignoring the principles 
of freedom of movement for which the Mongol Empire had propagated so thoroughly.439 
 Despite having cooperated in the Korean War and solving some (though by no 
means all-as we shall soon see) of their border disputes, the two formerly-rival-turned-
allies of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China could no longer deny that 
ideology had not smoothed over the bridges of the geopolitical rivalries that still lay 
between them. The alliance which held the Eurasian heartland together was showing its 
first cracks, and soon they would widen into canyons. 
 
7.2…The Sino-Soviet Split 
Despite the catastrophic results of many of the policies of The Great Leap Forward, 
China was growing in assertion and power. The leadership of China, feeling let down by 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s radical development method and personality cult 
(in other words, what Mao was doing at the time) and horrified by Soviet attempts to 
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downplay confrontation and seek more amenable relations with the United States and 
other powers, began to assert itself as an independent power more overtly. If the USSR 
would no longer be a stalwart ally on issues such as Taiwan while China had borne the 
brunt of the Korean War then perhaps it was not just differences of doctrine and 
hierarchy that lay between the nations, but that the centuries-long geopolitical rivalry 
between the nations could simply no longer be contained.440 441 
 The first big break occurred in light of increased militarization of Tibet to put down 
another rebellion. Due to border disputes in the region, India took the opportunity to 
assert its sovereignty over areas of nebulous ownership and also as a precautionary 
measure in reaction to the increased troop presence on the Chinese side of the border. 
India was a nation with friendly relations with the Soviet Union and perhaps the 
objective of the government was to exploit a breach between the two communist 
countries in taking such an action. The People’s Republic of China did not allow this 
deployment to go unopposed and launched a full scale assault on the Indian positions, 
driving them out and claiming the disputed mountain passes for China. The USSR was 
outraged that it had not even been consulted or told of the forthcoming operation. It was 
time to re-assert hegemony over the socialist camp as far as Moscow was concerned. 
Kruschev then decided to initiate a campaign which railed against ‘splittists’ in the 
communist movement in 1963.442 443 
 The danger of nebulous borders was thus made clear to all, even China. This last 
remaining vestige of formless geopolitics had to be thrown out in the era of radicalized 
nation-states and so Beijing made every effort to resolve as many of its remaining 
border issues with mutual compromises. By 1963 the PRC had signed fair border deals 
with Mongolia, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. But notoriously absent from 
this list was the biggest neighbor of all, The Soviet Union.444  
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Chairman Mao realized he could gain much from no longer being assumed to be 
the de facto vassal of Soviet policy.  Many of the various leftist factions ignored by the 
Soviets in Africa and Asia could be picked up as useful contacts and proxies from their 
position of being relegated on the sidelines.445 More importantly, with Northern Vietnam 
(soon to be just Vietnam proper) closer to the Soviets than the PRC as well as the new 
enemy India still maintaining good relations with Moscow, the Chinese leadership 
feared encirclement, something the United States could never do to them but the 
Soviets clearly could.446 
Mao would act decisively, fearing a Soviet sponsored coup. His first target was 
Soviet citizens, students and diplomatic personnel within China, and those living in 
Xinjiang were especially targeted for deportation and intimidation. Incensed, the Soviets 
retaliated by evicting all Chinese students from their places at Russian and Eastern Bloc 
universities and sending them home.447  
But picking on each other’s students was just the beginning. In 1964 Mao 
decided to up the stakes by re-opening the since closed debate on Mongolia’s 
independent status, accusing the Soviet Union of vassalizing a state wrongfully 
snatched from Chinese clutches in the era of imperialism. Even more worrying to 
Moscow, Mao made much the same point about Outer Manchuria (that which had since 
become Primorye and the base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok). This was 
likely intended to be a ploy to get a better treaty for the disputed Sino-Soviet border 
which was a leftover of the territorial ambiguities from the era of Manchukuo. 
Simultaneously to this aggressive assertion was the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, 
one objective of which was to root out Soviet sympathizers from the government as well 
as increase Mao’s personal power. In this time of fragility and upheaval in China, it was 
necessary to rally support with a foreign power as scapegoat. Therefore, the one which 
most threatened Chinese borders would do-even if it wasn’t one of the capitalist 
powers.448 Many of the temporarily buried issues had risen to the fore: 
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“Soviet accusations focused on chauvinism, racism, leadership cult and the like, 
charges virtually indistinguishable from the period of struggle against Nazism 
during World War II, and against Western imperialism.  At times they even 
exceeded accusations against the latter.  The Chinese accusation in turn 
centered on Soviet hegemonism and great power ambitions…Not only were the 
forces of communism weakened and split by the Sino-Soviet rift, but the two 
communist giants were at sword’s point, ready to give battle along all but military 
lines.”449 
There was to be no turning back now. The Eurasian Cold War had begun and Inner 
Asia was its largest new front. 
North Korea saw the brewing tensions and started to tilt towards China, denying 
the USSR the right to station nuclear weapons on its territory.450 Mongolia, 
unsurprisingly, took the opposite path and then-leader Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal requested 
Soviet reinforcements to protect his sparsely populated country from a hypothetical 
invasion of the giant to the south. The new Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev, used the 
phrase coined for operations in Eastern Europe of ‘Limited Sovereignty’ to uphold 
Soviet claim of pre-eminence in the communist world-with an obvious eye towards 
China and the Cultural Revolution which held so much of the socialist world aghast. In 
1968, Mao massively reinforced Chinese military divisions in Manchuria-while six Soviet 
divisions arrived in Mongolia and more in Siberia. Two events played into this decision, 
the Soviet Union crushing reform attempts in Czechoslovakia, showing blatant disregard 
for the domestic autonomy of its allies, and the increasing likelihood of American 
withdrawal from South Vietnam.  The government of China increasingly saw all 
alliances with the Soviet Union, not just its own, as unequal relationships set up by an 
increasingly imperialistic power.  The Chinese even began to build bunkers and fallout 
shelters in anticipation for a Soviet invasion.451  
The slow burning fuse had finally hit the bomb and in only a few years the two 
former allies were now already die-hard foes. At Zhenbao/Damanskii Island which was 
one of the disputed territories on the badly demarcated Ussuri River, artillery fire was 
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exchanged and Chinese military units began crossing into the areas of contention. All 
bets were now off.452 453 
Despite the apparently huge disparity of technology, economy, and stability 
between the powers which decisively favored the Soviet Union, the situation was more 
dangerous for them then might be assumed. The same vast spaces with (compared to 
China) very small population and barely enough infrastructure to support massive and 
prolonged military deployments put immense strain on both Siberia and the central 
government. Most military forces had to stay in the primary theater of potential conflict in 
Eastern Europe and so the Soviet Union effectively put together something they had 
learned from long periods of conflict in Inner Eurasia; a rapid reaction mobile strike force 
for punishing expeditions rather than broad front warfare.454 
A pattern emerged, first the Chinese would cross the disputed boundaries, and 
then the Soviets would try to drive them off. At first it was fist fights, then the Chinese 
soldiers would open fire, Soviet tanks would run over Chinese infantry, artillery fire 
would be exchanged. The first combat deployment of the T-62 tank occurred in this 
engagement, and the armor-led Soviet counterattack finally swept the Chinese from 
their encroachments and returned the frontier to what it had been before the 
escalation.455 456 457 
It was now that Mao, remembering that even Stalin made pragmatic alliances 
with capitalist countries, decided to become receptive to a more friendly relationship 
with the United States.458  Mao reportedly reminded his advisors of an ancient Chinese 
proverb advocating the position that it was more secure to make alliances with far away 
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countries and to have the state’s enemies nearby.459 Sun Tzu would have been pleased 
with such an application of geopolitical logic. 
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean the United States was also probing for a 
closer relationship with the Chinese.  National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of 
State) Henry Kissinger was seeing the breakdown of ideological considerations not only 
in his own country, which feared increasing Soviet military power more than anything 
else, but also the now obvious implosion of two implacable foes’ relationships.  The 
decision was made that it was time to recognize communist party domination of China 
in exchange for establishing a new balance of power.  This way the United States would 
be able to offset the growing strength of the Soviet Union by playing the role of the 
balancer with China as the leverage.  This kind of maneuver would ensure the U.S. 
retained the decisive position in world affairs.460   
Given that this was in the wake of the Vietnam debacle, while the U.S. was at low 
ebb and the Soviet Union was riding high, this kind of a change could rob the U.S.S.R. 
of its momentum.  With the official visit of Nixon to China and opening of formal relations 
in 1972, the two countries signed the Shanghai Communiqué which stipulated that 
neither country was to negotiate with third parties in the region without consulting each 
other and that both China and the U.S. would seek to prevent the domination of any one 
power over the Asia-Pacific region.  The following year the diplomatic ties would grow 
even closer culminating in what was effectively a defensive pact.  The Soviet Union was 
caught off guard, and now had not only the Iron Curtain in Europe to worry about 
defending, but also a vast border with China in East Asia.  As Dr. Kissinger explains: 
 
“The United States was not about to back the stronger against the weaker in any 
balance-of-power situation.  As the country with the physical capacity to disturb 
the peace, the Soviet Union would be given an incentive to moderate existing 
crisis and to avoid stirring up new ones while faced with resistance on two fronts.  
And China, which had its own capacity to upset the Asian equilibrium, would be 
restrained by the need for American goodwill on setting limits to Soviet 
adventurism.  Through all of this, the Nixon Administration would try to solve 
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practical issues with the Soviet Union while maintaining a dialogue on global 
concepts with the Chinese.461” 
 
Although it was feared that this game was dangerous and would greatly upset the 
relations of the two superpowers by introducing China as the wild card, the reverse was 
in fact to happen.  Realizing the danger of the situation Soviet foreign policy became 
more conciliatory and soon Nixon himself was invited to Moscow the following year. 
From the Chinese perspective, Manchuria (or North-East Province as it would become 
known), that eternal and dangerous frontier, was finally secure. It was not so further 
west.462 
 Eurasia had approached the closest it had ever been to becoming united since 
the Mongol Empire. Yet it had not quite made it. The Cold War now had three fronts, as 
was about to become manifestly apparent in the coming decade. 
 
7.3…War in Afghanistan While China Moderates 
 
The death of Mao and the rise of Deng Xiaoping to power over The People’s Republic 
of China ushered in a reigning in of the extremity of government policies-and this was 
felt in the hinterlands as well. 
 If inequality of alliance was one reason of friction between two powers claiming 
absolute truth, it could also be a problem for the different groups of citizens in a single 
country. With both sides having turned (with quite differing levels of success) to their 
main adversary as a potential ally in a potential war with the other, much of the ideology 
in the communist world became bankrupt as cohesive policy.463 China-being the more 
extremely doctrinaire of the two powers was the first to begin domestic reforms both to 
its economic system and it political apparatus. Though limited in scope, many of these 
reforms ameliorated the situation of Xinjiang to a considerable degree. Deng 
condemned policies of “Han chauvinism” in the frontier provinces and gave the Uighurs 
and others more local control over their party apparatus, though he did nothing to stem 
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the floodgates of ethnic Han migration to the region. After all, it was still a sparsely 
populated, turbulent, and border-disputed place with the Soviet Union.464 But now, open 
to investment from abroad and with an increasingly market based economy; the fate of 
the region under the PRC slowly began to change. As Millward states: 
 
“Xinjiang had been relegated to a status of strategic buffer zone and economic 
cul-de-sac since the rise of Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1950s and 1960s. In 
the new international context Chinese leaders moved simultaneously both to 
open the region as the conduit for the rest of Eurasia and to integrate it more 
firmly with the rest of China.”465 
 
This mixed policy, reminiscent in geopolitical terms of the old Han and Tang policies of 
keeping solid bases in the west surrounded by a “protectorate” would reap solid benefits 
in the decades to come. It was to be a different story across the border with the USSR. 
 After several decades of direct rule, certain benefits were manifest in Central 
Asia in the era immediately around and after the Sino-Soviet split. Soviet health 
programs had led to a population explosion throughout the region leading to an 
economic expansion in line with increasing industrialization. Unfortunately, this also 
increased the environmental damage, particularly from the massive irrigation works of 
the growing cotton fields.466 This strengthening of regional positioning in the importance 
of the various constituent parts of the USSR often took form in resistance to cultural 
integration-despite welcoming the economic ties of the state. This in turn increased 
Moscow’s fears of infiltration of the region from Islamic radicals-particularly in light of the 
recent Islamic Revolution in Iran whose ouster of the pro-American government there 
quickly became apparent to the originally gleeful Soviets that it would be of no benefit to 
them either.467 
 As the Soviets turned a paranoid gaze to their south, events unraveled in the 
perennial borderlands of Afghanistan. It had remained a stable buffer ever since the 
wars of disputes of the 19th Century, but in the late 70s-just as it was starting to 
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develop-calamity struck. The Daud dictatorship, which had seized power from the 
monarchy not long before, was in good relations with the Soviet Union, so the USSR 
was quite confused and dismayed when it was toppled by a small cadre of radical leftist 
revolutionaries with an extensive and potentially destabilizing package of sweeping 
reforms for a country with little state infrastructure outside of the major cities. This 
sudden shock of regime change and the heavy handed tactics of the new government 
caused widespread rebellion to break out across the country. The Soviets had neither 
wanted nor asked for this change of events, but fearing an opening for U.S, Pakistani, 
or even Iranian involvement in the rebellion, or even worse, a rebellion that might leak 
into the Turkic realms of the USSR, they decided to support the new Taraki government 
by dispatching advisers and army trainers (usually of Central Asian extraction) as well 
as special forces to bolster the new regime.468 
 The situation further deteriorated when the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s 
government split due to Hafizullah Amin, the former ally of Taraki, staging his own coup. 
This was one step too far for the Soviets, who saw Amin behave  like his self-
proclaimed mentor Stalin and drive the government deeper into a crisis by attempting to 
conduct massive purges. Moscow now found itself in the awkward position of having to 
shore up a faltering allied government by invading that allied country and decapitating 
its leadership. The Special Forces sent to protect the government in Kabul were ordered 
to storm the presidential palace and assassinate the president while a two pronged 
invasion of Soviet mechanized units made a massive pincer movement around the ring 
road of the country and occupying the majority of the urban areas-largely without a fight. 
The normal Deep Battle strategy was of no use against a sparse and tribal foe, so the 
lines of advance for armored columns were secured by paratroopers landing on the 
mountains near the roads.469 
Though the initial invasion itself was unquestionably a success, many in the 
politburo had deep reservations about an open ended commitment. Anatoli Adamishini, 
a foreign ministry official remarked: 
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“The action in Afghanistan is the quintessence of our internal affairs. The economic 
disorganization, the fear of the Central Asian Republics, the approaching Congress, the 
habit of deciding problems by force, the ideological dogmatism-what sort of a socialist is 
that [Afghanistan’s], what sort of revolutionaries are these?”470 
 
As the years were to drag on, the system that had tried to bring unity to modern Central 
Asia would indeed by taxed to its limit.471 
 Full scale combat operations were to last a decade. The Afghan forces bore the 
brunt of it, and the Soviets had clearly learned from American experience in Vietnam by 
remaining largely in reserve until needed, than exploding force with air power and 
armored columns. Still, due to the United States, China, and Pakistan lavishly arming 
the various insurgent forces and the forbidding terrain, a stalemate emerged which 
would continue until the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989. Even this withdrawal still left 
behind both SCUD missile operators and KGB agents-which helped repel an attack on 
Kabul in 1991, but with the fall of the Soviet Union that year they were withdrawn. The 
communist government in Afghanistan would actually outlive the Soviet Union by 
several years, even if dwindling to a greater Kabul-like city state before finally falling to 
the Pakistani-backed Taliban in 1996.472 
 Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the faltering command 
economy of the Soviet Union, had been an encouraging sign to the peoples of Central 
Asia, even in a time where a quagmire of a war had been burning right across their 
borders for a prolonged period. The Jadid School of Islamic learning (once which sought 
to reconcile secular governance with Islamic principles) was a common intellectual 
strand of the region. Born from the thinking of Crimean and Kazan Tatars (the 
descendants of various branches of the Golden horde) and gradually spread south 
towards Central Asia. The general mood was one of optimism that Moscow would now 
respect local cultures, take a more hands-off approach, and maintain the economic 
relationship perhaps with a bit more concern for environmental issues.473 
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 But it was not to be. The Soviet Union was finished. Though the Afghan War had 
shown the limitations of its logistics systems, the true cause of the collapse came from 
an unsustainable economic model coupled with a bloated defense budget (itself 
increasingly a product of rivalry with China adding to the already massive costs of 
occupying Eastern Europe). When a reactionary left wing coup was staged against the 
reforming Gorbachev in Moscow the game was up, even though the military uprising 
was quickly and non-violently quelled. Estonia was the first republic to declare 
independence, the rest following throughout 1991. Central Asia, in light of its central 
government economic dependence, the threat of Islamic radicals from Afghanistan, 
China’s rising power since the 80s, and the generally improving social and political 
conditions, was the last region to break off from Russia proper…but even it too went the 
path of independence to begin an new era in the history of Eurasia’s Heartland.474 475  
 
7.4…Warlords and Oasis States 
 
In the latter stages of the Cold War, certain leaders had risen up to power in the Central 
Asian republics. With the breakup of the Soviet system and its total dissolution at the 
dawn of 1992 these men found and seized the chance to declare their nations as 
independent and sovereign.476 But this was to be a very different kind of nationalism or 
independence than existed in Eastern Europe or East Asia (though unquestionably 
touched by modernist notions of nationalism through the Soviet experience)…one which 
acknowledged its history of a region reliant on mutual dependence and the confluence 
of multiple cultures. Despite the unprecedented and often arbitrary separation of the 
region into various republics the era of independence saw more resurgence of 
regionalism than further drifting apart: 
 
“The artificial Soviet division of Central Asia into five “ethnically based” countries 
has not weakened regional ties. Among other factors, the existence of almost all 
the Central Asian ethnic groups in every Central Asian country has provided a 
situation that is conducive in every way to expansion of one countries’ instability 
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to other regional countries. As a result, no single Central Asia state can be stable 
so long as others are unstable; in particular, a regional approach to their common 
security problems seems necessary for the five regional states.”477 
 
Because the region has always been a nexus of migration, each republic contains 
massive minority populations from neighbors. Almost a quarter of Tajikistan is Uzbek, 
and Uzbeks make up over 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s population. Uzbekistan had a western 
chunk of its territory as a semi-autonomous Karakalpakstan. Russians are almost just 
under 40% of the population of Kazakhstan and live in settlements throughout all of the 
republics. Peimani elaborates further: 
 
“The history of the five Central Asian countries is the history of a region, not of 
five separate political entities. Over time Central Asia has been ruled wither by 
foreign empires, which incorporated the region into their territories as a single 
political unit, or by a few regional multi-ethnic states. Rulers of these states never 
identified themselves with specific ethnic groups. As a result, for most of their 
history the indigenous ethnic groups of this region have seen themselves as 
members of a regional community sharing the same fate, rather than citizens of 
different states.”478 
 
This is not to imply that as independent states, these new nations would not pursue 
divergent paths-but rather that in order to pursue their own paths they had to have a 
level of regional flexibility and adaptability which was relatively unique to their 
geopolitical circumstances. 
 A mere two years after official independence, with the ex-Soviet party leaders still 
firmly in power though divested of communist ideology, a ‘Central Asian Union’ was 
created with the goal of furthering economic integration between Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. By this point Turkmenistan had gone fully down the path of 
neutrality under a closed and immensely retro-Stalinist political system and Tajikistan 
was then descending into chaos-but of the three Turkic countries who wished to stay 
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engaged in the region there was an acknowledgement that issues such as limited water 
resources and pipelines for oil and gas.479 
 Uzbekistan took the lead. As the most populous state with the largest army, 
President Islam Karimov saw his chance to play for top regional influence. It helped that 
now the region was open to investment and political connections to other countries. 
Turkey and Iran as well as the United States played the biggest roles in increasing 
foreign investment and establishing political ties with the new governments. Reaching 
out to Turkey as a culturally common counterpoint to Russia was a big part in the 
Karimov program for more independent action-but even so he still hosted the Tashkent 
Collective Security Agreement in 1992 and even called for continued Russian troop 
presence in the region to stem any potential tides of pan-Islamic ideology coming out of 
Afghanistan or Iran.480 
 According to Islam Karimov’s own book, Uzbekistan is pivotal as the center of 
Central Asia, the true axis between any competing power poles. It is thus that he 
advocates an equitable division of responsibilities among Commonwealth of 
Independent States-the association of Central Asian, Russian, and Belarusian interests 
formed during the breakup of the USSR-as well as using the framework of that 
organization to explore new methods for interrelation and interdependence throughout 
the region.481 With such objectives and the capacity to be a regional power it is no 
wonder Uzbekistan is leading the integrationist charge. Russia is often irked by 
Uzbekistan’s pretentions to be leader on such issues, but as we shall soon see, they 
have far too many common interests to openly compete for influence in the area and so 
are more often confederates.482 
 Kazakhstan, the second strongest regional player by most reckonings, was also 
a country which immediately began to pursue the integrationist line for the region. This 
may seem odd considering that it potentially could mean playing junior fiddle to 
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Uzbekistan, but Kazakhstan had and still has a very valid reason for keeping regional 
integration and stability at a maximum: its massive Russian population. President 
Nazarbaev made it a point of his reign to lead an officially multiethnic and religiously 
pluralist state. Fearing the rise of power of a right wing government in Russia which 
might demand places like the North of Kazakhstan (where a majority of the people are 
Russian) to be incorporated by the Russian state, the Kazakh nation has welcomed its 
sizable Russian minority into the government and political structure of the state and in 
1998 moved its far south-eastern located capital of Almaty to a new site near the center 
of the country and much closer to the areas of Russian settlement. Soon after, in 2000, 
a massive reserve of oil was discovered in the already resource-rich nation.483 484 
 Kyrgyzstan, poor and small compared to most of its neighbors and has significant 
Uzbek minorities and so contains little prospect for great amounts of independent 
action. Kyrgyzstan was thus the first to open its airspace to the United States after the 
9/11terrorist attacks, allowing the massive Manas Air Force Base to temporarily come 
under American jurisdiction for the purpose of supporting operations in Afghanistan. 
Suffering from widespread political and ethnic turmoil it may be, it still does however fit 
into the regional rubric of being a “secular authoritarianism with some state 
capitalism.”485 
 Turkmenistan, the most naturally well-endowed with resources of the former 
republics and also the only state sharing a border with Iran as well as its former co-
republics, may have partially removed itself from the regional states integration 
movement, but it has only been able to do so by becoming by far the most authoritarian 
state in the region. With all the rotating golden statues of the ‘founder’ of the nation (now 
deceased) and heavy obstacles to foreign investment at least on nation still lives behind 
a Soviet style 20th Century guise.486 
Tajikistan was the other member not interested in unity, for alone among the new 
states it was of primarily Iranian rather than Turkic cultural identity. That had not 
stopped it from being a fully integrated part of the region before-but of all the nations in 
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the region it was to have the most tragic experience of the post-Soviet aftermath. But its 
experience would also be one of the most illuminating examples of the changing power-
politics of the region which we shall soon explore in the next sub-section. 
Of course the post-Soviet era in Inner Asia was not simply restricted to the now 
independent republics which once were the southern bulwark of both Imperial Russian 
and Soviet empires. Xinjiang needless to say had not shared in the wave of new states 
born in the 90s; however it was still affected by the developments in Central Asia to a 
significant degree even as the rest of the region took a significantly different course. 
Decades of integrationist policies had flooded the region with Han migrants on a 
scale which dwarfed Russian settlement on Central Asia excepting northern 
Kazakhstan. By 1990 the population of the region was half Han Chinese and half 
Uighur. Xinjiang was finally, after thousands of years of struggle, firmly and 
unquestionable under direct Chinese administration.487 But this did not imply that the 
region was out of being relevant to the region-far from it. Xinjiang would benefit 
immensely from the large amounts of newly independent neighbors it found itself with 
and their resource-rich and opening to foreign investment markets. Seeking more 
regional connections, Post-Cold War Xinjiang would become what the Han Dynasty had 
originally tried to make it long term-a directly controlled Central Asian base from which 
to indirectly influence the western neighbors-who like after the latter era breakup of the 
Xiongnu-where ideally divided. In a short period of time Xinjiang had become the de 
facto base for Chinese business dealings throughout Central Asia.488 Its regional trade 
(and in consequence its level of economic development) was growing at an astounding 
pace, showing it to the biggest initial benefactor of Central Asian independence from an 
economic perspective.489 
The Chinese government was able to extract certain promises from its new 
neighbors that showed just how important its influence now was. Its own ethnic situation 
in the region remained (and still remains) one of potential volatility with occasional 
outbursts of strife, but since the 80s a gradualist melioration of dealing with the Uighurs 
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and Kazakhs had calmed things down significantly. With the base secure Chinese 
frontier diplomacy went on the offense in the region for the first time since the 18th 
Century. In 1996 they had extracted promises from all the Central Asian countries to not 
harbor separatist Uighur groups and to turn over anyone who advocated the creation of 
such groups to China.490 
One thing that did not change in the region was the nature of military 
deployment. Nuclear weapons testing and missile deployment had long since been a 
local specialty in Xinjiang, and the ‘Great Wall of Steel’ defense network which had 
arisen during and after the Sino-Soviet split was based on a rapid reaction force of 
highly mobile mechanized units meant to operate in sparsely populated areas with 
minimal logistical capabilities. It was something Ban Chao would have recognized from 
his campaign and occupations against the Xiongnu.491 
Finally in our overview of the post-Cold War geopolitical situation we come to the 
one country which alone had once achieved total hegemonic status in Inner Eurasia, 
Mongolia. Much reduced from its once mighty position, the present nation could almost 
be described as a city-state with vast pastoral properties. The least densely populated 
independent country in the world it is also the one which maintained its official status as 
its own nation despite that fact that it was an indirectly controlled puppet of the Soviet 
Union for the entirety of the Cold War.492 
Freed from domination and with the political monopoly held by the communist 
party broken, Mongolian became the most open and democratic of the former Soviet-
sphere countries outside of the Baltic.  However, much like the Central Asian republics it 
was not necessarily in Mongolia’s interests to pursue a wildly independent foreign policy 
which deviated from a Russian-dominated security network. Having only two neighbors, 
both being giant and powerful nations, Mongolia has been treading lightly in the post-
Cold War era.493 
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Mongolian ‘liberalism’ (as compared to the Central Asian states) is not so much a 
break with the past as it is a continuation of a pre-modern tradition-that of the proto-
constitution that governed the Mongol Empire, the Yasa.494 Due to its location Mongolia 
is dependent on one or both of its neighbors for sea access, and Russia for overland 
access to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia. This does not prevent Mongolian 
politicians from looking for other countries to have close relations with-particularly Japan 
and the United States, as Mongolian Presidential Adviser L. Galbagrakh stated: 
“Mongolia lies between two giants, therefore our cooperation with the United States is 
very important from the point of view of security as well as progress towards 
democracy.”495 
Mongolia views one of these giants as much more threatening than the other. 
Historically, as we have seen, the Russians have used Mongolia as an indirect buffer for 
the southern frontier of sparsely populated and often vulnerable Siberia, whereas the 
Chinese have sought to reclaim the region and have directly administered and 
integrated Inner Mongolia into their home realm. Combined with the perception after the 
Cold War of a Russia on the retreat and in decline and a rising China, Mongolia has 
been steadily pursuing policies which keep the close (if not as close as it once was) ties 
with Russia in matters of security and maintaining a skeptical-though not unfriendly-
position towards the Chinese. Russia has been quick in the past to remain tiny Mongolia 
that it cannot pursue a path of independence towards China on its own or in conjunction 
with far away states with which is shares no border.496  
 
7.5…The Revenge of the Formless Empire 
 
After the shedding of many territories the nation of Russia became the de facto 
successor to the Soviet Union, taking over the nuclear arsenals deployed on its former 
empire and inheriting much of the diplomatic leftovers from the previous era. It no longer 
had the economic or military power to affect events directly or the will to behave as an 
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interventionist policeman. And so, at first by necessity and later by intent Russia would 
begin to adapt itself to the new geopolitical situation by re-discovering the virtues of a 
formless geopolitical strategy. As Deputy Prime Minister Yegorl Gaidar stated as early 
in 1991: “We would be much better off on our own, for then Russia could be a great 
power again.”497 Given the calamitous state of Russia’s internal and economic stability 
in the coming decade, this sentiment may have been premature-but Gaidar was right 
that Russia could and would adapt successfully in light of the circumstances. Both the 
history and the geographic realities of the region would offer the guide, and the situation 
which arose soon after the fall of the USSR in Tajikistan would be the first case study. 
 In a fashion typical of post-Soviet Central Asia, Tajikistan had a local former party 
powerbroker holding on to power by reinvention as a nationalist president. Unlike those 
other states however, early into his reign Rakhmon Nabiev was forced from power by 
truly massive protests against his reign. A democratic opposition with Islamist 
tendencies grew into a regional movement in the south and its Islamic character grew 
proportionally due to influence from nearby Taliban Afghanistan. Tajikistan had split into 
armed camps and infiltration of the CIS by militant forces was feared.498 
 Both Russia and Uzbekistan feared the worst. Russian troops were deployed into 
the country to shore up the government and Uzbekistan began to fund Uzbek warlords 
in the country-getting them to back the side of the regime against the upswing of 
antigovernment momentum. These limited deployments and construction of Russian 
military bases checked the democratic and Islamist advances and the war stalemated in 
1995 to the point where a tenuous peace deal was enacted the next year which gave 
political concessions to the democratic side of the opposition while marginalizing the 
Islamist side.499 
 The effect of the war on Tajikistan’s international standing was the most 
interesting outgrowth of the conflict from an international perspective. The war had often 
been seen as an attempt by Iran to gain influence as Russia waned-and surely its 
results dashed the hope that Russia was on the retreat in the region after initial 
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withdrawal.500 The nominally independent country was now host the largest joint CIS 
peacekeeping force of any parts of the former Soviet Union. In effect, Tajikistan had 
become a joint “Uzbek-Russian Protectorate.”501 Russia effectively took over border 
control and policing in the region, regulating the Tajik border as it saw fit. 502This was 
the run-up to a counterthrust into Afghanistan-though not one at all reminiscent of the 
previous decade’s conventional occupation strategy. Another effect, and one further 
enabled by the re-assertion of Russian control over the country, was that now there was 
direct access to the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan-the so called Northern 
Alliance under Ahmed Shah Massoud-one of the greatest foes of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan in the previous decade.503 
 Russia funneled money and guns to its erstwhile foe, picking up the pace 
whenever Massoud suffered a defeat or it looked like the Taliban was on the march. 
Massoud remained by far the largest thorn in the side of the Taliban until his 
assassination one day before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.504 Much of the organization for 
those attacks took place in Afghanistan and its mastermind was living under the de 
facto protection of the Taliban regime. Suddenly, the situation had changed.505 
 President Vladimir Putin offered use of Russian airspace to launch the initial 
military operations which became Operation Enduring Freedom, but he was soon taken 
aback by the enthusiasm that many CIS states showed for American entry into the 
region as well as the large Manas Air force base in Kyrgyzstan being rented out to the 
US as a particular sticking point in his view. Fearing that perhaps the CIS area was 
being taken advantage of in ways which undermined Russia hegemony in the region 
countermeasures was soon taken. The Chinese government took a highly negative view 
towards these developments as well as US involvement in Central and South Asia 
increased continuously in the following years. Despite benefiting from the removal of the 
Taliban, it was time for the empires to strike back.506 507 
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 The increased relevance of terrorism, particularly of the Islamic variety, in the 
plans of nations offered the opening for Putin to hold onto Central Asian influence. If the 
United States could infiltrate the region under such a pretense, then so could Russia 
use terrorism as a rational for the expansion (or re-expansion) of its own regional sway. 
Putin was quick to sign joint military and security deals with the CIS states in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and set up a rapid reaction response force located in Kyrgyzstan and 
not far the leased-to-the-US Manas base.508 
 None of this negated the fact that the Taliban remnants and other radicals were 
still considered the primary enemy-and even as a vigorous response to US regional 
expansion was pursued, cooperation between Russia and the United States in 
Afghanistan was still to be continued. The de facto goal was to have the United States 
neutralize the Afghan problem while simultaneously preventing it from spreading its 
influence into Central Asia proper. Uzbekistan was the country least dependent on 
Russia and therefore the one most welcoming to the American presence. Though this 
relationship quickly fizzled when American, British and French diplomats insisted on 
criticizing the Uzbek government’s human right record and Russia and China more 
effectively re-asserted themselves.509 510 
 By 2005 the threat of expanding US influence in Central Asia was effectively 
neutralized. Uzbekistan was back in the CIS fold. The Kyrgyz took back outer security 
operations for the Manas base (now referred to as a ‘transit center’ and its status still 
under negotiation), as Ariel Cohen states: “While the US may maintain some presence 
in the area in the future, it will only be one of a much larger concert of powers, each with 
its own ties, clients and agendas. The US is not about to dominate Central Asia anytime 
soon.”511 Even officially neutral Turkmenistan was still paying for the upkeep of Russian 
military bases on its borders even as the new leadership after Niyazov’s death 
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maintained the structure of the closed off state.512  Dilip Hiro summarizes the position of 
the Central Asian nations in the post 9/11 world perfectly: 
 
“…Such were the compulsions of history, geography, and economics that none 
of these presidents could set themselves completely free from the embrace of 
Mother Russia. True, every now and then, a Central Asian leader struck a defiant 
pose only to realize that he could not sustain it for long. Indeed, as Russian 
president Vladimir Putin started transforming Russia’ political system into a 
“managed democracy” during his second term in office (from 2004 to 2008) –
marginalizing the opposition, gaining almost full control over the electronic media, 
virtually renationalizing energy and other important industries-the authoritarian 
and proto-authoritarian rulers of Central Asia began to feel at home once more in 
the Kremlin.”513 
 
Such a coordinated pushback was not brought about without a new and evolving 
framework for regional integration, something we must now turn to in order to 
understand the current evolution of the Formless Empire. 
 As both Russia and China began the push back against the United States, both 
the benefits of cooperation and the potential conflicts each could have become more 
apparent. In 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional network of 
military cooperation between China, Russia, and all the Central Asian countries 
excepting Turkmenistan, was born. Eventually it would include other states such as 
India, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mongolia as ‘observers’. The primary goal of this 
international network as stated in a 2002 press release was to “combat the three evils: 
terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.”514 
Not as explicitly stated but just as real is its purpose to keep outside powers at 
bay from the heart of Eurasia. Too weak on their own to do this, Russia and China must 
act in conjunction and in collaboration rather than dominance with the Central Asian 
states.515 The effect of such traditional indirect methods with modern means was aptly 
stated when President Medvedev of Russia wrote off $180 million of Kyrgystan’s debt 
and promised $300 million in loans to said country in exchange for upping the rent and 
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making life more difficult for the US base at Manas.516 But such loose alliances do not 
long outlast the containment of a common foe. Already tensions simmer between the 
two main power-poles in Inner Eurasia. Though they may be quiet now but two nations 
of such size and power competing for influence in many of the same places does 
present potential danger. To keep the CIS together and remain its guarantor, Russia 
may one day need a new common enemy when the United States is no longer a major 
regional player. This is, perhaps, somewhat intentional. As Jennifer Anderson states: 
 
“Russia and China’s strategic partnership is unwieldy and imprecise. Weighed 
down by contradictory commitments, hyperbolic rhetoric and a wide variety of 
intersecting interests, their relationship is inherently and deliberately vague.”517 
 
In addition to actual policy moves towards cooperation, joint military exercises through 
the SCO have become common. Both Russian and Chinese forces have participated 
with each other in mock-military operations as well as continuous Russian-Central Asian 
cooperation in military affairs. China and Kyrgyzstan have also conducted joint military 
exercises along their common border. China’s fear of instability or encirclement seem to 
have been allayed on the landward side for the time being, while Russian raw materials 
which complement the rapid pace of Chinese industrialization can be traded and 
pipelines constructed through eastern Siberia. Meanwhile Russian arms and military 
equipment is sold at steady rates to the Chinese military as well as the CIS states.518 519 
This type of loose confederation against a common foe is hardly a new era in the 
region, but such coalitions also tend not to be permanent. This relationship is fraught 
with potential difficulty-as it always has been since two different countries with two 
different ways of adapting diplomacy and military policy towards the security concerns 
of the Inner Eurasian steppe. Russian policy makers tend to view the situation as an 
unequal alliance and fear nationalist Chinese designs on what was once called ‘Outer 
Manchuria.” Furthermore, the sparsely populated and resource rich areas of eastern 
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Siberia are often considered to be vulnerable to a country with a teeming population just 
across the border.520 Chinese designs for expansion of influence in Central Asia are 
feared as well, by both Russian and Central Asian policy makers.521 The system is in 
flux, as it ever has been. In an era of satellites, armored columns, air power, Special 
Forces, electronic financial transactions, and at least token respect for national 
sovereignty though the potential for fully mobile small units of forces to keep a network 
held together by common economic and military objectives shows that after being 
almost totally snuffed out in the 20th Century, the Formless Empire is back and stronger 
than ever. It is a likely outcome that the countries best adapted through long (and often 
hard) experience with centuries of conflicts and moving borders in Inner Eurasia will 
retain a decisive advantage of riding the warp and weft of the geopolitics in this region. 
 
7.6…Conclusion: 
 
From their height of domination both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China had finally achieved the full scale pacification of Inner Eurasia. Their unity was 
temporary however and divisions between the two poles of communism became more 
extreme with time. Even division could not bring back the famous fluidity of the steppes 
(even while militaries and borders continued to shift to meet changing circumstances) 
as the once open steppes were brought under both countries’ central control and were 
integrated into their economies. But it was the seemingly stronger Russia whose feet 
were made of clay in the end, and the apparently weaker China who endured the tumult 
of the 90s unscathed-even strengthened. 
 State centralization and domination is absolute, and while there is little to no 
room for the indirect and informal political arrangements of past days, the viability to 
technology, a globalized economy, and regional independence in Central Asia mean 
that, as tactical doctrine, The Formless Empire has the potential to return, not as it once 
lingered in frontier states, but as foreign policy towards the frontier of the most 
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established states in the region as they seek to rebuild relationships with former rivals 
and neighbors. 
The present day People’s Republic of China sits upon a favorable geopolitical 
position compared to past dynasties. It meets all the territorial requirements necessary 
for border security (as the Chinese have come to understand it) in accomplishing what 
was once called the pacification of the western regions through direct settlement and 
the stabilization of Mongolia through border demarcation. Manchuria, the other region of 
danger has been thoroughly Sinicized and now can be viewed as a province of China 
(with the identity-stripping name of North-East China no less). Russia is the weaker 
power, though being the world’s strongest nuclear power and still a proper military 
power its borders are for now, secure. Now in the present day it is easy to say that the 
poles have reversed from the last several centuries and returned to when Cossacks first 
met the Qing Manchus in the Amur River back in the 17th Century. A sparsely populated 
Russian frontier, a strong state in China, and many smaller ambiguous power in-
between. But in the conclusion we will examine the ways this Chinese victory-much like 
that past one-might be a seemingly decisive result which hides the true amorphousness 
of the situation underneath. After all, the Formless Empire is just back in full swing now-
and it often thrives with many players in the game. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
“Nomad, you're the rider so mysterious/ 
Nomad, you're the spirit that men fear in us/ 
Nomad, you're the rider of the desert sands/ 
No man's ever understood your genius.” 
 
~Iron Maiden, The Nomad 
 
8.0…Summation: 
 
Having delved into each of the primary case studies from tracking the rise, fall, and 
potential resurgence of The Formless Empire concept in action, it is now time to both 
summarize the findings as well as state the summation of the geopolitical saga which 
they entail. Following this, a look at why it is important so keep this historical information 
in mind moving into the future will round out the purpose of this dissertation. 
 
8.1…Summarizing the Case Studies 
 
In a massive temporal scale we have had to be selective in the case studies used to 
make the case for understanding Inner Eurasian grand strategy in the indigenous 
evolution of The Formless Empire. Scythians, Sarmatians, and Hepthalites, to name but 
a few, have been excluded lest we overrun a desirable length. A greater degree of focus 
on the eastern edge of the region has kept up nearer Sun Tzu’s homeland as well as 
the modern nation-states and empires that have been more directly influenced in their 
policy-making by being exposed to both the benefits and calamities of contact with 
various Inner Eurasian societies. In a few cases where the influence spread westward 
or southward, we have tracked that as well to show the overall applicability of Formless 
Geopolitics. As was mentioned in the introduction, the cases which were chosen were 
specifically selected in order to best represent what the Formless Empire is all about: 
speed, mobility, indirect action, unconventional strategy, and geographic and 
circumstantial adaptation to vast and often sparsely populated land spaces. 
 The Xiongnu and their unified empire were an excellent first case study for 
showing the adaptive nature of formless geopolitics. Not only were they one of the 
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earliest among powerful confederations of steppe people, therefore showing the 
remarkable speed and power projection of the Eurasian cavalryman over vast spaces 
despite their often small numbers, but they also showed the indirect methods of politics 
and diplomacy which often arise from such a situation. Furthermore, the destruction of 
the Xiongnu Empire by the Chinese was also an effective early example of a settled 
state adapting to the superior mobility of its steppe neighbors and training and recruiting 
its own all-cavalry armies. In addition, after Pan Chao’s truly epic victory over the 
Xiongnu and the establishment of the Han Dynasty into Inner Asia it was not 
administered as a Chinese province but rather in a more indirect method. Certain critical 
geographic points were occupied, and the space in between were left to be ruled 
indirectly and through local elites. The western half of Xiongnu domains was left almost 
entirely untouched and largely served as a buffer state between the new Chinese 
realms further east and any new unruly tribe migrating through Central Asia. If the 
largely independent realm of Western Xiongnu turned against the Chinese, there would 
still be the Eastern Xiongnu to absorb the shock before any core Chinese territories 
would be affected.  
 The creative and clever use of large spaces occupied by small amounts of 
mobile forces would remain and in some ways even be strengthened by the successor 
Tang Dynasty, its founder himself or partially Turkic origin. Spreading east from north-
westerly origins the Tang would be renowned for its military power and Central Asian 
influence. Controlling the Silk Road trade routes would give it unprecedented wealth as 
well.  
After a ruinous civil war the Tang gave way and migratory nomads broke into 
China once again. While the Chinese carried on as before in the south under the Sung 
Dynasty, the nomadic Khitan people drove out from Mongolia to seize Manchuria and 
parts of Northern China. Being outnumbered by their settled subjects the Khitans 
adopted an indirect method of rule, a pattern which would be common to all nomadic 
people for centuries. The Khitans were the first to codify this into law in the Liao 
Dynasty, and their governance was largely based around the idea of several permanent 
Chinese-style cities holding the reins of power-but with a nomadic aristocracy which 
rode between them in a mobile tent city. Civic law was applied differently to nomads, 
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forest-dwellers, and agrarian Chinese and a true multicultural state of remarkable legal 
diversity was born from this nomadic minority. 
But even this startling innovation could not hold back the turbulent tides of other 
mobile people. The Jurchens rebelled and stormed out of Manchuria, soon taking over 
the former territory of the Khitans. Yet it was in this moment of ultimate crisis that the 
Khitan political system, which allowed the nomadic population to retain its mobility 
despite ruling over a predominantly settled state, showed its greatest degree of 
flexibility. The Prince Yelu Daishi, many of his courtiers, and a substantial segment of 
his cavalry rode out west and built a new kingdom amongst the oasis and rivers of 
Transoxiana. Despite the new and alien settings, this second gasp of Khitan power, that 
of the Kara-Khitai, would last for another century and be one of the dominant nations of 
Central Asia. It was largely able to do this by retaining the decentralized, flexible system 
of governance it had formed through experience in Manchuria. When it fell due to its 
own attempts to subvert this tried and true system by imposing Buddhism on its 
primarily Muslim subjects, it would be at the hands of another rising power, the 
Mongols, who were then in the process of learning the lessons the Khitans had 
apparently unlearned. They would go on to consume Khitan and Jurchen alike and go 
farther afield than either of those had dreamed. 
The Mongols were the apogee of nomadic power in Eurasian history, and the last 
gasp of the near-total military dominance of entirely nomadic people over settled people 
in warfare. But after the unification of the various previously marginal tribes by Temujin, 
who was proclaimed Chinggis Khan in 1206, they became the most successful land 
based conquerors in history. At first lacking the sophistication and nuance of the 
Khitans, they proved remarkably adaptable to foreign ideas and recruited heavily from 
new subject populations to staff their bureaucracy and governing classes. Especially 
popular with Khitans and Jurchens who were from similar nomadic backgrounds as the 
Mongols but also were somewhat integrated into the civilization of the Chinese.  
Once the Jurchens and the Khitans were both absorbed the Mongols began to 
expand elsewhere. A war started by the Turkic rulers of Persia brought them west 
through the rest of Central Asia and into the Middle East and from there the door lay 
open to a country which so far had been removed from integration into the Inner 
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Eurasian system, Russia. After Batu and Subotai’s campaigns in Russia and Europe, 
which struck into unfamiliar forest terrain by invading along the frozen rivers during 
winter, both Russia and China were harnessed to a single empire and a single pan-
continental trade system. Small Mongol armies, supplementing their ranks with local 
recruits, they had used the dominance given to them by being able to live on horseback 
and having unprecedented mastery of strategic deception and mobility out of proportion 
to their number. From Russia to Korea and Siberia to Persia, a small group of people 
dominated Eurasia through local proxies enforced by speed, flexibility, and an efficient 
international postal service. Even this massive success could only hold for a few 
generations, as regions begin to split into successor states which in turn adapted to 
more immediate local concerns, but the trade network would last for centuries to come. 
However, the Mongols success would one day unwittingly bring about the end of the 
nomadic dominance of the region by connecting the future nations of continental 
dominance to each other as well as the Mongolian methods of empire and strategy. 
The further from the center a successor kingdom was the more true it had to 
remain to its formless nomadic roots. Of the successor states, it was the Kipchak 
Khanate, or Golden Horde, which retained the greatest degree of formless principles, 
despite its distance and the forested terrain which many of its vassals were shrouded in. 
The Kipchak Khanate became most skilled at manipulating its vassals, deflecting 
expansionist wars launched from the west with buffers, and acquiring tribute and 
security with minimal military cost to themselves. Even with the periodic civil wars for 
succession which began to occur a few generations into their hegemony, it was usually 
not too difficult for the victorious party to re-assert the power hierarchy of the region with 
a campaign or two. The method was effective enough upon the Russian principalities 
that The Grand Duchy of Lithuania ended up growing immensely to the east using 
similar methods in the aftermath of the Mongol conquest. This system, which the 
Russians in later years would come to call ‘The Mongol Yoke’, was only overthrown 
from the outside by the next stage in the evolution of the Formless Empire: The 
Timurids. 
 The Timurids represented the start of the transformation of the primary seat of 
The Formless Empire from a purely nomadic model to a coalition of artisan agrarian 
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cities which was led by a semi-nomadic ruling class in charge of nomadic armies. 
Rather than merely enrich the nomadic tribes, the purpose of their often seemingly 
apocalyptic campaigns was to enrich their patron cities at the expense of others. This 
was accomplished not merely by looting, but by destroying the economic viability of 
certain trade routes (particularly the northern ones of the fantastically wealthy Kipchak 
Khanate) in order to redirect wealth back to the increasingly marginalized Central Asian 
oasis area. In this mission, the Timurids were somewhat successful, gaining a century 
back in the Eurasian economic spotlight, though their political project, founded as it was 
on large scale economic calamity, was certainly not, and the empire shrunk to a rump 
state almost immediately after the death of its founder. 
 The Timurids, finally reduced to nothing but a city state, were finally driven 
even from that a century later by the migrating Uzbeks, themselves descended from a 
branch of the Kipchak Khanates. It was then that they, like the Khitans before them, 
performed the feat of state migration and becoming, under Prince Babur, the Mughal 
Empire in northern India. Babur retained the cavalry focus of the army but added large 
cannons and matchlock guns to its repertoire. At the Battle of Panipat he proved the 
technological adaptation of the semi-nomadic army and defeated a much larger-and 
slower-enemy force. There they flourished, adapting to the new circumstances and 
forging a bridge between Central Asia and India. Eventually, they would be so invested 
in India their Central Asian segment of the empire would shrivel to an afterthought, and 
their armies would become more infantry and artillery based, a similar occurrence to 
what happened to the Ottoman Empire out west. Once the governing elite dropped its 
more tolerant social policies as well and became a more overt littoral state, it too-like the 
Kara-Khitai-began to lose ground to competitors. Interestingly, the biggest foe of the 
Mughals at the start of their decline was the cavalry-dominated army of the Marathas. 
Soon after the semi-nomadic Afghans and the sea power controlling British would enter 
the scene, all using superior mobility to force the increasingly conservative and rigid 
Mughal state to its knees. 
 No longer wielding global empire, the Mongols still managed to regain 
much wealth and security even after their total collapse in China through the 
machinations of Queen Manduhai. She wrestled the Mongol tribes back into a unified 
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entity, kept the resurgent Chinese at bay largely through guile, and placed Mongol 
horsepower in the center of a trade axis from East Asia to Central Asia, returning 
prosperity to her people but doing so at minimal cost in administration of military 
operations. A small snippet of the history of region perhaps, but one of the most telling 
examples of The Formless Empire at work for a small state rather than a massive 
empire. 
The initial deathblow was struck by another empire whose ruling elite originated 
in Central Asia but who had come to rule a long established civilized land: Iran. Nader 
Shah was an archetype of an up-and-coming warlord in the old Turkic mold, but being a 
frontier dweller in the service of Persia he was to seek his fortune as a Napoleonic 
figure there. His military innovations pushed the region further, not only in the dominant 
weapon of his armies being guns (something the Ottomans had done by this point as 
well) but in retaining the cavalry as the decisive branch (which the Ottomans did not do). 
It would be his speedier army which would put a larger Mughal force to flight outside of 
Delhi in the Battle of Karnai in 1739. 
But for the first time in Eurasian history, the strategic pendulum would swing back 
to the civilized countries in a decisive and irrevocable manner. Naval power had 
reached a technological point where it was a more effective commerce and power 
projector than land power, and the increasing levels of British, French, and Portuguese 
influence on the outskirts of littoral Eurasia boded ill for the nomadic, semi-nomadic, and 
caravan based entities dwelling within the Eurasian Heartland. The ability of naval 
power to harness the wealth of two entire new continents (North and South America) to 
Europe jump started this previously tenuous process.522 But this was a gradual change 
overall, and furthermore, the new up and coming powers who shared frontiers with the 
nomadic people had learned more than their fair share, like the Han Dynasty before 
them had. With the addition of military technologies that put the initiative back in the 
hands of the agrarian powers, their own take on the Formless Empire would begin, now 
heading in the opposite direction. 
If the reign of Nader Shah and the rise of the Mughals showed the total merger of 
nomad and settled, the expansions of the Manchus and the Russians would show the 
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total displacement of nomadic peoples as the settled people finally took the long term 
sustained offensive. The increasing sophistication of gunpowder weapons along with 
the greater economic might of cities and farms coupled with lessons learned from the 
nomads in the military sphere would prove an unbeatable combination when harnessed 
to the larger population and resource bases of Russia and China. Each of those two 
nations had been provinces of the Mongol Empire, and now each would come to wreak 
their vengeance in overlapping, yet also differing, ways. 
In terms of amount of territory conquered, Russia was the big winner. Using 
Cossacks, themselves semi-nomadic bands of societal outcasts who had developed 
their own horse-born culture, the Russian state drove into the Caucuses and Siberia 
largely in pursuit of security from raiders in the case of the former and profits from the 
fur trade in the case of the latter. Along the way they dismantled many successor 
fragment states from the Kipchak Khanate and even gave some of their ruling elite titles 
of nobility for defecting peacefully. Despite its authoritarian latter-day reputation, in 
terms of expansion, the Russian Empire was almost as ethnically and religiously 
tolerant as that of the Mongols. In Siberia in particular it was entirely driven by economic 
goals and initially very sparse settlements and Cossack-bases only cropped up only at 
strategic locations and the native people were largely worked into more of a tribute 
system than one of direct rule. Eventually, a turn southwards into Central Asia proper 
would be greatly facilitated by the deployment of railroads, sealing forever the fact that it 
was now the settled societies who had the truly decisive strategic mobility over the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. 
When the Manchus took over China they governed different populations using a 
variety of methods, much as the Khitans had. The Chinese were subjected to their usual 
bureaucratic system of governance-and perhaps even a particularly conservative variety 
of it as the dynasty aged-while the Mongols, Manchus, and Tibetans were placed under 
their more traditional kinship-based systems.  
Though the new Qing Dynasty did not expand as far or as fast as the Russian 
state, it faced much more difficult opposition to its westward drive and its gains in 
territory and vassals were thus just as impressive. Galdan Khan’s attempt to forge an 
independent Mongol state gave the Qing many a smarting blow in battle. But as Russia 
202 
 
and China, the two traditional sufferers of nomadic power, grew towards each other they 
replaced their original enemies as the driving strategic force of Inner Eurasia, but in so 
doing became the largest of rivals with each other. At first it was the Qing who came off 
for the better in the skirmishes upon the new Manchurian/Siberian frontier, but not much 
more than a century later the tables would begin to turn in favor of Russia, who after a 
long drive finally managed to wring so many concessions from a weakened and 
tottering Qing besieged by Britain and France that by the dawn of the Twentieth Century 
it would be Russian ports open in the south of the Manchuria, and the province would 
be crisscrossed by Russian railroads and economic concessions. This threatened 
Britain, and inspired limited British intervention in the southern reaches of Eurasia, 
showing just how powerful naval powers could be even in land-even if their gains were 
marginal at best. 
But this only helped bring a new rising power into the fray. Maritime dominance 
was in full swing in the geopolitics of the era, and even upstart Japan burst its way into 
the Eurasian scene after humiliating China and driving into Manchuria to defeat Russia 
in 1905. Despite the epic land battles, and Manchuria being the contested ground, it is 
worth noting that the most decisive victory earned by Japan in its war against Russia 
was the Battle of Tsushima, at sea. Nonetheless, the results of the Treaty of Portsmouth 
brought a new actor into Inner Asian affairs with the Japanese takeover of many of the 
Russian concessions in Manchuria. In the coming decades both the Qing Dynasty and 
the Romanov Dynasty would collapse to revolutionary pressures and Japan would seize 
the initiative at both of the current Eurasian hegemon’s expense. Soon both countries 
were engulfed by instability and civil war with Japanese agents and proxies infiltrating 
deeply into their various conflicts. Many of the warlords they supported also had a brief 
reign of indirect rule before being swallowed up by other parties. 
In many ways, Japan was an astute learner. Using spies and criminal 
connections they wrung concessions from warlords in both Russia and China, 
eventually paving the way for a wholesale seizure of Manchuria and the creation of a 
puppet regime there that in some ways echoed the old indirect Eurasian method of rule 
(and in many other ways, was quite wanting by such standards as well). Massive 
intervention in the Russian Civil War was relatively fruitless aside from a few temporary 
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economic gains and control over several White Russian community leaders, but China 
would eventually end up divided and torn asunder by Japanese policies. Despite this 
apparent adaptation, Japan, like Britain, did not meet with total success as it forayed 
further from the waves. Its military adapted to the new circumstances far less effectively 
than its policies did,  and attempts to further push the USSR and test its capabilities ran 
into the jaws of Zhukov’s more mobile, armored army and was crushed on the frontier 
between Manchuria and Mongolia. 
Even as the Soviets did away with the various indirect and decentralized 
methods of rule of their predecessors, their army had resuscitated the combination of 
speed and firepower which nomadic armies had once deployed. And in an era of 
industrialization and state power, it would be the military that would be the most decisive 
arm. Their tactics played the primary role in the defeat of Germany in the Second World 
War from Kursk onward, and their armies would crush a weakened and almost-already 
defeated Japan in a campaign of Manchurian conquest of nearly textbook success. A 
few years later China would be re-unified under communist leadership, and it appeared 
that the traditional anti-nomadic hegemons had been restored to the Eurasian throne, 
this time under a red banner instead of dynastic ones. 
But sometimes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. 
Communist solidarity did little to stop inter-state rivalry between the two countries. China 
looked for more distant (and thus less threatening) allies elsewhere and found it in the 
unlikely yet sensible choice of the United States. Russia floundered diplomatically, and 
border skirmishes rocked the old troublesome Siberia-Manchuria frontier. Conflict also 
stirred in Afghanistan, and while Soviet forces conducted themselves well, showing off 
the use of their army and its rapid deployment and campaigning ability, it was used for 
direct, rather than indirect control and so its battlefield successes could not translate 
into any kind of political results.  
This was a symptom of the greater modernist-style communist project in both 
Russia and China. Both empires had been built using mixed methods which took the 
indirect and formless style of their nomadic opponents and adapted them to settled 
agrarian states. In an age of ideology and party rule however, rampant centralization of 
culturally and geographically diverse people was an unsustainable dead end, at least in 
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the USSR, whose peaceful implosion implied resigned acceptance of even those 
committed to the core state. In China the state remains intact, in fact stronger than ever 
before since the dawn of the People’s Republic. But it is still rocked by ethnic upset in 
its various frontier regions, and guards its borders carefully. Still, when dealing with 
peoples outside of its borders it has shown a remarkable level of subtlety which the 
Soviet Union never really had. Despite its much larger share of regional power, the 
Chinese foreign policy establishment went about signing treaties on borders with the 
newly independent Central Asian states which more often than not appropriated territory 
fairly between the nations. With new economic dynamism the Chinese state began to 
set up investment and resource extraction around the region while pursuing friendly 
relations with the local elites. Perhaps it is fitting that the nation from which Sun Tzu was 
born adapted better to the changing realities of the post-Cold War era.  
The scale-back of Russian power meant its re-appraisal, however. From indirect 
involvement in the Tajik Civil War to shoring up its alliances with former Soviet states in 
Central Asia, particularly against Taliban influence and later against an encroaching 
United States. There was nothing quite like an absolute crash to start a full re-appraisal 
of foreign policy. So it was that the deployment of Russian power and the nature of the 
country’s geopolitics would change to one of small army bases, checkpoint control, 
helicopters, Special Forces, and personal relationships between elites. Gone was the 
Soviet juggernaut of massive troop deployments and direct occupation and in its place 
instead a streamlined machine to handle an era where the Russian state plays 
trendsetter and arbitrator amongst a cluster of de facto junior allies. Where things will 
stand in the future lies unknown, but by looking at the grand trends of geopolitics in the 
region, as we have done, a few humble probabilities can at least be discussed. 
Despite its many mutations and occasional abruptly occurring periods of waning, 
the key concepts of The Formless Empire survive and even thrive. Adaptability is after 
all the one of them, and changing winds of fortune to different nations and tribes hardly 
quashes the others. Mobility and speed trump size, indirect control proves a cost-
effective method of power projection, and retains a large amount of reserves to deploy 
decisively when it proves inadequate. Sun Tzu’s formless doctrine would not only have 
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been at home in the Inner Eurasia of the past had it been born there, but also in the 
Inner Eurasia of the present. 
 
8.2…The Future of the Formless Empire 
 
What happens now in Central Asia and the surrounding areas is not merely an 
observation relegated to the past alone. It is not simply an acknowledgement that Batu 
Khan greatly influenced Russian geopolitics and that Abaoji and Kublai influenced the 
Chinese in a similar fashion, but rather a chance to see how entire centuries of 
influencing experience with The Formless Empire are likely to impact the region going 
forward. The current priority of both Russia and China today is even superficially similar 
to that of the old nomadic powers, which is that the primary purpose of foreign policy is 
to secure favorable trade and economic enrichment through resource control. This is 
the obvious goal of the Chinese leadership, whereas Russia, already resource rich as it 
is, seems to focus on more tactical goals of securing space around it while it develops 
its domestic economy.523 
 The means of upholding a type of formless hegemony are not as ambiguous as 
the potential for their future use. When it comes to information gathering, the use of 
agents, highly mobile military units with large amounts of firepower, and the ability to 
deploy forces at the decisive moment there is no better era for than the present. With 
the retention of many military bases, certain collective security agreements like the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to facilitate cooperation on crime investigations, 
customs, and diplomacy, as well as the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to facilitate 
pan regional joint security initiatives and dialogue. Uzbekistan, long playing the role of 
team leader in Central Asia proper, works with Russian influence rather than against it 
in order to better secure political and economic stability, but now being independent, it 
also pushes its own agenda for further regional integration on the Turkic countries 
alone. In contemporary Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan’s, policies seem 
to reflect the former policies of the once tiny and vulnerable city-state of Muscovy, and 
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how its strengthened itself gradually by becoming the active collaborator and tax 
gatherer of the Kipchak Khanate. 
 The two biggest issues in Central Asia today, since the reduction of growing 
American influence has largely been a success, will most likely remain the ongoing 
relationship of its two strongest countries. This could go in a variety of directions with 
three primary branches with gray areas between them. The three major options to 
consider are continued or even increasing co-operation, the retention of the present 
ambiguous relationship, and increasing division if not outright rivalry. 
 Continued co-operation seems the most likely in the immediate short term. The 
United States is still a more powerful country than either Russia or China and the threat 
of Islamic radicals to both Eurasian powers is still palpable. Increased co-operation 
would be a victory of foreign policy planning and regional stability would most likely 
favor China more than Russia overall, as it has the stronger economy and larger 
population. For this reason only a drastic weakening of the Russian world position could 
likely bring this scenario about. Or potentially, a weakening of the Chinese state enough 
that Russia would no longer be threatened by such an unequal alliance. No matter 
which power was the dominant actor in such a hypothetical alliance though, such a 
large and necessarily loose partnership would be a victory for The Formless Empire on 
a huge scale to whoever could pull it off and keep their hegemony as indirect as 
possible. In the long run, however, this should probably be considered a less-than-likely 
scenario. 
 The retention of the present ambiguous relationship is the least telling of the 
three, but also a safe bet worth examining. The advantages of maintaining a lose status 
quo are many, mostly related to the fact that nations can adapt their policies to events 
as they occur. But the very potential that Central Asian states would act perhaps against 
Russian interest or seek close ties to Japan, Turkey, or the United States would case a 
change in the status-quo by the likely defensive reactions of the big regional powers. 
Even if this way forward might at first seem the most appealing for the smaller states of 
the area, it likely would simply lead to a backlash from their larger neighbors which 
would put them into an even more unequal and precarious situation than they are now. 
After all, their biggest neighbors are also their largest economic partners. As Karimov 
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states in his own book, both interrelation and interdependence are the way forward for 
the new states of the region.524 
 Increasing division and/or outright rivalry is our final and most dramatic option to 
consider. This has been the norm in relations between China and Russia since both 
came to be the dominant powers inside the Eurasian heartland. They began their rivalry 
with skirmishes in the Amur basin, but it aside briefly to deal with the scourge of 
remaining nomadic people further west, and then returned to it nonstop until both 
regimes were under the control of communist parties in 1949. Their second period of 
cooperation was unprecedented in scope to anything before but lasted barely two 
decades before tension re-ignited in the same Amur basin and led to rivalry which 
lasted until the end of the Cold War. Now the rivalry has been set aside, but neither are 
things between the two powers reliably friendly outside of the short term. Differences in 
the nation’s circumstances change their position and priorities. China’s economic 
growth is much larger, and mostly fed from industrializing, whereas Russia is largely 
dependent on resource exports. These economies seem compatible, and they are, but it 
leads Russia in the weaker position. Most Russian gas is shipped to Europe, and what 
is in the east is often looking for Japanese investment to at least increase the options 
and to avoid being entirely dependent on the Chinese.525 
 Russia’s position in the region is largely carved from the former Soviet husk. It is 
more likely to degrade than improve. China becomes a more attractive trade partner 
every day and India, Iran, Turkey, and Japan all have various economic connections in 
the region now. Were a fall-out to occur between Russia and China it would be Russia 
which would have to play the defensive and likely China holding the initiative. Would a 
threatened Russia ramp up competition and rhetoric to hold onto its various attempts at 
maintaining a Moscow-centered order in Central Asia? Given fear of the immense 
population disparity of Siberia versus the bordering Chinese provinces which once were 
Manchuria, it is likely that whether the government wants it or not, a popular backlash 
against getting too close to the Chinese state is a very real possibility for Russian policy 
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makers. So too must Chinese policy makers occasionally deal with irredentist calls for 
lost territory to Russia in the Nineteenth Century.  
The question is what would a split look like between these two giants? With such 
a level of regional integration in Central Asia, it seems that Russia is the country with 
the built in home field advantage in case of another split between the Eurasian 
hegemons. But China too has learned from its modern past, if not as dramatically. Its 
foreign policy in Central Asia is often conducted with a humility and equality that Russia 
lacks. Were some kind of devastating rift to grow between the powers, be it competition 
over regional allies, general fear and suspicion, or whatnot, the conflict would most 
likely be indirect. Since both nations are nuclear powers it seems unlikely that either of 
their territory would be violated. The countries between them, however, may not be so 
lucky. Drawing upon their collective heritage, however, might increase regional solidarity 
against both current powers. Even so, the danger for the smaller countries in such a 
situation would be immense.  
The best chance for the small states to prosper is to hope that now that party-
driven modernization programs lie in the dust, and attempts to expand by Islamists have 
been thwarted, that the way forward is not through nationalism or embracing 
Neoliberalism with the same utopian gusto which their ancestors once had for 
Bolshevism, but rather to take what is best from the regional historical experiences and 
apply them adapted to contemporary contexts. Whether unity or division lies in the 
future of Inner Eurasia, the best guide forward will be the one that recognizes that the 
region works best when geopolitics is formless and adaptable to the local circumstances 
on the ground. Wide spaces, mobility, multiculturalism, and a civic polity based on 
acceptance of divergence rather than enforced unity are key. If the Central Asian 
republics can look more to their history and less the history of romantic nationalism they 
can better form coalitions with each other to affirm their independence or increase their 
bargaining power in pan-regional alliances with larger states. If Russia and China could 
overcome their seemingly increasing flirtations with xenophobia and centralization they 
too could guarantee greater success in building the links required to wield stable 
influence in a place like Central Asia. But if the lessons of the past are ignored than 
political projects like the SCO and Eurasianism will bear bitter fruit, if any at all. Chinggis 
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Khan’s Yasa code of law, Khitan acceptance of differences, and traditional Turkic and 
Mongolian adaptability serve as stronger policy benchmarks than contemporary Han 
chauvinism or Russia’s increasingly racist political culture. What keeps geopolitics 
formless today reminds us that empire is not an anachronism, but a present reality in a 
new and adapted form, one with deep historical precedent and hardly relegated merely 
to specific periods of European history.  
Despite having long been made militarily irrelevant, the example of nomadic 
peoples still has much to teach us both in how to govern diverse regions as well as how 
to plan for their prosperity, all while keeping the military forces at the peak of efficiency 
by being low in number put high on range and mobility. Above all is the knowledge and 
willingness to always adapt to changing circumstances. As Sun Tzu puts it: 
 
“So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled 
in a hundred battles; if you do not know other but know yourself, you win one and 
lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be 
imperiled in every single battle.”526 
 
8.3…Conclusion: 
The Formless Empire is a unique indigenous geopolitical development which shows the 
societal adaptation of cultures and states in the particular geographic context of the 
inland realms of Eurasia. Rather than an intentional process, it was the outgrowth of a 
confluence of terrain, population density, and the highly mobile lifestyle adapted to 
either live within those contexts or compete with those who did. As times changed the 
logistical necessity of the nomadic lifestyle gave way to the material superiority of 
technologically advanced settled states, but even they too took with them many of the 
influences of their waning foes. In an era now dominated with mechanized armed 
forces, electronic communication, and flexible international business models, much of 
the world has become more formless in its diplomacy and warfare, but the long standing 
nature of Inner Eurasian geopolitics remains a peculiar and steadfast example of a 
region which has always been so. 
                                                          
526
 Sun Tzu, 82. 
210 
 
 This study has sought to show the uniqueness of geopolitics and how derived 
from indigenous experience they are within the heart of the Eurasian landmass, but that 
is not to claim that other regions do not have their own unique contributions to offer. It 
would be a beneficial future project to study the geopolitics of various regions on their 
own historical terms as the primary method rather than universalizing theories. While 
there seem to be more similarities than differences in state motivation, the methods 
used to achieve the various goals of self-interest, security, and the like varying strategic 
and tactical elements of behavior across different lands and peoples could be an 
illuminating window in the discipline of International Relations, which too often seems to 
divorce itself from historical context if not history itself, especially before the modern 
period.   
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